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INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP 
 
CHAPTER NINE (2d ed) 
THE INNOVATION COMMONS 
 
BROOKS V. BYAM 





 By the agreement between Brown and Brooks (18th of September, 1837), it 
was agreed by Brown to sell and convey unto Brooks ‘a right of manufacturing 
friction matches according to letters patent, granted to Phillips, & c. in the said 
town of Ashburnham, to the amount of one right, embracing one person only, so 
denominated, in as full and ample manner to the extension of the said one right 
as the original patentee;’… 
 
The question, then, is, whether the license or privilege granted by the 
patentee to Brown is not an entirety, and incapable of being split up into distinct 
rights, each of which might be assigned to different persons in severalty….. 
 
…[T]he case of Lord Mountjoy, reported in Godb. 17, Moore, 174, and more 
fully upon the same points in And. 307, approaches by a very near analogy to 
the present case. There, Lord Mountjoy granted by indenture a certain mannor 
to one Browne in fee, and there was a proviso in the indenture, and a covenant 
by Browne, that Lord Mountjoy, his heirs, and assigns, might dig for ore in the 
lands parcel of the manor, and dig turf also, for the purpose of making alum. 
Lord Mountjoy demised his interest for a term of years to one L., and L. assigned 
over the same to two other persons; and among other questions, one was, 
whether Lord Mountjoy could assign over this right, and if the subsequent 
assignment to the two were good. Godbolt says, that it was decided by the 
judges, that the assignment to the two was good; but that the two assignees 
could not work severally, but together with one stock, or such workmen as 
belonged to them both. Lord Coke, who was counsel in the case for Lord 
Mountjoy, and who reported to the privy council, where the question arose, the 
opinion of the judges, confirms in Co. Litt. 165a, the report of Godbolt, and says, 
                                                 
1 Justice Story was an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court at this time, but was 
sitting as a circuit judge. 
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that the judges, among other things, resolved, ‘That the Lord Mountjoy might 
assign his whole interest to one, two, or more; but then, if there be two or more, 
they could make no division of it, but work together with one stock; neither 
could the Lord Mountjoy, &c. assign his interest in any part of the waste to one 
or more, for that might work a prejudice and a surcharge to the tenant of the 
land.’ And, therefore, Lord Coke adds, if such an uncertain inheritance 
descendeth to two partners, it cannot be divided between them….  Now, it 
seems to me, that, in this aspect, the case of Lord Mountjoy has a very striking 
application to the present case. The grant was of a mere right to dig ore, &c.; 
and yet upon the ground of possible or probable prejudice to the grantor 
(Browne) of this privilege, it was held to be indivisible….. 
 
The general rule of the common law is, that contracts are not apportionable; 
and this rule seems ordinarily, although not universally, true, where the 
apportionment is by the act of the party, and not by mere operation of law; or 
where the contract is only in part performed, and is not in its own nature and 
terms severable. …. 
 
… [I]f I buy as many bricks from a kiln as two horses can haul in an ordinary 
wagon, or as one mason can lay on the wall of my house in a day, it is a valid 
sale of the quantity of bricks when ascertained. Certainly it is; but then it is a 
valid sale of the bricks as property, not the sale of the mere privilege to 
manufacture bricks at my kiln. So, it is asked, if the owner of a brick-yard sells to 
A. the right of making as many bricks on any land, as six men can strike in a 
day, whether it may not make a valid sale to a third person of all, that one man 
can strike? Certainly he may; but then he sells the ascertained quantity of bricks; 
and not the right to make them. So, in the case at bar, Brown might well sell to 
any person or persons all or any undivided portion of the matches made by him 
under his license; but that would be a very different thing from a sale of a 
fraction of the privilege to make them….. 
 
Upon the whole, I retain the opinion that the license in this case was an 
entirety, and incapable of division, or of being broken up into fragments in the 
possession of different persons. The right granted is to the grantee and six 
persons to be employed by him in making matches; and if it be assignable, the 
assignment must be of the entirety of the license to the assignee, and it cannot 
be apportioned among different persons in severalty…. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1. Is Lord Mountjoy’s case really a “very near analogy” to the case at bar?  
The ore and turf in Mountjoy’s was “rivalrous”; that is, one person could take 
some of it only by depriving others.  In that case dividing it up without an 
agreement restricting the output of those using it would lead to overproduction.  





But the right to make matches under a patent permits the owner to make as 
many as he or she pleases without limiting the amount that others can make.  
Should that make a difference? Isn’t Justice Story’s distinction between the sale 
of bricks and of the right to make them at a particular kiln also off point?  After 
all, the right to make bricks at the owner’s kiln is also rivalrous, given that the 
kiln has only limited capacity. See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, Ch. 
12 (2011). 
 
In any event, IP rights are for the most part readily capable of being 
divided.  See, e.g., Rembrandt Data Technologies v. AOL, LLC 641 F.3d 1331 
(2011), where a corporation reorganized, and as a part of the reorganization 
“divested most of its businesses and assets, including its agreements and 
licenses . . . including its right to sublicense.” This was simply a right rather than 
a specific quantity of a physical good. 
 
A popular song sold on iTunes might be licensed millions of times, with 
each licensee acquiring a license to listen and without impairing the rights of 
others.  The limit on this proposition is “congestion externalities,” which occur 
when the licensee market becomes overcrowded.  For example, if a license to 
make a product is given to too many firms there may be too many sellers in the 
market to enable all of them to make a profit. 
 
PATENT POOLS AND THE PRICE FIXING PROBLEM 
 
 
E. BEMENT & SONS v. NATIONAL HARROW COMPANY 
186 U.S. 70 (1902) 
Mr. Justice Peckham:          
 
… ‘The first two above-named firms conducted their business in separate 
portions or territory of the United States, under the same United States letters 
patent, and the other firms began their business in hostility to the same letters 
patent. The first two firms began a number of patent lawsuits against the other 
firms and their customers for infringement of patents. These suits were 
vigorously prosecuted, and the court finally decided the patents valid, and 
ordered an accounding of profits, against the firm of Chase, Taylor, & Company, 
and W. S. Lawrence. 
 
‘Prior to September, 1890, the last four of the above-named firms settled their 
disputes over patents with the first two firms, and took licenses under their 
letters patent. Considerable sums of money were paid in settlement of these 
disputes and rights; and prior to said date, September, 1890, there was no other 





relation between the first two firms named and the other parties than that of 
licensor and licensee under United States letters patent. 
 
‘In the year 1890, and just prior thereto, other persons, firms, and 
corporations began the spring tooth harrow business, and other patent lawsuits 
followed. Suits were begun against the defendants herein, and against their 
customers purchasing their spring tooth harrows; and one case had gone to final 
decree, in which the defendant was ordered to account for profits and damages; 
and an injunction had been granted in another suit. Proceedings were pending 
upon an application for rehearing in these cases. 
 
‘In September, 1890, the six firms first above named decided to organize 
a corporation known as the National Harrow Company of New York, with a view 
to transferring various United States letters patent owned by the six firms 
respectively to said corporation, and for the purpose of conducting the 
manufacture of some part or portion of the material which entered into their 
spring tooth harrow business. 
 
The only Federal question raised in the record is as to the validity of 
contracts … with regard to the act of Congress on the subject of trusts. 26 Stat. 
at L. 209, chap. 647.   The 1st section of the act provides that ‘every contract, 
combination in the form of trust, or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade 
or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations, is hereby 
declared to be illegal.’ Every person making such a contract is deemed guilty of a 
misdemeanor, and on conviction is to be punished by fine or by imprisonment, or 
both. As the statute makes the contract in itself illegal, no recovery can be had 
upon it when the defense of illegality is shown to the court. The act provides for 
the prevention of violations thereof, and makes it the duty of the several district 
attorneys, under the direction of the Attorney General, to institute proceedings in 
equity to prevent and restrain such violations, and it gives to any person injured 
in his business or property the right to sue; but that does not prevent a private 
individual when sued upon a contract which is void as in violation of the act from 
setting it up as a defense, and we think when proved it is a valid defense to any 
claim made under a contract thus denounced as illegal. 
 
This brings us to a consideration of the terms of the license contracts, for 
the purpose of determining whether they violate the act of Congress. The first 
important and most material fact in considering this question is that the 
agreements concern articles protected by letters patent of the government of the 
United States. The plaintiff, according to the finding of the referee, was at the 
time when these licenses were executed the absolute owner of the letters patent 
relating to the float spring tooth harrow business. It was therefore the owner of 
a monopoly recognized by the Constitution and by the statutes of Congress. An 
owner of a patent has the right to sell it or to keep it; to manufacture the article 





himself or to license others to manufacture it; to sell such article himself or to 
authorize others to sell it. As stated by Mr. Justice Nelson, in Wilson v. Rousseau, 
4 How. 646, 674, in speaking of a patent: 
 
‘The law has thus impressed upon it all the qualities and characteristics of 
property for the specified period, and has enabled him to hold and deal 
with it the same as it case of any other description of property belonging 
to him, and on his death it passes, with the rest of his personal estate, to 
his legal representatives, and becomes part of the assets.’ 
 
Again, as stated by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in Grant v. Raymond, 6 Pet. 218, 
241: 
 
‘To promote the progress of useful arts is the interest and policy of every 
enlightened government. It entered into the views of the framers of our 
Constitution, and the power ‘to promote the progress of science and 
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the 
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries,’ is among 
those expressly given to Congress. This subject was among the first 
which followed the organization of our government. It was taken up by 
the first Congress at its second session, and an act was passed 
authorizing a patent to be issued to the inventor of any useful art, etc., 
on his petition, ‘granting to such petitioner, his heirs, administrators, or 
assigns, for any term not exceeding fourteen years, the sole and 
exclusive right and liberty of making, using, and vending to others to be 
used, the said invention or discovery.’ The law further declares that the 
patent ‘shall be good and available to the grantee or grantees by force of 
this act, to all and every intent and purpose herein contained.’ The 
amendatory act of 1793 contains the same language, and it cannot be 
doubted that the settled purpose of the United States has ever been, and 
continues to be, to confer on the authors of useful inventions an 
exclusive right in their inventions for the time mentioned in their patent. 
It is the reward stipulated for the advantages derived by the public for 
the exertions of the individual, and is intended as a stimulus to those 
exertions. The laws which are passed to give effect to this purpose ought, 
we think, to be construed in the spirit in which they have been made, and 
to execute the contract fairly on the part of the United States, where the 
full benefit has been actually received, if this can be done without 
transcending the intention of the statute, or countenancing acts which 
are fraudulent or may prove mischievous. The public yields nothing which 
it has not agreed to yield; it receives all which it has contracted to 
receive. The full benefit of the discovery, after its enjoyment by the 
discoverer for fourteen years, is preserved; and for his exclusive 
enjoyment of it during that time the public faith is pledged.’ 






In Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co. 77 Fed. 288, 
294, it is stated regarding a patentee: 
 
‘If he see fit, he may reserve to himself the exclusive use of his invention 
or discovery. If he will neither use his device nor permit others to use it, 
he has but suppressed his own. That the grant is made upon the 
reasonable expectation that he will either put his invention to practical 
use or permit others to avail themselves of it upon reasonable terms is 
doubtless true. This expectation is based alone upon the supposition that 
the patentee’s interest will induce him to use, or let others use, his 
invention. The public has retained no other security to enforce such 
expectations. A suppression can endure but for the life of the patent, and 
the disclosure he has made will enable all to enjoy the fruit of his genius. 
His title is exclusive, and so clearly within the constitutional provisions in 
respect of private property that he is neither bound to use his discovery 
himself nor permit others to use it. The Dictum found in Hoe v. Knap, 27 
Fed. 204, is not supported by reason or authority. 
 
It is true that in certain circumstances the sale of articles manufactured 
under letters patent may be prevented when the use of such article may be 
subject, within the several states, to the control which they may respectively 
impose in the legitimate exercise of their powers over their purely domestic 
affairs, whether of internal commerce or of police regulation. Thus an 
improvement for burning oil, protected by letters patent of the United States, 
was condemned by the state inspector of Kentucky as unsafe for illuminating 
purposes, under the statute requiring an inspection and imposing a penalty for 
the violation of the statute; and it was held that the enforcement of the statute 
was within the proper police powers of the state, and that it interfered with no 
right conferred by the letters patent.  
 
Notwithstanding these exceptions, the general rule is absolute freedom in 
the use or sale of rights under the patent laws of the United States. The very 
object of these laws is monopoly, and the rule is, with few exceptions, that any 
conditions which are not in their very nature illegal with regard to this kind of 
property, imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the licensee for the right to 
manufacture or use or sell the article, will be upheld by the courts. The fact that 
the conditions in the contracts keep up the monopoly or fix prices does not 
render them illegal…. 
 
In these contracts, provision is expressly made, not alone for 
manufacture, but for the sale of the manufactured product throughout the 
United States, and at prices which are particularly stated, and which the seller is 
not at liberty to decrease without the assent of the licensor. These contracts 





directly affected, not as a mere incident of manufacture, the sale of the 
implements all over the country, and the question arising is whether the 
contracts which thus affect such sales are void under the act of Congress. 
 
On looking through these licenses we have been unable to find any 
conditions contained therein rendering the agreement void because of a violation 
of that act. There had been, as the referee finds, a large amount of litigation 
between the many parties claiming to own various patents covering these 
implements. Suits for infringements and for injunction had been frequent, and it 
was desirable to prevent them in the future. The execution of these contracts did 
in fact settle a large amount of litigation regarding the validity of many patents, 
as found by the referee. This was a legitimate and desirable result in itself. The 
provision in regard to the price at which the licensee would sell the article 
manufactured under the license was also an appropriate and reasonable 
condition. It tended to keep up the price of the implements manufactured and 
sold, but that was only recognizing the nature of the property dealt in, and 
providing for its value so far as possible. This the parties were legally entitled to 
do. The owner of a patented article can, of course, charge such price as he may 
choose, and the owner of a patent may assign it, or sell the right to manufacture 
and sell the article patented, upon the condition that the assignee shall charge a 
certain amount for such article. 
 
It is also objected that the agreement of the defendant not to 
manufacture or sell any other float spring tooth harrow, etc., than those which it 
had made under its patents before assigning them to the plaintiff, or which it 
was licensed to manufacture and make, under the terms of the license, except 
such other style and construction as it may be licensed to manufacture and sell 
by the plaintiff, is void under the act of Congress. 
 
The plain purpose of the provision was to prevent the defendant from 
infringing upon the rights of others under other patents, and it had no purpose 
to stifle competition in the harrow business more than the patent provided for, 
nor was its purpose to prevent the licensee from attempting to make any 
improvement in harrows. It was a reasonable prohibition for the defendant, who 
would thus be excluded from making such harrows as were made by others who 
were engaged in manufacturing and selling other machines under other patents. 
It would be unreasonable to so construe the provision as to prevent defendant 
from using any letters patent legally obtained by it and not infringing patents 
owned by others. This was neither its purpose nor its meaning. 
 
There is nothing which violates the act in the agreement that plaintiff 
would not license any other person than the defendant to manufacture or sell 
any harrow of the peculiar style and construction then used or sold by the 
defendant. It is a proper provision for the protection of the individual who is the 





licensee, and is nothing more in effect than an assignment or sale of the 
exclusive right to manufacture and vend the article. In brief, after a careful 
examination of these contracts, we are unable to find any provision in them, 
either taken separately or in connection with all the others therein contained, 
which would render the contracts between these parties void as in violation of 
the act of Congress. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  Developing technologies are often patent intensive as new innovations are 
built atop previous innovations or complementary technologies are patented.  
The result can be a “patent thicket” in which large numbers of essential patents 
are owned by separate firms. Thickets increase the costs of innovating and in 
extreme cases can even prevent new innovations from emerging.  See, for 
example, the Wright airplane litigation discussed n the first chapter. See 
generally Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent 
Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam 
B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001). 
 
One solution is for firms to create a patent pool. While antitrust is 
rightfully wary of agreements among  competing firms, patent pools can be 
economically justified. In a patent pool, the owners of related patents create a 
pool of their patents and license the entire pool, both to members of the pool 
and perhaps to others in the same or related markets.  Rather than being 
concerned with potential infringement and having to go through the cost of 
discovering whether a particular technology is patented, and by whom, the 
innovator can simply purchase a license to the entire pool.   
 
Copyright law can create similar thickets, particularly for digital access for 
purposes of scientific research.  See from Jerome H. Reichman & Ruth L. Okediji, 
When Copyright Law and Science Collide: Empowering Digitally Integrated 
Research Methods on a Global Scale, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1362 (2012).  Could 
pooling solve that problem as well?  One problem may be that copyright has a 
much larger proportion of "non-practicing entities," and as a result there is a 
much less even balance of power in the system.  Researchers may need access 
to copyrighted data, which can be highly specific to their particular task, but 




2.   Note that in his discussion of patent licensing agreements Justice Peckham 
did not distinguish vertical from horizontal agreements.  For example, he relied 
on the button fastener case, which is discussed in Chapter one.  That was a 
purely vertical case involving a tying arrangement.  Should it make any 





difference that horizontal agreements are more competitively threatening?  Or is 
that question irrelevant to patent policy?  Today, a price fixing agreement among 
two or more competitors, such as the harrow manufacturers or the light bulb 
manufacturers in the GE case, reprinted infra, would generally be regarded as 
unlawful per se unless there were legitimate joint production or some other form 
of joint venture.  However, resale price agreements among non-competitors are 
generally treated under the rule of reason and most are lawful.  Leegin Creative 
Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (applying rule of reason to 
resale price maintenance between a supplier and retailer).  Suppose, for 
example, that GE owned a patent on light bulb technology and manufactured 
general use light bulbs.  However, it did not wish to manufacture specialty bulbs 
for kitchen ovens or other hot areas and licensed Westinghouse to manufacture 
those, requiring Westinghouse to set a specified price.  Is the agreement 
horizontal?  What if GE did not manufacture any light bulbs at all, but simply 
licensed Westinghouse to make them and specified the price? 
 
In addition, note that Justice Peckham did not distinguish between agreements 
that set fees for licensing the patents from agreements fixing the price of the 
patented product.  Firms engaged in cross-licensing necessarily must agree on 
the price of the license itself, even if the price is zero (as it often is).  But why do 
they need to agree on the product price?  Justice Peckham suggests that 
otherwise they might not be able to earn adequate returns.  But isn’t this just 
another way of saying that perhaps there were too many firms making harrows 
and competition would have thinned out the least efficient ones?  Interestingly, 
Justice Peckham is well known for his rejection of a “ruinous competition” 
defense in the first price-fixing case to reach the Supreme Court.  United States 
v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 290 (1897).  Further, Justice Peckham 
wrote there, a reasonable price is the one set by competition.  Should it be any 
different when the price-fix accompanies a patent cross license? 
 
UNITED STATES v. GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. 
272 U.S. 476 (1926) 
 
Mr. Chief Justice TAFT delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 
This is a bill in equity, brought by the United States in the District Court for the 
Northern District of Ohio to enjoin the General Electric Company, the 
Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Company, and the Westinghouse Lamp 
Company from further violation of the Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890. 26 Stat. 
209. The bill made two charges, one that the General Electric Company, in its 
business of making and selling incandescent electric lights, had devised and was 
carrying out a plan for their distribution throughout out the United States by a 
number of so called agents, exceeding 21,000, to restrain interstate trade in 
such lamps and to exercise a monopoly of the sale thereof; and, second, that it 





was achieving the same illegal purpose through a contract of license with the 
defendants, the Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Company and the 
Westinghouse house Lamp Company. As the Westinghouse Lamp Company is a 
corporation all of whose stock is owned by the Westinghouse Electric & 
Manufacturing Company, and is but its selling agent, we may treat the two as 
one, and reference hereafter will be only to the defendants the General Electric 
Company, which we shall call the Electric Company, and the Westinghouse 
Company. 
 
The government alleged that the system of distribution adopted was merely a 
device to enable the Electric Company to fix the resale prices of lamps in the 
hands of purchasers, that the so-called agents were in fact wholesale and retail 
merchants, and the lamps passed through the ordinary channels of commerce in 
the ordinary way, and that the restraint was the same and just as unlawful as if 
the so-called agents were avowed purchasers handling the lamps under resale 
price agreements. The Electric Company answered that its distributors were bona 
fide agents, that it had the legal right to market its lamps and pass them directly 
to the consumer by such agents, and at prices and by a system prescribed by it 
and agreed upon between it and its agents, there being no limitation sought as 
to resale prices upon those who purchased from such agents. 
 
The second question in the case involves the validity of a license granted March 
1, 1912, by the Electric Company to the Westinghouse Company to make, use, 
and sell lamps under the patents owned by the former. It was charged that the 
license in effect provided that the Westinghouse Company would follow prices 
and terms of sale from time to time fixed by the Electric Company and observed 
by it, and that the Westinghouse Company would, with regard to lamps 
manufactured by it under the license, adopt and maintain the same conditions of 
sale as observed by the Electric Company in the distribution of lamps 
manufactured by it. 
 
There had been a prior litigation between the United States and the three 
defendants and 32 other corporations, in which the government sued to dissolve 
an illegal combination in restraint of interstate commerce in electric lamps, in 
violation of the Anti-Trust Act, and to enjoin its further violation. A consent 
decree was entered in that cause, by which the combination was dissolved, the 
subsidiary corporations surrendered their charters and their properties were 
taken over by the General Electric Company. The defendants were all enjoined 
from fixing resale prices for purchasers, except that the owner of the patents 
were permitted to fix the prices at which a licensee should sell lamps 
manufactured by it under the patent. After the decree was entered, a new sales 
plan, which was the one here complained of, was submitted to the Attorney 
General. The Attorney General declined to express an opinion as to its legality. 
The plan was adopted and has been in operation since 1912. 






The government insists that these circumstances tend to support the 
government's view that the new plan was a mere evasion of the restrictions of 
the decree and was intended to carry out the same evil result that had been 
condemned in the prior litigation. There is really no conflict of testimony in the 
sense of a variation as to the facts but only a difference as to the inference to be 
drawn therefrom. The evidence is all included in a stipulation as to certain facts, 
as to what certain witnesses for the defendants would testify, and as to the 
written contracts of license and agency made by the General Electric Company 
and the Westinghouse Company. 
 
 The General Electric Company is the owner of three patents-one of 1912 to Just 
& Hanaman, the basic patent for the use of tungsten filaments in the 
manufacture of electric lamps; the Coolidge patent of 1913, covering a process 
of manufacturing tungsten filaments by which their tensile strength and 
endurance is greatly increased; and, third, the Langmuir patent of 1916, which is 
for the use of gas in the bulb, by which the intensity of the light is substantially 
heightened. These three patents cover completely the making of the modern 
electric lights with the tungsten filaments, and secure to the General Electric 
Company the monopoly of their making, using, and vending. 
 
The total business in electric lights for the year 1921 was $68,300,000, and the 
relative percentages of business done by the companies were: General Electric, 
69 per cent.; Westinghouse, 16 per cent.; other licensees, 8 per cent.; and 
manufacturers not licensed, 7 per cent. The plan of distribution by the Electric 
Company divides the trade into three classes. The first class is that of sales to 
large consumers readily reached by the General Electric Company, negotiated by 
its own salaried employees, and the deliveries made from its own factories and 
warehouses. The second class is of sales to large consumers under contracts 
with the General Electric Company, negotiated by agents, the deliveries being 
made from stock in the custody of the agents; and the third is of the sales to 
general consumers by agents under similar contracts. The agents under the 
second class are called B agents, and the agents under the third class are called 
A agents. Each B agent is appointed by the General Electric Company by the 
execution and delivery of a contract for the appointment, which lasts a year from 
a stated date, unless sooner terminated. It provides that the company is to 
maintain on consignment in the custody of the agent a stock of lamps, the sizes, 
types, classes, and quantity of which and the length of time which they are to 
remain in stock to be determined by the company. The lamps consigned to the 
agents are to be kept in their respective places of business, where they may be 
readily inspected and identified by the company. The consigned stock, or any 
part of it, is to be returned to the company as it may direct. The agent is to keep 
account books and records giving the complete information as to his dealings for 
the inspection of the company. All of the lamps in such consigned stock are to be 





and remain the property of the company until the lamps are sold, and the 
proceeds of all lamps are to be held in trust for the benefit and for the account 
of the company until fully accounted for. The B agent is authorized to deal with 
the lamps on consignment with him in three ways-first to distribute the lamps to 
the company's A agents as authorized by the company; second, to sell lamps 
from the stock to any consumer to the extent of his requirements for immediate 
delivery at prices specified by the company; third, to deliver lamps from the 
stock to any purchaser under written contract with the company to whom the B 
agent may be authorized by the company to deliver lamps at the prices and on 
the terms stated in the contract. The B agent has no authority to dispose of any 
of the lamps, except as above provided, and is not to control or attempt to 
control prices at which any purchaser shall sell any of such lamps. The agent is 
to pay all expenses in the storage, cartage, transportation, handling, sale, and 
distribution of lamps, and all expenses incident thereto and to the accounting 
therefor, and to the collection of accounts created. This transportation does not 
include the freight for the lamps in the consignment from the company to the 
agent. The agent guarantees the return to the company of all unsold lamps in 
the custody of the agent within a certain time after the termination of his 
agency. The agent is to pay over to the company not later than the 15th of each 
month an amount equal to the total sales value, less the agent's compensation, 
of all of the company's lamps sold by him-that is, first, of the collections that 
have been made; second, of those customers' accounts which are past due. This 
is to comply with the guaranty of the agent of due and prompt payment for all 
lamps sold by him from his stock. Third, the agent is to pay to the company the 
value of all of the company's lamps lost or missing from or damaged in the stock 
in his custody. 
 
There is a basic rate of commission payable to the agent, and there are certain 
special supplemental and additional compensations for prompt and efficient 
service. If the agent becomes insolvent, or fails to make reports and remittances, 
or fails in any of his obligations, the appointment may be terminated, and, when 
terminated, either at the end of the year or otherwise, the consigned lamps 
remaining unsold are to be delivered to the manufacturer. It appears in the 
evidence that since 1915, although there is no specific agreement to this effect, 
the company has assumed all risk of fire, flood, absolescence, and price decline, 
and carries whatever insurance is carried on the stocks of lamps in the hands of 
its agents and pays whatever taxes are assessed. This is relevant as a 
circumstances to confirm the view that the so-called relation of agent to the 
company is the real one. There are 400 of the B agents, the large distributors. 
They recommend to the company efficient and reliable distributors in the 
localities with which they are respectively familiar, to act as A agents, whom the 
company appoints. There are 21,000 or more of the A agents. They are usually 
retail electrical supply dealers in smaller places. The only sales which the A agent 
is authorized to make are to consumers for immediate delivery and to purchasers 





under written contract with the manufacturer, just as in the case of the B agents. 
The plan was, of course, devised for the purpose of enabling the company to 
deal directly with consumers and purchasers, and doubtless was intended to 
avoid selling the lamps owned by the company to jobbers or dealers and prevent 
sale by these middlemen to consumers at different and competing prices. The 
question is whether, in view of the arrangements made by the company with 
those who ordinarily and usually would be merchants buying from the 
manufacturer and selling to the public, such persons are to be treated as agents 
or as owners of the lamps, consigned to them under such contracts. If they are 
to be regarded really as purchasers, then the restriction as to the prices at which 
the sales are to be made is a restraint of trade and a violation of the Anti-Trust 
Law. 
 
We find nothing in the form of the contracts and the practice under them which 
makes the so-called B and A agents anything more than genuine agents of the 
company, or the delivery of the stock to each agent anything more than a 
consignment to the agent for his custody and sale as such. He is not obliged to 
pay over money for the stock held by him until it is sold. As he guarantees the 
account when made, he must turn over what should have been paid whether he 
gets it or not. This term occurs in a frequent form of pure agency known as sale 
by del credere commission. There is no conflict in the agent's obligation to 
account for all lamps lost, missing, or damaged in the stock. It is only a 
reasonable provision to secure his careful handling of the goods intrusted to him. 
We find nothing in his agreement to pay the expense of storage, cartage, 
transportation (except the freight on the original consignment), handling and the 
sale and distribution of the lamps, inconsistent with his relation as agent. The 
expense of this is of course covered in the amount of his fixed commission. The 
agent has no power to deal with the lamps in any way inconsistent with the 
retained ownership of the lamps by the company. When they are delivered by 
him to the purchasers, the title passes directly from the company to those 
purchasers. There is no evidence that any purchaser from the company or any of 
its agents is put under any obligation to sell at any price, or to deal with the 
lamps purchased except as an independent owner. The circumstance that the 
agents were in their regular business wholesale or retail merchants, and under a 
prior arrangement had bought the lamps and sold them as their owners, did not 
prevent a change in their relation to the company. We find no reason in this 
record to hold that the change in this case was not in good faith and actually 
maintained. 
 
 But it is said that the system of distribution is so complicated and involves such 
a very large number of agents, distributed throughout the entire country, that 
the very size and comprehensiveness of the scheme brings it within the Anti-
Trust Law. We do not question that in a suit under the Anti-Trust Act the 
circumstance that the combination effected secures domination of so large a part 





of the business affected as to control prices is usually most important in proof of 
a monopoly violating the act. But under the patent law the patentee is given by 
statute a monopoly of making, using and selling the patented article. The extent 
of his monopoly in the articles sold and in the territory of the United States 
where sold is not limited in the grant of his patent, and the comprehensiveness 
of his control of the business in the sale of the patented article is not necessarily 
an indication of illegality of his method. As long as he makes no effort to fasten 
upon ownership of the articles, he sells control of the prices at which his 
purchaser shall sell, it makes no difference how widespread his monopoly. It is 
only when he adopts a combination with others, by which he steps out of the 
scope of his patent rights and seeks to control and restrain those be whom he 
has sold his patented articles in their subsequent disposition of what is theirs, 
that he comes within the operation of the Anti-Trust Act. The validity of the 
Electric Company's scheme of distribution of its electric lamps turns, therefore, 
on the question whether the sales are by the company through its agents to the 
consumer, or are in fact by the company to the so-called agents at the time of 
consignment. The distinction in law and fact between an agency and a sale is 
clear. For the reasons already stated, we find no ground for inference that the 
contracts made between the company and its agents are, or were intended, to 
be other than what their language makes them. 
 
The government relies in its contention for a different conclusion on the case of 
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 [1911]2 That 
case was a bill in equity brought by the Miles Medical Company to enjoin Park & 
Sons Company from continuing an alleged conspiracy with a number of 
wholesale and retail dealers in proprietary medicines, to induce the persons who 
had entered into certain agency contracts, to the number of 21,000 through the 
country, to break their contracts of agency with the Medical Company, to the 
great injury of that company. The agency concerned the sale of proprietary 
medicines prepared by secret methods and formulas and identified by distinctive 
packages and trade-marks. The company had an extensive trade throughout the 
United States and certain foreign countries. It had been its practice to sell its 
medicines to jobbers and wholesale druggists, who in turn sold to retail druggists 
for sale to the customer. It had fixed not only the price of its own sales to 
jobbers and wholesale dealers but also the prices of jobbers and small dealers. 
The defendants had inaugurated a cut-rate or cutprice system, which had caused 
great damage to the complainants' business, injuriously affected its reputation, 
and depleted the sales of its remedies. The bill was demurred to, on the ground 
that the methods set forth in the bill, by which attempt was made to control the 
sales of prices to consumers was illegal both at common law and under the Anti-
                                                 
2 [ed.  The Dr. Miles rule of per se illegality for resale-price maintenance was upset 
and replaced with a rule of reason in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, 
Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007)] 





Trust Act, and deprived the bill of any equity. This was the issue considered by 
the court. 
 
The plan of distribution of the Miles Medical Company resembled in many details 
the plan of distribution in the present case, except that the subject-matter there 
was medicine by a secret formula, and not a patented article. But there were 
certain vital differences. These led the Circuit Court of Appeals (164 F. 803, 90 C. 
C. A. 579) to declare that the language of the so-called contracts of agency were 
false in their purport, and were merely used to conceal what were really sales to 
the so-called agents. This conclusion was sustained by certain allegations in the 
bill inconsistent with the contracts of agency, to the effect that the Medical 
Company did sell to these so-called agents the medical packages consigned. This 
court, however, without reference to these telltale allegations of the bill found in 
the contracts themselves and their operation plain provision for purchases by the 
so-called agents which necessarily made the contracts as to an indefinite amount 
of the consignments to them, contracts of sale rather than of agency. The court 
therefore held that the showing made was of an attempt by the Miles Medical 
Company through its plan of distribution to hold its purchasers after the 
purchase at full price to an obligation to maintain prices on a resale by them. 
This is the whole effect of the Miles Medical Case. That such it was is made plain 
in the case of Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U. S. 8, 21 in 
which then Chief Justice White reviewed the various cases on this general 
subject and spoke of the Miles Medical Case as follows: 
 
‘In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 it was decided that 
under the general law the owner of movables (in that case, proprietary 
medicines compounded by a secret formula) could not sell the movables and 
lawfully by contract fix a price at which the product should afterwards be sold, 
because to do so would be at one and the same time to sell and retain, to part 
with and yet to hold, to project the will of the seller so as to cause it to control 
the movable parted with when it was not subject to his will because owned by 
another, and thus to make the will of the seller unwarrantedly take the place of 
the law of the land as to such movables. It was decided that the power to make 
the limitation as to price for the future could not be exerted consistently with the 
prohibitions against restraint of trade and monopoly contained in the Anti-Trust 
Law.’ 
 
Nor does the case of Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 226 
U. S. 20, sustain the contention of the government on the first question. There a 
number of manufacturers, one of whom owned a patent for enameled iron ware 
for plumbing fixtures made a combination to accept licenses to make the 
patented commodities and to sell them in interstate trade to jobbers and to 
refuse to sell to jobbers who would not agree to maintain fixed prices in sales to 
plumbers. This was an attempt just like that in the Miles Medical Co. Case to 





control the trade in the articles sold and fasten upon purchasers who had bought 
at full price and were complete owners an obligation to maintain resale prices. 
 
We are of opinion, therefore, that there is nothing as a matter of principle or in 
the authorities which requires us to hold that genuine contracts of agency like 
those before us, however comprehensive as a mass or whole in their effect, are 
violations of the Anti-Trust Act. The owner of an article patented or otherwise is 
not violating the common law or the Anti-Trust Act by seeking to dispose of his 
articles directly to the consumer and fixing the price by which his agents transfer 
the title from him directly to such consumer. The first charge in the bill can not 
be sustained. 
 
 Second. Had the Electric Company as the owner of the patents, entirely 
controlling the manufacture, use and sale of the tungsten incandescent lamps, in 
its license to the Westinghouse Company, the right to impose the condition that 
its sales should be at prices fixed by the licensor and subject to change according 
to its discretion? The contention is also made that the license required the 
Westinghouse Company not only to conform in the matter of the prices at which 
it might vend the patented articles, but also to follow the same plan as that 
which we have already explained the Electric Company adopted in its 
distribution. It does not appear that this provision was express in the license, 
because no such plan was set out therein, but even if the construction urged by 
the government is correct, we think the result must be the same. 
 
The owner of a patent may assign it to another and convey (1) the exclusive 
right to make, use, and vend the invention throughout the United States; or (2) 
an undivided part or share of that exclusive right; or (3) the exclusive right under 
the patent within and through a specific part of the United States. But any 
assignment or transfer short of one of these is a license giving the licensee no 
title in the patent and no right to sue at law in his own name for an 
infringement.  Conveying less than title to the patent or part of it, the patentee 
may grant a license to make, use, and vend articles under the specifications of 
his patent for any royalty, or upon any condition the performance of which is 
reasonably within the reward which the patentee by the grant of the patent is 
entitled to secure.  It is well settled, as already said, that where a patentee 
makes the patented article, and sells it, he can exercise no future control over 
what the purchaser may wish to do with the article after his purchase.  It has 
passed beyond the scope of the patentee's rights. Adams v. Burks, 17 Wall. 453; 
Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. 539. 
 
But the question is a different one which arises when we consider what a 
patentee who grants a license to one to make and vend the patented article may 
do in limiting the licensee in the exercise of the right to sell. The patentee may 
make and grant a license to another to make and use the patented articles but 





withhold his right to sell them. The licensee in such a case acquires an interest in 
the articles made. He owns the material of them and may use them. But if he 
sells them he infringes the right of the patentee, and may be held for damages 
and enjoined. If the patentee goes further and licenses the selling of the articles, 
may he limit the selling by limiting the method of sale and the price? We think he 
may do so provided the conditions of sale are normally and reasonably adapted 
to secure pecuniary reward for the patentee's monopoly. One of the valuable 
elements of the exclusive right of a patentee is to acquire profit by the price at 
which the article is sold. The higher the price, the greater the profit, unless it is 
prohibitory. When the patentee licenses another to make and vend and retains 
the right to continue to make and vend on his own account, the price at which 
his licensee will sell will necessarily affect the price at which he can sell his own 
patented goods. It would seem entirely reasonable that he should say to the 
licensee, ‘Yes, you may make and sell articles under my patent but not so as to 
destroy the profit that I wish to obtain by making them and selling them myself.’ 
He does not thereby sell outright to the licensee the articles the latter may make 
and sell or vest absolute ownership in them. He restricts the property and 
interest the licensee has in the goods he makes and proposes to sell. 
 
This question was considered by this court in the case of Bement v. National 
Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70. A combination of manufacturers owning a patent to 
make float spring tool harrows licensed others to make and sell the products 
under the patent on condition that they would not during the continuance of the 
license sell the products at a less price or on more favorable terms of payment 
and delivery to purchasers than were set forth in a schedule made part of the 
license. That was held to be a valid use of the patent rights of the owners of the 
patent. It was objected that this made for a monopoly. The court, speaking by 
Mr. Justice Peckham, said: 
 
‘The very object of these laws is monopoly, and the rule is, with few 
exceptions, that any conditions which are not in their very nature illegal with 
regard to this kind of property, imposed by the patentee and agreed to by 
the licensee for the right to manufacture or use or sell the article, will be 
upheld by the courts. The fact that the conditions in the contracts keep up 
the monopoly or fix prices does nor render them illegal.’ 
 
Speaking of the contract, he said: 
 
‘The provision in regard to the price at which the licensee would sell the 
article manufactured under the license was also an appropriate and 
reasonable condition. It tended to keep up the price of the implements 
manufactured and sold, but that was only recognizing the nature of the 
property dealt in, and providing for its value so far as possible. This the 
parties were legally entitled to do. The owner of a patented article can, of 





course, charge such price as he msy choose, and the owner of a patent may 
assign it or sell the right to manufacture and sell the article patented upon 
the condition that the assignee shall charge a certain amount for such 
article.’… 
 
Nor do we think that the decisions of this court holding restrictions as to price of 
patented articles invalid apply to a contract of license like the one in this case. 
Those cases are: Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U. S. 8; Straus 
v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U. S. 490; Standard Sanitary Manufacturing 
Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20; Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339. 
These cases really are only instances of the application of the principle of Adams 
v. Burks, 17 Wall. 453, 456, already referred to that a patentee may not attach 
to the article made by him or with his consent a condition running with the 
article in the hands of purchasers limiting the price at which one who becomes 
its owner for full consideration shall part with it. They do not consider or 
condemn a restriction put by a patentee upon his licensee as to the prices at 
which the latter shall sell articles which he makes and only can make legally 
under the license. The authority of Bement v. Harrow Co. has not been shaken 
by the cases we have reviewed. 
 
For the reasons given, we sustain the validity of the license granted by the 
Electric Company to the Westinghouse Company. The decree of the District Court 
dismissing the bill is affirmed. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  The law of patent licensing clearly permits patentees to specify the quantity 
of goods that the licensee can produce.  What is the difference between 
specifying the quantity and specifying the price?  Indeed, many cartels, including 
OPEC, fix output rather than price.  For example, if GE decided that the profit-
maximizing output of lighbulbs is 10,000,000 per year and it had the capacity to 
make 6,000,000 itself, it could license Westinghouse to make 4,000,000 a year, 
thus yielding the same output and price that a cartel would. 
 
2. While courts favor settlement of infringement disputes over litigation, they 
sometimes become wary if the settlement is used as an attempt to circumvent 
antitrust law.   In Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 
2d 986 (N.D. Ill., 2003), Judge Posner, sitting by designation, argued that if the 
General Electric case were tried today, the Court would be unlikely to uphold the 
agreement, at least without determining both the validity of the patents and “the 
rationale for the licensing agreements.”   He observed that the initial royalty rate 
of two percent “suggest[ed] that the right to use the [General Electric] patents 
was not worth a lot to Westinghouse” and that the minimum-price term in the 
licensing agreement had the effect of “minimiz[ing] competition.”    As Judge 





Posner observed, the strength of the patent(s) subject to the settlement is highly 
relevant to the antitrust analysis.  A useless patent could be used to facilitate a 
naked price fixing agreement if one firm licenses others to use it while specifying 
the sale price or limiting the output. 
 
If a patent is valuable a licensor would ordinarily want to 
maximize its own revenue by charging a high license fee, not by requiring 
the licensee to charge a high price.  Such a price profits the licensee 
rather than the patentee.  However, if the patent is weak or worthless, 
then it may simply by an excuse for collusion, suggested by a low license 
fee and a price maintenance provision.  See Louis Kapow, The Patent-
Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1813, 1856–57 
(1984). 
 
EFFICIENT PATENT POOLS 
 
STANDARD OIL CO. (INDIANA) ET. AL.  v. UNITED STATES 
283 U.S. 163 (1931) 
 
Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 
This suit was brought by the United States in June, 1924, in the federal 
court for northern Illinois, to enjoin further violation of section 1 and section 2 of 
the Sherman Anti-Trust Trust Act July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (15 USCA §§ 
1, 2). The violation charged is an illegal combination to create a monopoly and to 
restrain interstate commerce by controlling that part of the supply of gasoline 
which is produced by the process of cracking. Control is alleged to be exerted by 
means of seventy-nine contracts concerning patents relating to the cracking art. 
The parties to the several contracts are named as defendants. Four of them own 
patents covering their respective cracking processes, and are called the primary 
defendants. Three of these, the Standard Oil Company of Indiana, the Texas 
Company, and the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, are themselves large 
producers of cracked gasoline. The fourth, Gasoline Products Company, is merely 
a licensing concern. The remaining forty-six defendants manufacture cracked 
gasoline under licenses from one or more of the primary defendants. They are 
called secondary defendants…. 
 
The violation of the Sherman Act now complained of rests substantially 
on the making and effect of three contracts entered into by the primary 
defendants. The history of these agreements may be briefly stated. For about 
half a century before 1910, gasoline had been manufactured from crude oil 
exclusively by distillation and condensation at atmospheric pressure. When the 
demand for gasoline grew rapidly with the widespread use of the automobile, 
methods for increasing the yield of gasoline from the available crude oil were 





sought. It had long been known that from a given quantity of crude, additional 
oils of high volatility could be produced by ‘cracking’; that is, by applying heat 
and pressure to the residum after ordinary distillation. But a commercially 
profitable cracking method and apparatus for manufacturing additional gasoline 
had not yet been developed. The first such process was perfected by the Indiana 
Company in 1913; and for more than seven years this was the only one practiced 
in America. During that period the Indiana Company not only manufactured 
cracked gasoline an large scale, but also had licensed fifteen independent 
concerns to use its process. 
 
Meanwhile, since the phenomenon of cracking was not controlled by any 
fundamental patent, other concerns had been working independently to develop 
commercial processes of their own. Most prominent among these were the three 
other primary defendants, the Texas Company, the New Jersey Company, and 
the Gasoline Products Company. Each of these secured numerous patents 
covering its particular cracking process. Beginning in 1920, conflict developed 
among the four companies concerning the validity, scope, and ownership of 
issued patents. One infringement suit was begun; cross-notices of infringement, 
antecedent to other suits, were given; and interferences were declared on 
pending applications in the Patent Office. The primary defendants assert that it 
was these difficulties which led to their executing the three principal agreements 
which the United States attacks; and that their sole object was to avoid litigation 
and losses incident to conflicting patents. 
 
The first contract was executed by the Indiana Company and the Texas 
Company on August 26, 1921; the second by the Texas Company and Gasoline 
Products Company on January 26, 1923; the third by the Indiana Company, the 
Texas Company, and the New Jersey Company, on September 28, 1923. The 
three agreements differ from one another only slightly in scope and terms. Each 
primary defendant was released thereby from liability for any past infringement 
of patents of the others. Each acquired the right to use these patents thereafter 
in its own process. Each was empowered to extend to independent concerns, 
licensed under its process, releases from past, and immunity from future claims 
of infringement of patents controlled by the other primary defendants. And each 
was to share in some fixed proportion the fees received under these multiple 
licenses. The royalties to be charged were definitely fixed in the first contract; 
and minimum sums per barrel, to be divided between the Taxes and Indiana 
companies, were specified in the second and third.... 
 
The Government contends that the three agreements constitute a pooling 
by the primary defendants of the royalties from their several patents; that 
thereby competition between them in the commercial exercise of their respective 
rights to issue licenses is eliminated; that this tends to maintain or increase the 
royalty charged secondary defendants and hence to increase the manufacturing 





cost of cracked gasoline; that thus the primary defendants exclude from 
interstate commerce gasoline which would, under lower competitive royalty 
rates, be produced; and that interstate commerce is thereby unlawfully 
restrained. There is no provision in any of the agreements which restricts the 
freedom of the primary defendants individually to issue licenses under their own 
patents alone or under the patents of all the others; and no contract between 
any of them, and no license agreement with a secondary defendant executed 
pursuant thereto, now imposes any restriction upon the quantity of gasoline to 
be produced, or upon the price, terms, or conditions of sale, or upon the territory 
in which sales may be made. The only restraint thus charged is that necessarily 
arising out of the making and effect of the provisions for cross-licensing and for 
division of royalties. 
 
The Government concedes that it is not illegal for the primary defendants 
to cross-license each other and the respective licensees; and that adequate 
consideration can legally be demanded for such grants. But it contends that the 
insertion of certain additional provisions in these agreements renders them 
illegal. It urges, first, that the mere inclusion of the provisions for the division of 
royalties, constitutes an unlawful combination under the Sherman Act because it 
evidences an intent to obtain a monopoly. This contention is unsound. Such 
provisions for the division of royalties are not in themselves conclusive evidence 
of illegality. Where there are legitimately conflicting claims or threatened 
interferences, a settlement by agreement, rather than litigation, is not precluded 
by the Act. Compare Virtue v. Creamery Package Co., 227 U. S. 8, 33. An 
interchange of patent rights and a division of royalties according to the value 
attributed by the parties to their respective patent claims is frequently necessary 
if technical advancement is not to be blocked by threatened litigation. If the 
available advantages are upon on reasonable terms to all manufacturers desiring 
to participate, such interchange may promote rather than restrain competition. 
 
The Government next contends that the agreements to maintain royalties 
violate the Sherman Law because the fees charged are onerous. The argument is 
that the competitive advantage which the three primary defendants enjoy of 
manufacturing cracked gasoline free of royalty, while licensees must pay to them 
a heavy tribute in fees, enables these primary defendants to exclude from 
interstate commerce cracked gasoline which would, under lower competitive 
royalty rates, be produced by possible rivals. This argument ignores the 
privileges incident to ownership of patents. Unless the industry is dominated, or 
interstate commerce directly restrained, the Sherman Act does not require cross-
licensing patentees to license at reasonable rates others engaged in interstate 
commerce…. The allegation that the royalties charged are onerous is, standing 
alone, without legal significance; and, as will be shown, neither the alleged 
domination, nor restraint of commerce, has been proved. 
 





The main contention of the Government is that even if the exchange of 
patent rights and division of royalties are not necessarily improper and the 
royalties are not oppressive, the three contracts are still obnoxious to the 
Sherman Act because specific clauses enable the primary defendants to maintain 
existing royalties and thereby to restrain interstate commerce. The provisions 
which constitute the basis for this charge are these. The first contract specifies 
that the Texas Company shall get from the Indiana Company one-fourth of all 
royalties thereafter collected under the latter’s existing license agreements; and 
that all royalties received under licenses thereafter issued by either company 
shall be equally divided. Licenses granting rights under the patents of both are to 
be issued at a fixed royalty-approximately that charged by the Indiana Company 
when its process was alone in the field. By the second contract, the Texas 
Company is entitled to receive one-half of the royalties thereafter collected by 
the Gasoline Products Company from its existing licensees, and a minimum sum 
per barrel for all oil cracked by its future licensees. The third contract gives to 
the Indiana Company one-half of all royalties thereafter paid by existing 
licensees of the New Jersey Company, and a similar minimum sum for each 
barrel treated by its future licensees,-subject in the latter case to reduction if the 
royalties charged by the Indiana and Texas companies for their processes should 
be reduced. The alleged effect of these provisions is to enable the primary 
defendants, because of their monopoly of patented cracking processes, to 
maintain royalty rates at the level established originally for the Indiana process. 
 
The rate of royalties may, of course be a decisive factor in the cost of 
production. If combining patent owners effectively dominate an industry, the 
power to fix and maintain royalties is tantamount to the power to fix prices.  
Where domination exists, a pooling of competing process patents, or an 
exchange of licenses for the purpose of curtailing the manufacture and supply of 
an unpatented product, is beyond the privileges conferred by the patents and 
constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act. The lawful individual monopolies 
granted by the patent statutes cannot be unitedly exercised to restrain 
competition. …  But an agreement for cross-licensing and division of royalties 
violates the Act only when used to effect a monopoly, or to fix prices, or to 
impose otherwise an unreasonable restraint upon interstate commerce. …  In the 
case at bar, the primary defendants own competing patented processes for 
manufacturing an unpatented product which is sold in interstate commerce; and 
agreements concerning such processes are likely to engender the evils to which 
the Sherman Act was directed. …  We must, therefore, examine the evidence to 
ascertain the operation and effect of the challenged contracts. 
 
No monopoly, or restriction of competition, in the business of licensing 
patented cracking processes resulted from the execution of these agreements. 
Up to 1920 all cracking plants in the United States were either owned by the 
Indiana Company alone, or were operated under licenses from it. In 1924 and 





1925, after the cross-licensing arrangements were in effect, the four primary 
defendants owned or licensed, in the aggregate, only 55 per cent. of the total 
cracking capacity, and the remainder was distributed among twenty-one 
independently owned cracking processes. This development and commercial 
expansion of competing processes is clear evidence that the contracts did not 
concentrate in the hands of the four primary defendants the licensing of 
patented processes for the production of cracked gasoline. Moreover, the record 
does not show that after the execution of the agreements there was a decrease 
of competition among them in licensing other refiners to use their respective 
processes. 
 
No monopoly, or restriction of competition, in the production of either ordinary or 
cracked gasoline has been proved. The output of cracked gasoline in the years in 
question was about 26 per cent. of the total gasoline production. Ordinary or 
straight run gasoline is indistinguishable from cracked gasoline and the two are 
either mixed or sold interchangeably. Under these circumstances the primary 
defendants could not effectively control the supply or fix the price of cracked 
gasoline by virtue of their alleged monopoly of the cracking processes, unless 
they could control, through some means, the remainder of the total gasoline 
production from all sources. Proof of such control is lacking. Evidence of the total 
gasoline production by all methods, of each of the primary defendants and their 
licensees is either missing or unsatisfactory in character. The record does not 
accurately show even the total amount of cracked gasoline produced, or the 
production of each of the licensees, or competing refiners. Widely variant 
estimates of such production figures have been submitted. These were not 
accepted by the master and there is no evidence which would justify our doing 
so. 
 
No monopoly, or restriction of competition, in the sale of gasoline has 
been proved. On the basis of testimony relating to the marketing of both cracked 
and ordinary gasoline, the master found that the defendants were in active 
competition among themselves and with other refiners; that both kinds of 
gasoline were refined and sold in large quantities by other companies; and that 
the primary defendants and their licensees neither individually or collectively 
controlled the market price or supply of any gasoline moving in interstate 
commerce. There is ample evidence to support these findings. 
 
Thus it appears that no monopoly of any kind, or restraint of interstate 
commerce, has been effected either by means of the contracts or in some other 
way. In the absence of proof that the primary defendants had such control of the 
entire industry as would make effective the alleged domination of a part, it is 
difficult to see how they could by agreeing upon royalty rates control either the 
price or the supply of gasoline, or otherwise restrain competition. By virtue of 
their patents they had individually the right to determine who should use their 





respective processes or inventions and what the royalties for such use should be. 
To warrant an injunction which would invalidate the contracts here in question, 
and require either new arrangements or settlement of the conflicting claims by 
litigation, there must be a definite factual showing of illegality. 
 
In the District Court, the Government undertook to prove the violation 
charged by showing that the three agreements challenged were made by the 
primary defendants in bad faith. The bulk of the testimony introduced by it, is 
directed to this issue and relates to the validity and scope of twenty-three jointly-
used patents which were selected by it for attack. This evidence was admitted, 
over objection, for the purpose of showing that these patents were either invalid 
or narrow in scope; that there was no substantial foundation for the alleged 
conflicts and threatened infringement suits; that these were a pretext; and that 
the patents had been secured, and their infringement was being asserted, 
merely as a means of lending color of legality to the making of the contracts by 
which competition would inevitably be suppressed. The master found, after an 
elaborate review of the entire art, that the presumption of validity attaching to 
the patents had not been negatived in any way; that they merited a broad 
interpretation; that they had been acquired in good faith; and that the scope of 
the several groups of patents overlapped sufficiently to justify the threats and 
fear of litigation. The District Court stated that the particular claims should be 
interpreted narrowly, and that the respective inventions might be practiced 
without infringement of adversely owned patents. But it confirmed the finding of 
presumptive validity and did not question the finding of good faith. It held that 
the patents were adequate consideration for the cross-licensing agreements and 
that the violation charged could not be predicated on patent invalidity. Inasmuch 
as the Government did not appeal from these findings, we need not consider any 
of the issues concerning the validity or scope of the cracking patents; and we 
accept the finding that they were acquired in good faith. Neither the findings nor 
the evidence on this issue supply any ground for invalidating the contracts. 
 
The remaining issues in the case have become moot. The Government 
objected to a number of early Indiana Company licenses which contained certain 
territorial restrictions on the production of cracked gasoline; and also to a 
provision in the first contract between primary defendants, and in licenses 
thereunder, by which the Indiana Company secured an option to purchase a 
portion of the cracked gasoline manufactured in, or shipped into, its sales 
territory. At the hearing before the District Court it appeared that these 
provisions had never been enforced. Upon the court’s request the objectionable 
clauses were voluntarily cancelled some months before the entry of the decree. 
Similarly, the propriety of certain blanket acknowledgments of patent validity in 
the first contract, and in a number of licenses under later contracts, were 
questioned by the lower court. At its suggestion, these provisions also were 
formally cancelled by the parties. As the relief here sought is an injunction, and 





hence relates only to the future, the alleged validity of such provisions has 
become moot. 
 
The District Court accepted the Government’s estimates of cracked 
gasoline production; found that the primary defendants were able to control both 
supply and price by virtue of their control of the cracking patents; held that 
although these patents were valid consideration for the cross-licenses, the 
agreement to maintain royalties was in effect a method for fixing the price of 
cracked gasoline; and concluded that a monopoly existed as a result of such 
agreements. This appears to be the only basis for the relief granted. But the 
widely varying estimates, relied upon to establish dominant control of the 
production of cracked gasoline were insufficient for that purpose. And the court 
entirely disregarded not only the fact that the manufacture of the cracked is only 
a part of the total gasoline production, but also the evidence showing active 
competition among the defendants themselves and with others. Its findings are 




NOTE: PATENT POOLS:  BLOCKING RELATIONSHIPS, PRICE FIXING 
AND BOUNDARY AMBIGUITY 
 
One rationale for patent pools is that they are needed to prevent “blocking” 
claims, which occur when claims in one patent overlap with claims in a different 
patent.  As a result, the technology in one patent cannot be practiced without 
infringing the other patent.  The Harrow case, supra, very likely involved blocking 
claims.  The court typically decided these early cases, however, without 
discussing blocking.  Standard Oil very likely did not involve blocking claims. 
 
Blocking patent relationships can be both one-way and two-way.  If patent B is 
built atop patent A — for example, if B was a patented improvement on A – the 
typical result is a one-way block.  A firm wishing to practice patent B would also 
need a license to practice patent A, but not vice-versa.  By contrast, a two-way 
block occurs when the owner of patent A can prevent the practice of patent B, 
and the owner of patent B can prevent the practice of patent A. See Richard J. 
Gilbert, Antitrust for Patent Pools: A Century of Policy Evolution, 2004 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 3 (2004). 
 
Patents in a blocking relationship are formally complementary.  That is, they 
must be used together. By contrast, if alternative patents perform the same 
economic or mechanical function but do not block one another they are 
considered substitutes.  In that case a licensee might need either one of them, 
but not both.  In Standard Oil the process patents in question were very likely 
substitutes rather than complementary blocking patents: the Court indicated that 





cracking “was not controlled by any fundamental process” and that other firms 
had come up with cracking technology independently. Standard Oil at 167. If 
Standard had obtained a “fundamental process” which other firms had relied on 
in their processes, then it would have a one-way blocking patent. 
 
Patent pools are easily justified when the patents in question are complements 
that block one another.  They are more difficult to justify when they bring 
competing patents together.  See generally ROBERT C. LIND ET AL., REPORT ON 
MULTIPARTY LICENSING 10–16  (2003) (discussing the evolution of the various 
types of patent-pool arrangements). 
 
Firms with complementary products do not typically have an incentive to fix 
prices.  For example, the makers of printers would not profit from an agreement 
with makers of computers under which the computer makers reduced computer 
output and raised price.  Printer makers are best off if computers are as high 
quality and cheap as possible, and computer makers are better off if printers are 
both good and cheap. 
 
Should the story for patents be any different?  That is, if patents are blocking the 
first patentee would benefit if the second patent were sold as cheaply as 
possible.  That would leave more margin for the first patentee.  However, the 
problem is much more complex if we are considering product prices rather than 
patent prices.  Two firms that both make printers may have complementary (i.e., 
blocking) patents.  Their agreement to pool (i.e., cross license) one another’s 
patents is almost certainly efficient.  But often in the history of patent pools the 
parties have also agreed either to limit the output of printers or to fix their price.  
The gains from price fixing could be enormous and are particularly suspicious if 
one or both of the patents are of dubious quality or the patents represent only a 
small portion of the value of the overall product.  In any event, however, what 
socially beneficial motive could the poolers have for fixing product prices, given 
that patents are nonrivalrous goods – that is, each can be used a large number 
of times without diminishing what is left over?  One important difference 
between a pool or commons for, say, fisheries or cattle grazing is that overuse of 
the commons is a serious problem and the participants have a justifiable interest 
in limiting the number of uses (e.g., 10 cows per farmer on a grazing commons).  
Output limitations for commons do not have a similar justification.  
 
Of course, a large patent pool might bring together hundreds or even thousands 
of patents, and both blocking (complementary) and substitute relationships will 
be present.  Another reason patent pools are used has less to do with whether 
the patents in the pool are substitutes or complements than with the ambiguity 
of patent boundaries, particularly in computer, electronic and other information 
technologies.  As a result those evaluating them cannot readily determine their 
relationships. When the cost of defining and defending individual boundaries is 





greater than the cost of sharing, firms may find it profitable to form a 
“commons” for joint production.  In the case of grazing commons the operative 
facts are (1) cattle, unlike plants, move around; and (2) given that the land and 
its use are relatively cheap, the relative costs of fencing are high in relation to 
the costs of establishing a commons together with some access rules.  See 
ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). 
 
  Compare the situation of firms making, say, cellular phones, which could have 
thousands of patent but determining the precise boundaries of each could be 
very costly.  A litigation fight over the scope of a single patent typically costs 
more than $1,000,000.  Further, this rationale applies equally to complementary 
and competing patents.  This fact very likely explains a great many patent pools 
today, particularly in information technologies, such as software, electronics and 
data processing, and perhaps even some business method patents.  See 
CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: 
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, Ch. 12 (2011). 
 
PATENT PACKAGE LICENSING 
 
AUTOMATIC RADIO MFG. CO., INC. v. HAZELTINE RESEARCH, INC. 
339 U.S. 827 (1950) 
 
Mr. Justice MINTON delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 
This is a suit by respondent Hazeltine Research, Inc., as assignee of the 
licensor’s interest in a nonexclusive patent license agreement covering a group of 
570 patents and 200 applications, against petitioner Automatic Radio 
Manufacturing Company, Inc., the licensee, to recover royalties. The patents and 
applications are related to the manufacture of radio broadcasting apparatus. 
Respondent and its corporate affiliate and predecessor have for some twenty 
years been engaged in research, development, engineering design and testing 
and consulting services in the radio field. Respondent derives income from the 
licensing of its patents, its policy being to license any and all responsible 
manufacturers of radio apparatus at a royalty rate which for many years has 
been approximately one percent. Petitioner manufactures radio apparatus, 
particularly radio broadcasting receivers. 
 
The license agreement in issue, which appears to be a standard Hazeltine 
license, was entered into by the parties in September 1942, for a term of ten 
years. By its terms petitioner acquired permission to use, in the manufacture of 
its ‘home’ products, any or all of the patents which respondent held or to which it 
might acquire rights. Petitioner was not, however, obligated to use respondent’s 
patents in the manufacture of its products. For this license, petitioner agreed to 





pay respondent’s assignor royalties based upon a small percentage of petitioner’s 
selling price of complete radio broadcasting receivers, and in any event a 
minimum of $10,000 per year.  
 
This suit was brought to recover the minimum royalty due for the year 
ending August 31, 1946, for an accounting of other sums due, and for other 
relief. The District Court found the case to be one appropriate for summary 
procedure under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., 
and sustained the motion of respondent for judgment. The validity of the license 
agreement was upheld against various charges of misuse of the patents, and 
judgment was entered for the recovery of royalties and an accounting, and for a 
permanent injunction restraining petitioner from failing to pay royalties, to keep 
records, and to render reports during the life of the agreement. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed, one judge dissenting, and we granted certiorari in order to 
consider important questions concerning patent misuse and estoppel to 
challenge the validity of licensed patents. 
 
The questions for determination are whether a misuse of patents has 
been shown, and whether petitioner may contest the validity of the licensed 
patents, in order to avoid its obligation to pay royalties under the agreement. 
 
It is insisted that the license agreement cannot be enforced because it is 
a misuse of patents to require the licensee to pay royalties based on its sales, 
even though none of the patents are used. Petitioner directs our attention to the 
‘Tie-in’ cases. These cases have condemned schemes requiring the purchase of 
unpatented goods for use with patented apparatus or processes, prohibiting 
production or sale of competing goods, and conditioning the granting of a license 
under one patent upon the acceptance of another and different license. 
Petitioner apparently concedes that these cases do not, on their facts, control 
the instant situation. It is obvious that they do not. There is present here no 
requirement for the purchase of any goods. Hazeltine does not even 
manufacture or sell goods; it is engaged solely in research activities. Nor is there 
any prohibition as to the licensee’s manufacture or sale of any type of apparatus. 
The fact that the license agreement covers only ‘home’ apparatus does not mean 
that the licensee is prohibited from manufacturing or selling other apparatus. 
And finally, there is no conditioning of the license grant upon the acceptance of 
another and different license. We are aware that petitioner asserted in its 
countermotion for summary judgment in the District Court that Hazeltine refused 
to grant a license under any one or more of its patents to anyone who refused to 
take a license under all. This averment was elaborated in the affidavit of 
petitioner’s attorney in support of the motion. The point was not pressed in the 
Court of Appeals or here. 
 





But petitioner urges that this case ‘is identical in principle’ with the ‘Tie-in’ 
cases. It is contended that the licensing provision requiring royalty payments of a 
percentage of the sales of the licensee’s products constitutes a misuse of patents 
because it ties in a payment on unpatented goods. Particular reliance is placed 
on language from United States v. U.S. Gypsum, 333 U.S. 364, 389. That case 
was a prosecution under the Sherman Act for an alleged conspiracy of Gypsum 
and its licensees to extend the monopoly of certain patents and to eliminate 
competition by fixing prices on patented and unpatented gypsum board. The 
license provisions based royalties on all sales of gypsum board, both patented 
and unpatented. It was held that the license provisions, together with evidence 
of an understanding that only patented board would be sold, showed a 
conspiracy to restrict the production of unpatented products which was an invalid 
extension of the area of the patent monopoly. There is no indication here of 
conspiracy to restrict production of unpatented or any goods to effectuate a 
monopoly, and thus the Gypsum case does not aid petitioner. That which is 
condemned as against public policy by the ‘Tie-in’ cases is the extension of the 
monopoly of the patent to create another monopoly or restraint of competition-a 
restraint not countenanced by the patent grant….  This royalty provision does 
not create another monopoly; it creates no restraint of competition beyond the 
legitimate grant of the patent. The right to a patent includes the right to market 
the use of the patent at a reasonable return. 
 
The licensing agreement in issue was characterized by the District Court 
as essentially a grant by Hazeltine to petitioner of a privilege to use any patent 
or future development of Hazeltine in consideration of the payment of royalties. 
Payment for the privilege is required regardless of use of the patents. The 
royalty provision of the licensing agreement was sustained by the District Court 
and the Court of Appeals on the theory that it was a convenient mode of 
operation designed by the parties to avoid the necessity of determining whether 
each type of petitioner’s product embodies any of the numerous Hazeltine 
patents. D.C., 77 F.Supp. at 496. The Court of Appeals reasoned that since it 
would not be unlawful to agree to pay a fixed sum for the privilege to use 
patents, it was not unlawful to provide a variable consideration measured by a 
percentage of the licensee’s sales for the same privilege. Numerous District 
Courts which have had occasion to pass on the question have reached the same 
result on similar grounds, and we are of like opinion. 
 
The mere accumulation of patents, no matter how many, is not in and of 
itself illegal. See Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 
U.S. 637. And this record simply does not support incendiary, yet vague, charges 
that respondent uses its accumulation of patents ‘for the exaction of tribute’ and 
collects royalties ‘by means of the overpowering threat of disastrous litigation.’ 
We cannot say that payment of royalties according to an agreed percentage of 
the licensee’s sales is unreasonable. Sound business judgment could indicate 





that such payment represents the most convenient method of fixing the business 
value of the privileges granted by the licensing agreement. We are not unmindful 
that convenience cannot justify an extension of the monopoly of the patent. But 
as we have already indicated, there is in this royalty provision no inherent 
extension of the monopoly of the patent. Petitioner cannot complain because it 
must pay royalties whether it uses Hazeltine patents or not. What it acquired by 
the agreement into which it entered was the privilege to use any or all of the 
patents and developments as it desired to use them. If it chooses to use none of 
them, it has nevertheless contracted to pay for the privilege of using existing 
patents plus any developments resulting from respondent’s continuous research. 
We hold that in licensing the use of patents to one engaged in a related 
enterprise, it is not per se a misuse of patents to measure the consideration by a 
percentage of the licensee’s sales. 
 
It is next contended by petitioner that the license agreement is 
unenforceable because it contained a provision requiring the following restrictive 
notice to be attached to apparatus manufactured by petitioner under the 
agreement: “Licensed by Hazeltine Corporation only for use in homes, for 
educational purposes, and for private, non-commercial use, under one or more 
of the following patents and under pending applications:‘ followed by the word 
‘Patent’ and the numbers of the patents which are, in the opinion of Licensor, 
involved in apparatus of the types licensed hereunder manufactured by one or 
more licensees of Licensor.’ 
 
Respondent did not seek to have this provision of the agreement 
enforced, and the decree of the District Court does not enforce it. It may well 
have been a dead letter from the beginning, as indicated by the fact that, as 
petitioner averred in its answer, it has never observed this provision of the 
agreement. Thus it is doubtful that the legality of this provision could be 
contested, even assuming that the issue was properly raised, which respondent 
disputes. In any event, it is clear that any issue with respect to this provision of 
the agreement is moot. An affidavit of the president of respondent corporation 
advises us of certain letters which were sent by respondent in September 1945, 
to each of its licensees, including petitioner. These letters authorized the 
discontinuance of the restrictive notice provision and the substitution of the 
marking ‘This apparatus is licensed under the United States patent rights of 
Hazeltine Corporation.’ It is further averred that this form of notice is all that 
respondent has required of its licensees since September 1945. Since this 
provision of the agreement was made for the benefit of respondent, it could 
voluntarily waive the provision. 
 
Finally, it is contended that notwithstanding the licensing agreement, 
petitioner-licensee may contest the validity of the patents it is charged with 
using. The general rule is that the licensee under a patent license agreement 





may not challenge the validity of the licensed patent in a suit for royalties due 
under the contract. United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 196 U.S. 310.3 The general 
principle of the invalidity of price-fixing agreements may be invoked by the 
licensee of what purport to be valid patents to show in a suit for royalties that 
the patents are invalid. Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394. 
There is no showing that the licensing agreement here or the practices under it 
were a misuse of patents or contrary to public policy. This limited license for 
‘home’ use production contains neither an express nor implied agreement to 
refrain from production for ‘commercial’ or any other use as part consideration 
for the license grant. The Katzinger and MacGregor cases are inapplicable. The 
general rule applies, and petitioner may not, in this suit, challenge the validity of 
the licensed patents. 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
 
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom Mr. Justice BLACK concurs, dissenting. 
 
We are, I think, inclined to forget that the power of Congress to grant 
patents is circumscribed by the Constitution. The patent power, of all legislative 
powers, is indeed the only one whose purpose is defined. Article I, § 8 describes 
the power as one ‘To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.’ This statement of policy limits the power 
itself. 
 
Mr. Justice Brandeis and Chief Justice Stone did not fashion but they 
made more secure one important rule designed to curb the use of patents. It is 
as follows: One who holds a patent on article A may not license the use of the 
patent on condition that B, an unpatented article, be bought. Such a contract or 
agreement would be an extension of the grant of the patent contrary to a long 
line of decisions. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 
502; Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Corp., 283 U.S. 27; Morton 
Salt v. G.S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488, 491-492….   For it would sweep under the 
patent an article that is unpatented or unpatentable. Each patent owner would 
become his own patent office and, by reason of the leverage of the patent, 
obtain a larger monopoly of the market than the Constitution or statutes permit. 
 
That is what is done here. Hazeltine licensed Automatic Radio to use 570 
patents and 200 patent applications. Of these Automatic used at most 10. 
Automatic Radio was obligated, however, to pay as royalty a percentage of its 
                                                 
3 [ed -- The Supreme Court subsequently overruled this doctrine of licensee estoppel in 
Lear vs. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969)] 
 





total sales in certain lines without regard to whether or not the products sold 
were patented or unpatented. The inevitable result is that the patentee received 
royalties on unpatented products as part of the price for the use of the patents. 
The patent owner has therefore used the patents to bludgeon his way into a 
partnership with this licensee, collecting royalties on unpatented as well as 
patented articles. A plainer extension of a patent by unlawful means would be 
hard to imagine. 
 
Chief Justice Stone wrote for the Court in Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric 
Co., 317 U.S. 173, holding that a licensee is not estopped to challenge a price-
fixing clause by showing the patent is invalid. He also wrote for the Court in 
Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, holding the estoppel did not 
bar the assignor of a patent from defending a suit for infringement of the 
assigned patent on the ground that the alleged infringing device was that of a 
prior-art expired patent. 
 
These decisions put the protection of the public interest in free enterprise above 
reward to the patentee. The limitations which they made on the estoppel 
doctrine represented an almost complete cycle back to the salutary teaching of 
Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234, that, ‘It is as important to the 
public that competition should not be repressed by worthless patents, as that the 
patentee of a really valuable invention should be protected in his monopoly.’ To 
estop the licensee from attacking the validity of patents is to forget that ‘It is the 
public interest which is dominant in the patent system. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-
Continent Investment Co., supra, 320 U.S. at page 665. 
 
It is said that if the purpose was to enlarge the monopoly of the patent-for 
example, through price fixing-then estoppel would not bar the licensee from 
challenging the validity of the patents. But what worse enlargement of monopoly 
is there than the attachment of a patent to an unpatentable article? When we 
consider the constitutional standard, what greater public harm than that is there 
in the patent system? 
 
It is only right and just that the licensee be allowed to challenge the 
validity of the patents. A great pooling of patents is made; and whole industries 
are knit together in the fashion of the unholy alliances revealed in United States 
v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, and United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 
364. One who wants the use of one patent may have to take hundreds. The 
whole package may contain many patents that have been foisted on the public. 
No other person than the licensee will be interested enough to challenge them. 
He alone will be apt to see and understand the basis of their illegality. 
 
 The licensee protects the public interest in exposing invalid or expired 
patents and freeing the public of their toll. He should be allowed that privilege. 





He would be allowed it were the public interest considered the dominant one. 
Ridding the public of stale or specious patents is one way of serving the end of 
the progress of science. We depart from a great tradition in this field (and see 
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products, 339 U.S. 605), when we affirm this 
judgment. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  The license agreement at issue did two things.  First, it permitted the 
licensee to use any or all of the several hundred patents in the patentee’s 
portfolio.  This is called “package licensing.”  Second, it required the licensee 
to pay a royalty calculated as a percentage of the sales of its product output, 
including the sales of at least some radios that apparently did not use any of 
the patents in the portfolio.  Is either of these terms inherently 
anticompetitive? 
 
Package licensing is particularly valuable when a firm owns many 
interrelated patents and it is difficult for an outside observer to verify 
precisely which patents are being practiced in a particular device.  This is 
another problem of boundary ambiguity.  Where is the competitive harm, 
however?  The licensee might complain that package licensing requires it to 
take a larger package than it would otherwise wish to purchase.  But is that 
any different from the land owner who insists on selling its 1000 acres as a 
plot rather than subdividing it?  On the other side, package licensing might 
exclude a rival when the package contains patents for which rival producers 
have effective competing technologies.  Suppose, for example, that the 
dominant patentee has patent A, B & C, which it packages at a single price.  
A rival makes an alternative technology C’, which many licensees would 
prefer, but the package licensing terms offer one price for any combination, 
which means that the package licensee can use the C patent at a marginal 
cost of zero.  The rival, having only the C’ patent, cannot afford to compete 
with a price of zero. 
 
And what about basing royalties on sales of the finished product?  In 
most cases this is very likely nothing more than a form of surrogate pricing in 
which the price is tagged to something readily capable of being measured.  
How many times a particular patent is used in a complex piece of equipment 
might be hard to measure, but how many units of the product as made is 
typically fairly easy to determine.  Further, the sale price of the finished 
product occurs in a market that already exists.  By contrast, there may not be 
a good mechanism for placing a value on a patent that is not sold anywhere 
else.  As a result the product price becomes a useful surrogate for patent 
value. 
 





NERO AG v. MPEG LA, L.L.C. 
2010 WL 4878835  (C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2010) 
 
MARIANA R. PFAELZER, District Judge. 
 
Plaintiff Nero AG (“Nero”) brings this antitrust lawsuit against Defendant 
MPEG LA, LLC (“MPEG LA”) for anticompetitive conduct in MPEG LA's licensing of 
patent pools related to industry standards for consumer electronics. Nero 
contends MPEG LA has violated Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act by 
unlawfully maintaining, extending, and/or abusing its monopoly power.  
 
The FAC [First Amended Complaint]  relies on three basic allegations: (1) 
Nero has no practical alternative to licensing from the MPEG-2 pool; (2) MPEG LA 
has impermissibly expanded the temporal scope of its monopoly by adding non-
essential patents with later term expiration dates to the MPEG-2 patent pool; and 
(3) MPEG LA coerced licensees into an Extended MPEG-2 License, which cannot 
be cancelled until January 31, 2016. 
 
Nero's monopolization claim continues to rely heavily on the economic 
infeasibility of individual licensing, but Nero has not demonstrated any attempt to 
license the necessary patents individually. “The burden of proving lack of a 
realistic opportunity to license directly cannot be met where a plaintiff never 
makes an inquiry or attempts to negotiate a single individual license.” Nero AG, 
2010 WL 4366448, at *6 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Cinram Int'l, 
Inc., 299 F.Supp.2d 370, 377-78 (D.Del.2004)). As the Court explained in its 
prior Order, because Nero has not tried to individually license only the patents it 
needs, its argument that direct licensing is economically infeasible remains a 
speculative hypothesis.  
 
The FAC includes a new allegation that it would cost Nero $7 million to 
determine which essential patents Nero must license to comply with the MPEG-2 
standard. FAC ¶42. Even if Nero's estimate were accurate, this allegation adds 
nothing to pleading because the time and effort Nero will have to expend to 
determine which patents it needs to license to avoid infringement litigation is 
irrelevant to the feasibility determination. Thus, having already rejected Nero's 
excuse that it would be cost-prohibitive for Nero to determine which patents it 
needs to license in order to practice its technology without infringing, the Court 
concludes again that Nero has failed to plausibly allege that direct licensing is 
infeasible. 
 
Nero's allegations of predatory conduct continue to be premised on 
inference. Nero infers that because of the “drastic and unforeseen increase in the 
number of patents” in the patent pool, MPEG LA must have added hundreds of 
non-essential patents to the pool for predatory purposes….  [T]he FAC adds six 





examples of nonessential patents that Nero alleges were added for predatory 
purposes. Nero includes the following patents and the corresponding 
parenthetical descriptions in the FAC: U.S. Patent Nos. 5,420,866 (encryption, 
transmission of multiple program streams, and remote tower transmission and 
the like); 4,833,543 (hardware-implemented MPEG-2); 4,849,812 (same); 
5,457,701 (remote tower transmission and the like); 5,461,420 (telecine 
processing schemes); 5,453,790 (digital playback in real time). FAC ¶ 40. Nero 
alleges: 
 
Those patents and others are not infringed by the products offered by 
Nero and other similarly-situated (MPEG-2-compliant) companies, and, as 
a result, these patents are not essential to complying with the MPEG-2 
standard. On information and belief, such nonessential patents were 
added to the MPEG-2 pool only to extend the ultimate expiration date of 
the pool and/or to make individual licensing impracticable. 
 
However, none of these six patents support Nero's allegations of 
predatory conduct. Three of these allegedly nonessential patents are part of the 
initial 27 patents submitted to the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) in connection 
with its request for a Business Review Letter approving the MPEG-2 pool and, 
thus, were not added later to improperly extend the temporal scope of the pool. 
See Steinberg Decl., Ex. K FN4 (listing U.S. Patent Nos. 4,849,812; 5,420,866; 
and 5,457,701 as “MPEG-2 patents to be included in the patent pool.”). The 
other three patents also could not have been added to extend the temporal 
scope of the pool. The ′543 patent expired in 2006. The ′420 patent and the 
′790 patent expire in 2013. See Motion at 17 n. 8. Because at least two patents 
in the original pool will not expire until 2014, it is impossible that the ′420, ′543 
or ′790 patents were added to extend the duration of the MPEG-2 pool because 
the “new” patents expire before the original patents. Therefore, none of the six 
patents Nero alleges are nonessential could have been added for the 
anticompetitive purpose of unlawfully extending the temporal scope of the 
MPEG-2 pool. In that regard, Nero's allegations of predatory conduct remain 
entirely implausible. 
 
Nero also alleges that MPEG LA added nonessential patents to the MPEG-
2 pool to increase the cost to Nero of determining which patents it needs to 
practice its technology in compliance with the standard. Nero identifies six 
nonessential patents but does not include any factual basis or explanation of why 
the patents are not essential to practice the MPEG-2 standard. Nero explains only 
that the patents address “peripheral matters” such as encryption, transmission of 
multiple program streams, and digital playback. See FAC ¶ 40. 
 
Nero contends a patent is not essential if it is possible to practice the 
MPEG-2 standard without infringing it. In other words, Nero contends an 





essential patent is a patent which is necessarily infringed in connection with the 
use or implementation of the MPEG-2 standard. Therefore, according to Nero's 
tailored theory of patent essentiality, if Nero does not need to license the patent 
to manufacture its product in compliance with the MPEG-2 standard, the patent 
is nonessential.FN6 However, this Court has already ruled, “[i]t is not 
anticompetitive for a patent pool to include numerous potentially blocking 
patents, patents which may or may not be essential but which are more efficient 
to license as part of the pool than to risk the expense of future litigation.” Nero 
AG, 2010 WL 4366448, at * 5 (citing U.S. Philips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 
1187-90 (Fed.Cir.2005)); Princo v. ITC, 563 F.3d 1301, 1310 (Fed.Cir.2009) 
(finding a patent is essential if it is reasonable for a manufacturer of standard-
compliant products to believe that its product infringed any of the claims in the 
patent), vacated on other grounds by Princo v. ITC, 583 F.3d 1380 
(Fed.Cir.2009). Nero is not entitled to a patent pool customized by MPEG LA to 
Nero's precise needs; direct licensing can accomplish that aim. 
 
Nero's chief complaint is that a licensee wanting to individually license the 
patents necessary to practice its technology has to conduct its own essentiality 
review of the unexpired patents. But if there were no patent pool at all,  Nero 
would have to conduct the same inquiry. The fact that there is an option to 
license from a patent pool is therefore a benefit to Nero. Princo v. ITC, 563 F.3d 
at 1310 (recognizing patent pools are desirable because they can generate 
precompetitive efficiencies in the form of reduced transaction costs). Nero has 
not plausibly alleged that it did not have the option to license the patents 
individually; it has not plausibly alleged that the package licensing is a restraint 
of trade. See, e.g., McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381, 
409-10 (10th Cir.1965) (distinguishing patent misuse cases in which licensees 
were faced with a take all or none choice from the case where “the package 
license was purely voluntary and a licensee who did not want the whole package 
could obtain a license on a reasonable basis covering any particular patent he did 
want.”) 
 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DISMISSES the case with prejudice…. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  How can a firm monopolize anything – or even obtain a higher price for that 
matter – by including nonessential patents in a pool?  Licensees value what they 
need.   In this case they cannot resell what they do not need.  As a result the 
value of a nonessential patent is zero, isn’t it?  The boundary complexity 
argument may have more bite.  If a patentee and a manufacturer are disputing 
whether the manufacturer needs a license, it might be fairly easy to get a legal 
opinion about a single patent stating whether or not the manufacturer’s product 
infringes the patent.  But suppose the patentee places 1000 patents into a 





package and states that the manufacturer is infringing several of them, but 
without identifying which ones.  Now the transaction costs of determining 
noninfringement have risen considerably and it may be cheaper simply to obtain 
a license.  Would that practice violate the antitrust laws?  Would it violate the 
Patent Act?  Would it constitute misuse? 
 
2.  In Philips, the Federal Circuit decided that patents within a pool are 
considered non-essential if there are “commercially feasible alternatives to those 
patents” and that “[i]f there are no commercially practicable alternatives to the 
allegedly nonessential patents, packaging those patents together with so-called 
essential patents can have no anticompetitive effect in the marketplace, because 
no competition for a viable alternative product is foreclosed.” Philips v. ITC, 424 
F.3d 1179, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted). If there are viable 
alternatives to the so-called nonessential patents, then the effect of “tying” the 
essential with the nonessential patents can have an anticompetitive effect.  Cv. 
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Brantley v. NBC, reprinted in Chapter Two, supra, 
where the court rejected a claim that it was unlawful to tie desired and undesired 
cable television channels but no identified rival was excluded. 
 
PATENT POOLS AND EXCLUSION 
 
UNITED STATES V. SINGER MFG. CO. 
374 U.S. 174 (1963) 
 
 
Mr. Justice CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court. 
 
  ….  Singer is the sole United States manufacturer of household zigzag sewing 
machines. In addition to the multicam variety at issue here, it produces 
replaceable cam machines but not the manually operated zigzag. Singer sells 
these machines in this country through a wholly owned subsidiary and in various 
foreign countries through independent distributors. Singer's sales comprised 
approximately 61.4% of all domestic sales in multicam zigzag machines in the 
United States in 1959. During the same year some 22.6% were imported from 
Japan and about 16% from Europe. In 1958 Singer's percentage was 69.6%, 
Japanese imports 20.7% and European imports 9.7%. Further, Singer's 1959 
and 1960 domestic sales of multicam machines amounted to approximately $46 
million per year, in each of which years such sales accounted for about 45% of 
all its domestic sewing machine sales. 
 
  It appears that Singer by April 29, 1953, through its experimental 
department, had completed a design of a multiple cam zigzag mechanism in 
what it calls the Singer ‘401’ machine. It is disclosed in Singer's Johnson Patent. 
In 1953 Singer was also developing its Perla Patent as used in its ‘306’ 





replaceable cam machine and in 1954 its ‘319’ machine-carried multiple cam 
machine. In September of 1953 Vigorelli, an Italian corporation, introduced in 
the United States a sewing machine incorporating a stack of cams with a single 
follower. Singer concluded that Vigorelli had on file applications covering its 
machine in the various patent offices in the world and that the Singer design 
would infringe. On June 10, 1955, Singer bought for $8,000 a patent disclosing a 
plurality of cams with a single cam follower from Carl Harris, a Canadian. It was 
believed that this patent, filed June 9, 1952, might be reissued with claims 
covering the Singer 401 as well as its 319 machine, and that the reissued patent 
would dominate the Vigorelli machine a well as a Japanese one introduced into 
the United States in September 1954 by Brother International Corporation. 
Thereafter Singer concluded that litigation would result between it and Vigorelli 
unless a cross-licensing agreement could be made, and this was effected on 
November 17, 1955. The license was nonexclusive, world-wide and royalty 
free….   The agreement also contained provisions by which each of the parties 
agreed not to bring any infringement action against the other ‘in any country’ or 
institute against the other any opposition, nullity or invalidation proceedings in 
any country. In accordance with this agreement Singer withdrew its opposition to 
Vigorelli's patent application in Brazil and Vigorelli later (1958) abandoned a 
United States interference to the Johnson application which cleared the way for 
the Johnson Patent to issue on December 2 of that year. 
   
  While Singer was negotiating the cross-license agreement with Vigorelli it 
learned that Gegauf, a Swiss corporation, had a patent covering a multiple cam 
mechanism. This placed an additional cloud over Singer's Harris reissue plan 
because the Gegauf patent enjoyed an effective priority date in Italy of May 31, 
1952. This was nine days earlier than Singer's Harris patent filing date in the 
United States. In December 1955 Singer learned that Gegauf and Vigorelli had 
entered a cross-licensing agreement covering their multiple cam patents similar 
to the Vigorelli-Singer agreement. In January 1956 Singer found that Gegauf had 
pending an application in the United States Patent Office and assumed that it 
was based on the same priority date, i.e.,  May 31, 1952. If this was true Singer 
could use its Harris reissue patent only to oppose through interference the 
allowance of broad claims to Gegauf. It therefore made preparation to negotiate 
with Gegauf, first approaching Vigorelli in order to ascertain how the latter had 
induced Gegauf to grant him a royalty-free license and drop any claim of 
infringement. Singer made direct arrangements for a conference with Gegauf for 
April 12, 1956, and the license agreement was made April 14, 1956. 
 
 The setting for this meeting was that Gegauf had a dominant Swiss 
patent with applications in Germany, Italy, and the United States all prior to 
Singer. In addition, Singer's counsel had examined Gegauf's Swiss patent and 
advised that it was valid. Singer opened conversation with indications of coming 
litigation on the Harris patent, concealing the Johnson and Perla applications. 





Gegauf felt secure in his patent claims but insecure with reference to the inroads 
the Japanese machines were making on the United States market. It was this 
‘lever’ which Singer used to secure the license, pointing out that without an 
agreement Gegauf and Singer might litigate for a protracted period; that they 
should not be fighting each other as that would only delay the issue of their 
respective patents; and, finally, that they should license each other and get their 
respective patents ‘so they could be enforced by whoever would own the 
particular patent.’ Singer in the discussions worked upon these Gegauf fears of 
Japanese competition ‘because one of the strong points' of its argument was that 
an agreement should be made ‘in order to fight against this Japanese 
competition in their building a machine that in any way reads on the patents of 
ourselves and of Bernina (Gegauf) which are in conflict. The trial judge found 
that the only purpose ‘disclosed to Gegauf, and in fact the very one used to 
convince Gegauf of the advisability of entering into an agreement’ was to ‘obtain 
protection against the Japanese machines which might be made under the 
Gegauf patent; this sprang from a fear which Singer had good reason to believe 
to be well founded.’ While he found Singer's ‘underlying, dominant and sole 
purpose * * * was to settle the conflict in priority between the Gegauf and Harris 
patents and to secure for Singer a license right under the earlier patent,’ it is 
significant that no such overriding purpose was found to have been disclosed to 
Gegauf. 
 
 The license agreement covered (1) the Singer-Harris patent and its 
reissue application in the United States and nine corresponding foreign ones, and 
(2) the Gegauf Swiss, Italian and German patents, as well as the United States 
and German applications covering the same. The parties agreed in the first 
paragraph of the agreement ‘not to do anything, either directly or indirectly and 
in any country, the result of which might restrict the scope of the claims of the 
other party relating to the subject matter of the above mentioned patents and 
patent applications.’ In addition ‘each undertakes, in accordance with the laws 
and regulations of the Patent Office concerned, to facilitate the allowance in any 
country of claims as broad as possible, as regards the subject matter of the 
patents and patent applications referred to above.’ The parties also agreed not to 
sue one another on the basis of any of the patents or applications. Singer agreed 
not to make a ‘slavish’ copy of Gegauf's machine and to give Gegauf ‘the amical 
assistance of its patent attorneys for the defense of any of the above mentioned 
Gegauf patents or patent applications against an action in cancellation.’ The 
agreement made no mention of Singer's Perla or Johnson aplications, the 
existence of which Singer did not wish Gegauf to know….. 
 
First it may be helpful to set out what is not involved in this case. There 
is no claim by the Government that it is illegal for one merely to acquire a patent 
in order to exclude his competitors; or that the owner of a lawfully acquired 
patent cannot use the patent laws to exclude all infringers of the patent; or that 





a licensee cannot lawfully acquire the covering patent in order better to enforce 
it on his own acccount, even when the patent dominates an industry in which the 
licensee is the dominant firm. Therefore, we put all these matters aside without 
discussion. 
 
What is claimed here is that Singer engaged in a series of transactions 
with Gegauf and Vigorelli for an illegal purpose, i.e., to rid itself and Gegauf, 
together, perhaps, with Vigorelli, of infringements by their common competitors, 
the Japanese manufacturers. The Government claims that in this respect there 
were an identity of purpose among the parties and actions pursuant thereto that 
in law amount to a combination or conspiracy violative of the Sherman Act. It 
claims that this can be established under the findings of the District Court. 
 
We note from the findings that the importation of Japanese household 
multicam zigzag sewing machines first came to notice in the United States in 
1954 with the introduction of such a machine by the Brother International 
Corporation. It incorporated the mechanism of the Vigorelli zigzag and the Singer 
401 machines. By 1959 importations of all Japanese household sewing machines 
reached 1,100,000, while importations of European machines reached only 
100,000. Moreover, it appears that all but two domestic manufacturers were put 
out of business in three to four years after the Japanese machines first 
appeared. The two remaining domentic manufacturers were Singer and a 
company not specializing in sewing machines, which manufactured only straight 
stitch machines on order for a single domestic customer….. 
 
We now come to the assignment of the Gegauf patent to Singer….  
Singer proposed to Vigorelli that it could prosecute the Gegauf patent in the 
United States better than Gegauf and, after Vigorelli agreed, solicited his help in 
getting Gegauf to agree to assign the patent. …  Gegauf replied that he would be 
happy to meet Singer to discuss ‘mutual enforcement’ of its United States 
application and the Harris reissue. Then, in the final conferences in Europe 
Gegauf told Singer that he had no objection ‘to making an agreement with 
Singer, in order to stop as far as possible Japanese competitors in the United 
States market.’ Further, the trial court found that Singer assured Gegauf that 
‘Singer was insurance against common competitors' and Gegauf's fears that if 
Singer stopped the Japanese infringements in the United States they (the 
Japanese) would go to Europe, where Gegauf was not in as good a position to 
stop them, were unfounded because a greater risk was run in Europe if Singer 
were not permitted to first stop infringements in the United States. Finally, the 
court found that  Singer was determined ‘to drive home the point’ that Gegauf 
stood to benefit more by enforcement of the patents in the United States 
because the ‘Brother Pacesetter’ machine, a big selling and patent infringing 
Japanese-made machine, was in direct competition with the Gegauf machine in 
the United States….. 






 As we have noted with reference to the cross-license agreement, the trial 
court decided that ‘(t)he undisputed facts support no conclusion other than that 
the underlying, dominant and sole purpose of the license agreement was to 
settle the conflict in priority between the Gegauf and Harris patents * * *.’ We 
have rejected this conclusion on the trial court's own finding in the next 
paragraph of the opinion that Singer's ‘secondary’ purpose, the only one 
disclosed to Gegauf, was its ‘desire to obtain protection against the Japanese 
machines which might be made under the Gegauf patent.’  
 
 The trial court held that the fact that Singer had a purpose, which 
‘Gegauf well knew,’ of enforcing the patent upon its acquisition, that the 
enforcement ‘would most certainly include Japanese manufacturers who were 
the principal infringers,’ and ‘that Gegauf shared with Singer a common concern 
over Japanese competition’ did not establish a conspiracy.  Given the court's own 
findings and the clear import of the record, it is apparent that its conclusions 
were predicated upon ‘an erroneous interpretation of the standard to be applied. 
* * * Thus, ‘(b)ecause of the nature of the District Court's error we are reviewing 
a question of law, namely, whether the District Court applied the proper standard 
to essentially undisputed facts.’ United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 
44 (1960). There in a discussion of a like problem we held that ‘the inference of 
an agreement in violation of the Sherman Act’ is not ‘merely limited to particular 
fact complexes,’ ibid., ‘Both cases,’ the Court continued, ‘teach that judicial 
inquiry is not to stop with a search of the record for evidence of purely 
contractual arrangements. * * *’ Whether the conspiracy was achieved by 
agreement, by tacit understanding, or by ‘acquiescence * * * coupled with 
assistance in effectuating its purpose is immaterial.’  Here the patent was put in 
Singer's hands to achieve the common purpose of enforcement ‘equally 
advantageous to both’ Singer and Gegauf and to Vigorelli as well. What Singer 
had refused Vigorelli, i.e., acting ‘in concert against others,’ was thus 
achieved by the simple expedient of transferring the patent to Singer. 
  
Thus by entwining itself with Gegauf and Vigorelli in such a program 
Singer went far beyond its claimed purpose of merely protecting its own 401 
machine-it was protecting Gegauf and Vigorelli, the sole licensees under the 
patent at the time, under the same umbrella. This the Sherman Act will not 
permit. As the Court held in Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 
208, 210 (1921), the conspiracy arises implicitly from the course of dealing of the 
parties…. The fact that the enforcement plan likewise served Singer is of no 
consequence, the controlling factor being the overall common design, i.e., to 
destroy the Japanese sale of infringing machines in the United States by placing 
the patent in Singer's hands the better to achieve this result. It is this concerted 
action to restrain trade, clearly established by the course of dealings, that 
condemns the transactions under the Sherman Act…. 






  Moreover this overriding common design to exclude the Japanese 
machines in the United States is clearly illustrated by Singer's action before the 
United States Tariff Commission. Less than eight months after the patent was 
issued it started this effort to bar infringers in one sweep. As an American 
corporation, it was the sole company of the three that was able to bring such an 
action…. This maneuver was for the purpose, as the trial court found, of giving 
Singer “a better chance of prevailing before the Tariff Commission' in its efforts 
to exclude' infringing machines….. 
 
It is strongly urged upon us that application of the antitrust laws in this 
case will have a significantly deleterious effect on Singer's position as the sole 
remaining domestic producer of zigzag sewing machines for household use, the 
market for which has been increasingly preempted by foreign manufacturers. 
Whether economic consequences of this character warrant relaxation of the 
scope of enforcement of the antitrust laws, however, is a policy matter 
committed to congressional or executive resolution. It is not within the province 
of the courts, whose function is to apply the existing law. It is well settled that 
‘(b)eyond the limited monopoly which is granted, the arrangements by which the 
patent is utilized are subject to the general law,’ United States v. Masonite Corp., 
supra, 316 U.S. at 277 and it ‘is equally well settled that the possession of a valid 
patent or patents does not give the patentee any exemption from the provisions 
of the Sherman Act beyond the limits of the patent monopoly. By aggregating 
patents in one control, the holder of the patents cannot escape the prohibitions 
of the Sherman Act.’  
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  One of the most famous patent pools in American industrial history involved 
the sewing machine in the middle of the nineteenth century, more than a 
century before the Singer decision printed here. See Adam Mossoff, The Rise and 
Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 
53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165 (2011). 
 
 Elias Howe, Jr. was an impoverished apprentice in a machine shop in 
Boston when he overheard someone saying that a functional sewing machine 
would be worth a fortune. Howe began experimenting and invented a 
functioning machine whose patent issued in 1846, but his invention was not 
commercially successful. A number of other firms entered the race for a 
commercial machine and I. M. Singer was issued a patent in 1851.  While Howe’s 
machine was able to produce 250 stitches per minute, Singer’s machine 
produced 900.  However, parts of the Singer machine were covered by Howe’s 
1846 patent, and the two entered several years of costly patent infringement 





litigation, Singer finally settled with Howe, and as part of the settlement agreed 
to pay Howe a license for every machine sold. 
 
 Several other machines appeared on the market, and Singer found 
himself in over twenty different patent-infringement lawsuits spanning at least 
three different venues. “By the mid-1850s, sewing machine firms were spending 
all their time, money, and energy in patent litigation.” Id. at 194. Finally, the 
firms formed a patent pool in which the patents were cross licensed and each 
firm paid a license fee for every machine produced.  That largely brought an end 
to the litigation. 
 
2.  As the principal case suggests, patent pools may be used for exclusion as well 
as collusion.  The participants in the pool may license to one another freely but 
use their patents to keep outsiders from entering the market.  A patentee acting 
alone may generally refuse to license without antitrust or patent law liability.  But 
how should the law treat an agreement among two or more firms that they will 
not license their patents to outsiders?  Could a pool attain all the efficiencies that 
pooling makes possible by agreeing to license their patents to one another but 
not specifying whether or not the members may also license their own patents to 
outsiders? 
 
COPYRIGHT BLANKET LICENSING 
 
BROADCAST MUSIC, INC. v. MOOR-LAW, INC. 
527 F. Supp. 758 (D. Del. 1981) 
 
STAPLETON, District Judge: 
 
Virtually all licensing of performing rights to musical compositions in the 
United States is conducted by two large organizations representing thousands of 
individual copyright owners, Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”) and the American 
Society of Composers, Authors, & Publishers (“ASCAP”)…. This lawsuit involves 
antitrust and copyright misuse challenges to BMI's practices in licensing music 
rights to small establishments, like nightclubs and bars, that provide live music. 
 
In 1977, BMI and several publisher affiliates initiated a copyright 
infringement action against Moor-Law, Inc., a Delaware corporation doing 
business as the Triple Nickel Saloon. In 1979, BMI initiated another infringement 
action under the amended Copyright Act. The two actions were consolidated. 
Triple Nickel raised the affirmative defense of copyright misuse, and 
counterclaimed for violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 
3 of the Clayton Act…. 
 





The central issue at trial was the legality of BMI's use of a “blanket 
license” agreement. This agreement provides users like the Triple Nickel with 
access to all compositions within the BMI repertory, and bases the fee for that 
access not on the amount of BMI music used, but on the user's total 
entertainment expenses. 
 
…  BMI licensees fall into two categories: broadcast and non-broadcast 
(or general). Included among the broadcast licensees are television networks like 
CBS, television stations, and radio stations. Included among the non-broadcast 
licensees are hotel and motels, dance studios, skating rinks, colleges, concert 
halls, and a sub-category called “GLAs.” GLAs are small establishments like bars, 
nightclubs and restaurants that offer live music and are subject to BMI's General 
Licensing Agreement (GLA). 
 
The Triple Nickel falls within the GLA category. Owned and operated by 
Mr. Robert Moor, the Triple Nickel has been doing business in Bear, Delaware, 
since September 1976. It offers primarily country and western music.  
 
The “blanket license” offered by BMI to establishments like the Triple 
Nickel provides the licensee with the right to immediate, indemnified access to 
any and all songs in the BMI repertory. The GLA licensee is charged an annual 
fee for the license based on its annual entertainment expenses (i.e. the cost of 
hiring musicians). The Triple Nickel's fee for BMI's license based on its 1979 
estimated entertainment expenses of $75,000 would have been $400. Mr. Moor 
testified that an ASCAP representative informed him that their licensing fee for 
the Triple Nickel would be approximately $600….. 
  
The events leading up to this litigation are not atypical of the experiences 
of other GLA licensees who testified at trial. In January 1977, Mr. Moor, the 
owner of the Triple Nickel, received a form letter from BMI informing him of his 
obligation under the copyright statute and the necessity for obtaining a BMI 
license. The Triple Nickel was also visited by a BMI representative; Mr. Moor 
refused to enter into the BMI blanket license. After a second visit by the BMI 
representative, during which the performance of live songs at the Triple Nickel 
were logged, and two more letters, BMI initiated this copyright infringement 
action against the Triple Nickel in August 1977. In 1978, counsel for BMI and the 
Triple Nickel engaged in correspondence concerning the form of license. BMI 
offered a per piece license to Mr. Moor if he could identify the songs he wanted 
to use; Mr. Moor requested a list of all BMI compositions; BMI explained such a 
list was not available since BMI had a constantly changing repertory of one 
million songs (over 40,000 new songs being added annually), but invited Mr. 
Moor to New York to search the BMI library himself. This was the end of 
negotiations between the parties. 
 





The relevant market in this case is the licensing of musical performing 
rights to GLA licensees. An examination of the characteristics of this unique 
market is essential to an evaluation of the Triple Nickel's antitrust and copyright 
misuse claims.  
 
Both parties' experts agreed that this market has natural monopoly 
characteristics. Because there are thousands of individual copyright “sellers” 
seeking to deal with thousands of GLA buyers, the potential transaction costs are 
very high. Economies of scale exist as sellers band together to spread transaction 
costs of identical transactions over a larger group. Thus, some pooling of 
copyrights by individual copyright holders is a necessity in order to take 
advantage of the natural monopoly characteristics of the market. 
 
In addition, both parties' experts agree that the goods in this market—the 
performing rights to the musical compositions—have the characteristics of “public 
goods”. Public goods have two salient characteristics which operate in this 
market. First, unlike private goods (e.g. apples), one can use a public good 
without leaving any less for others to consume. Once a musical composition is 
created, the marginal cost of additional consumption is zero. The second 
characteristic of public goods is that it is difficult to exclude persons who do not 
pay from using the good. The owners of private goods can withhold their goods 
from the market and release them only in return for payment; but, once a 
composer's song becomes known, he or she finds it difficult to prevent that good 
from being “stolen” by users. The enforcement problem resulting from this public 
good characteristic manifests itself in the GLA market through users who don't 
pay any licensing fee. During the course of this litigation, this has been labeled 
the “free rider” problem. 
 
Because the high transaction costs derived from natural monopoly 
characteristics are increased by the public good enforcement problem, very large 
performing rights organizations, like BMI and ASCAP, in which individual 
copyright holders pool their rights are necessary to achieve efficiency. The larger 
the organization, the more efficient it will be in reducing transaction costs; 
indeed, Triple Nickel's expert, Dr. Cirace, advocated one combined licensing 
operation as the most efficient means of operating in this market. The necessity 
for these large licensing organizations makes competition in the sense of many 
sellers competing against each other in the GLA market unrealistic. 
 
The parties are also in agreement that the nature of the GLA market 
makes some kind of blanket license a necessity. As the Supreme Court observed 
in CBS IV : 
 
Individual sales transactions in this industry are quite expensive, as would 
be individual monitoring and enforcement, especially in light of the 





resources of single composers. Indeed, as both the Court of Appeals and 
CBS recognize the costs are prohibitive for licenses with individual radio 
stations, nightclubs, and restaurants, ... and it was in that milieu that the 
blanket license arose. 
 
 CBS IV, 441 U.S. at 20. 
 
Moreover, the Supreme Court's recognition in the CBS case that most 
users want “unplanned, rapid and indemnified access” to a wide range of 
compositions, is particularly apt in the GLA market. Testimony at trial made clear 
that GLA users typically do not know in advance what compositions will be 
performed nightly in their establishments and yet want the right to perform them 
instantaneously. The blanket license provides instantaneous access to any 
composition desired. 
 
A corollary of the conclusion that the blanket license is a necessity in the 
GLA market is that the alternatives required by BMI's consent decree of direct 
licensing with individual copyright owners or of per piece licensing are unfeasible 
in this market. Again, the parties seem to agree on this point. Unlike the 
situation in CBS where large networks were interested in a relatively small 
number of compositions known in advance of performance, GLAs like the Triple 
Nickel are small establishments which lack the resources or the advance notice to 
contact copyright owners individually on a large scale. Likewise, because GLA 
owners rarely know in advance of performance the songs a band intends to play 
and because GLA bands often take audience requests, a prospective per piece 
license is unrealistic. 
 
Finally, although the parties disagree over appropriate methods of 
pricing, they seem to agree that the natural market forces of supply and demand 
do not operate normally on pricing in this market. Because of the public good 
characteristic that the marginal cost of using a musical composition is zero, 
normal cost-based pricing is not feasible. The parties seem to agree that some 
form of pricing based on benefit conferred is appropriate. But, since as a 
practical matter a GLA needs a license from both ASCAP and BMI, the normal 
constraint on benefit pricing-alternative supply-does not operate in this market. 
 
Thus, although large performing rights organizations are a necessity in 
this market, the result in the current market is that BMI can exercise substantial 
monopoly power over price. This monopoly power of the seller is particularly 
strong in a negotiating situation where there is no corresponding power on the 
buyer's side. Unlike the television network market where buyers like CBS exercise 
some monopsony power of their own, the buyers in the GLA market are weak 
and diffuse. 
 





While normal competitive forces do not operate in this market, it is not 
true that BMI's price for its GLA license is unconstrained. Testimony at trial 
convinced me that the free rider problem does provide a significant constraint on 
the price BMI charges. The higher the price it charges, the greater the resistance 
of GLA users is likely to be, and, conversely, the lower the price, the lower the 
resistance will be. Since the free rider problem tends to make BMI's enforcement 
costs high and can, indeed, cause increased costs to more than consume 
increased revenue from a higher price, BMI considers this problem when setting 
a price. 
 
The Triple Nickel's primary challenge is to the current licensing 
agreement BMI offers to GLAs. It maintains that the offering of that license 
without providing a realistic alternative constitutes an illegal tie-in which is a per 
se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. But regardless of the disposition of 
the tie-in claim, the Triple Nickel attacks the combination of full repertory blanket 
license and fee tied to entertainment expense as a general restraint of trade 
illegal under Section 1. It further argues that BMI's imposition on GLAs of this 
blanket license involving pooled copyrights priced in such a way that it includes 
other factors besides the amount of BMI music used constitutes copyright 
misuse…. 
 
The Triple Nickel argues that BMI's current licensing practices coerce it 
into purchasing music which it does not wish to perform in order to secure 
access to music which it does wish to perform. Because of this “tie-in”, the Triple 
Nickel maintains that this case is an appropriate one for per se rather than Rule 
of Reason analysis. As I indicated in my prior opinion, however, this issue was 
resolved against the Triple Nickel in CBS IV. 
 
As discussed in more detail … infra, the Triple Nickel failed to prove that 
there was only one category of musical compositions, i.e., country-western, for 
which it desired performing rights. The Triple Nickel also failed to prove that 
there was a larger category of music-e.g. a “family” of music including country, 
bluegrass and gospel-that could be adequately defined to meet its needs. It is 
true, as the Triple Nickel urges, that BMI music may theoretically be categorized 
as consisting of two kinds of music: music that the Triple Nickel wants to play in 
its establishment, and music that the Triple Nickel doesn't want to play. But it is 
not true in any realistic sense that the full repertory license forces the Triple 
Nickel to take the music it doesn't want along with the music it wants; rather 
Triple Nickel's method of doing business, which does not permit advance 
identification of the compositions it will ultimately wish to play, causes it to need 
the right to perform the full BMI repertory. The Supreme Court recognized this 
fact when it characterized the blanket license as akin to a single product: 
 





The blanket license is composed of the individual compositions plus the 
aggregating service. Here, the whole is truly greater than the sum of its 
parts; it is, to some extent, a different product.... (T)o the extent the 
blanket license is a different product, ASCAP is not really a joint sales 
agency offering the individual goods of many sellers, but is a separate 
seller offering its blanket license, of which the individual compositions are 
raw material. 
 
CBS IV, 441 U.S. at 21-22. 
 
In CBS IV, the Supreme Court held that ASCAP's blanket license required 
Rule of Reason analysis and each of the reasons given for that conclusion 
support the utilization of that approach in this case. Here, as there, the market is 
sufficiently unusual and the Court's experience with the challenged practice 
sufficiently sparse that one cannot confidently characterize the defendants' 
conduct as “ ‘plainly anticompetitive’ and very likely without ‘redeeming virtue.’ ” 
 
Accordingly, I hold that Rule of Reason analysis is appropriate in this case 
and turn to the evidence in order to assess the actual and potential adverse 
impacts of BMI's practices on the relevant market, the positive contributions of 
those practices in that market, and the effects of the alternative practices which 
Triple Nickel believes would involve less restraint on competition. 
 
The first and most obvious restraint of trade which arises from BMI's 
current licensing practices is the one focused on in the CBS case, the elimination 
of price competition among those whose compositions are in its pool of music. 
There are additional anticompetitive effects, however, of the kind reflected in the 
leading “block booking” cases upon which the Triple Nickel so heavily relies. 
  
This package selling arrangement results in the sellers selling more 
“product” than they would in a competitive market. In a competitive market, 
some sellers would sell more songs than others depending upon the popularity of 
their compositions. In this market, however, sellers pool their songs and sell 
them on an all-or-nothing basis. By thus banding together, rather than 
competing against each other, the sellers are able to lever the selling power of 
one copyright to the selling power of others and thus enlarge the monopoly of 
all. As a result, less popular sellers sell more than they otherwise would. As the 
Supreme Court has observed in a motion picture context: 
 
Where a high quality film greatly desired is licensed only if an inferior one 
is taken, the latter borrows quality from the former and strengthens its 
monopoly by drawing on the other. The practice tends to equalize rather 
than differentiate the reward for the individual copyrights. 
 





United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). 
 
In addition to rewarding inferior copyrights, all copyrights will tend to 
achieve greater sales by package selling than they would without such an 
arrangement. Even the most popular songs are not wanted by all GLAs. Thus, 
any songwriter is likely to increase his sales by combining his songs in a package 
with all other songs, since some buyers who would not otherwise purchase his 
songs must now do so in order to get the songs that they do desire. 
  
In addition to the anticompetitive effects on individual copyright sellers, 
there are corresponding effects on the copyright buyers. BMI's current licensing 
practices deprive GLA purchasers of the control which they would have in a 
competitive market over the amount of business they conduct with a particular 
source. In a competitive market, for example, a GLA would have the ability to 
reduce its purchases from a particular source in response to a price rise. Where 
the only feasible access to BMI's music is through an all-or-nothing license which 
bases the price paid on factors other than the quantity of BMI music performed, 
however, a GLA is unable to reduce its total obligation to BMI through control of 
the quantity of BMI music performed. 
  
Finally, the all-or-nothing BMI license may erect barriers to entry to 
potential competition from other musical performing rights organizations. GLA 
proprietors testified that the combined costs of BMI and ASCAP all-or-nothing 
licenses were significant for them, and that the arrival of a third licensing 
organization, SESAC, increased their resistance to licensing proposals further. 
When the only option the seller offers is all-or-nothing, the buyer presumably 
wants to deal with as few sellers as possible. In such a situation, because the 
price the buyer is charged is not related to the quantity used, even if its total 
quantity of music used remains the same, it may face a higher total price with 
each additional seller, rather than a reallocation of total price among different 
sellers. One would expect that the burden of this increased resistance to 
licensing would not be visited equally on all sellers in the market. The buyers 
have a greater incentive to resist a new and smaller organization who controls a 
smaller percentage of the compositions desired and whose willingness and ability 
to enforce its rights through expensive litigation has not been as forcefully 
demonstrated in the marketplace. Since the willingness of most GLA's to take a 
license without litigation is crucial to success in this market, the increased 
resistance engendered by the absence of a relationship between price and 
quantity may constitute a barrier to entry. The significance of that barrier is 
impossible to assess, however, on the basis of the record in this case. 
 
BMI asserts, and the Triple Nickel does not dispute, that BMI's blanket 
license has redeeming virtues. As earlier noted, the parties agree that performing 
rights societies and their blanket licenses reduce transaction costs which would 





otherwise be prohibitive. BMI's blanket license thus has a pro-competitive effect 
in the sense that there would be no market if individual GLAs were left to 
negotiate with individual copyright holders. 
 
Moreover, Triple Nickel acknowledges that some form of blanket license is 
necessary to meet the needs of GLAs. The “unplanned, rapid and indemnified 
access” which GLAs need can only be afforded by a form of licensing which does 
not require the identification of particular musical compositions in advance of 
their performance. 
 
BMI justifies the “full repertory” blanket license both on the ground that it 
is the best means of meeting the needs of virtually all GLA buyers and on the 
ground that a less than full repertory license system, if feasible at all, would be 
significantly more expensive to administer than a full repertory one. Since GLA 
users tend to use a large number and wide variety of musical compositions, their 
needs can generally be most completely served with access to as large a 
repertory as possible. Because the marginal cost of additional consumption is 
zero, it is no less expensive for BMI to provide access to a more limited repertory 
of songs than to its full repertory of a million songs. Indeed, as discussed 
hereafter, a limited repertory license would undoubtedly be more expensive for 
BMI to provide because, among other things, of the additional cost of monitoring 
the holders of such licenses to ascertain if their use of BMI compositions exceeds 
the scope of their licenses. 
 
Finally, BMI justifies pricing based on the GLA user's total entertainment 
expense as a convenient, inexpensive and reliable way of providing a rough 
measure of the benefit conferred by the music rights licensed. The only 
information necessary to administer the present pricing system is a GLA's annual 
figures for its entertainment expenses. Since these figures must be kept for tax 
purposes in any event, there is virtually no cost involved in gathering this data 
and it is likely to be reliable. 
 
Triple Nickel acknowledges that there is no feasible way to create and 
maintain price competition between copyright holders in the GLA market. It 
asserts, however, that there are alternative forms of licensing which BMI could 
offer in addition to its current full repertory license which would involve less 
restraint on the GLA's freedom of choice and on the entry of additional 
performing right societies in the market. The Triple Nickel's first suggestion is 
that BMI offer a less-than-full repertory, or “mini” blanket, license as an 
alternative to its full repertory license and its per piece license. Second, the 
Triple Nickel urges that a license be offered that bases cost on a retroactive 
determination of the quantity of BMI music played each year and a “proxy”, per 
performance price. 
 





The alternative form of license that was the primary focus of Triple 
Nickel's trial testimony and post-trial briefing was a limited repertory license 
based on a category of music, like “country and western”. It also proposed a 
limited repertory license based on a family of music, like country, bluegrass, folk 
and gospel. In either event, the suggestion is that the price would bear the same 
relationship to the price for a full repertory license which the BMI compositions in 
the covered categories bears to the compositions in BMI's total repertory. For 
pricing purposes, BMI would categorize a limited sample of its songs in order to 
determine what percentage of BMI music fell into each field of music and this 
category percentage would be periodically adjusted through sampling of the new 
songs that BMI constantly adds to its repertory. 
 
The first problem with the Triple Nickel's suggestion is that the “mini” 
blanket licenses which it proposes would not meet its own needs. The music 
performed at the Triple Nickel includes compositions that have gained popularity 
in a variety of performance styles. Mr. William Ivey, Director of the Country 
Music Foundation and an expert in the identification of the styles of musical 
performance, testified that only about two-thirds of the music performed at the 
Triple Nickel had a country and western performance history, and, therefore, 
even if it were possible to categorize music based on the primary style in which 
such music has historically been performed, approximately one-third of the 
compositions performed at the Triple Nickel would fall outside the country and 
western category. Indeed, the Triple Nickel admits that the music it plays 
includes rock and roll, folk, bluegrass, and gospel, as well as country and 
western. It has suggested no “mini” blanket license which would authorize it to 
play all that it is in fact using. 
 
More fundamentally, however, it is simply not feasible to categorize music 
for licensing purposes into such performance style labels. As Mr. Ivey explained, 
the method of categorizing musical compositions proffered by the Triple Nickel is 
in reality a categorization not of the music but the style in which the music is 
performed. Since there is insufficient information residing in the composition 
itself (that is, the score and lyrics) to determine the performance style, to 
categorize a song based on score and lyrics alone would be arbitrary. Moreover, 
any such categorization based on a study of performance history would be 
subject to disagreement. Frequently a musician will take a song historically 
popular in one style and perform it in a different style. And it is also common for 
a song which has gained popularity in one performance style to subsequently 
gain popularity in another style. For these reasons, a “mini” blanket licensing 
system would create intolerable uncertainty in the marketplace. 
 
In addition, even if it were assumed for purposes of argument that there 
are GLA users whose licensing needs would be satisfied by a limited category 
license, obviously no one would opt for that form of license if the fee for it 





equaled or exceeded the fee for the full blanket license. Perhaps in recognition of 
this fact, Triple Nickel suggests that the Court decree a proportionately reduced 
price for “mini” blanket licenses. It tenders no persuasive rationale for doing so, 
however. The benefit derived from the use of BMI music will not vary materially 
depending upon whether a user is performing twenty different BMI songs from 
different categories each night or twenty songs from the same category. 
Moreover, the “mini” blanket license would necessarily cost more to administer 
than the full repertory license because the “mini” license would involve 
categorization costs, additional policing costs, and the costs of resolving, and of 
attempting to avoid, disputes over the scope of the license. For these reasons, 
there is no basis for an injunction requiring a proportionately reduced fee for a 
“mini” license. As the experts acknowledged, however, in the absence of such a 
decree, there is no reason to believe that BMI's charge for a “mini” blanket 
license would be less than its charge for a full repertory one. 
 
In examining the alternatives that an antitrust claimant has proposed, the 
Third Circuit has described the comparative standard normally applied under rule 
of reason analysis as follows: 
 
(T)he test is not whether the defendant deployed the least restrictive 
alternative. Rather the issue is whether the restriction actually 
implemented is ‘fairly necessary’ in the circumstances of the particular 
case, or whether the restriction ‘exceeds the outer limits of restraint 
reasonably necessary to protect the defendant.’ 
 
American Motor Inns, 521 F.2d at 1248-49. The record in this case convincingly 
demonstrates that the full repertory blanket license system is “fairly necessary” 
to serve the relevant market and that “mini” blanket licenses are not a practical 
alternative. 
 
The primary problem which the Triple Nickel has with the current 
practices of BMI is not with the form of its licenses but rather with the prices that 
it charges. It proposes alternative pricing schemes with features that are 
purportedly designed to overcome several restraints which it attributes to BMI's 
current pricing arrangement. First, the Triple Nickel objects to the current 
practice because it is not related to the amount of BMI music actually performed 
by the licensee. It proposes a use-based pricing approach. Second, the Triple 
Nickel argues that a price based on total entertainment expense illegally extends 
BMI's monopoly power because it charges for factors other than the actual 
benefit the GLA user derives from the blanket license. It proposes a pricing 
formula which utilizes the number of performances of BMI music, the number of 
listeners per performance, and a per performance or “per use” price. Finally, the 
Triple Nickel seeks to solve the problem caused by the absence of competitive 
restraints on BMI's pricing by requiring it to charge a “proxy”, per use price. 






In place of the current licensing agreement which fails to account for 
actual use, the Triple Nickel proposes that the price of a full repertory blanket 
license be based on the amount of BMI music actually performed, measured 
after the fact. It concedes that measuring use daily throughout the year would 
be impractical, so it has suggested a sampling system under which songs used at 
a GLA establishment would be logged by the licensee over a short period of time. 
Dr. Lamb, a computer and statistics expert, suggested that a sample of 150 
songs would be sufficiently reliable. BMI would then use its computer to 
determine what percentage of the GLA's total song consumption belongs to BMI. 
This percentage and an estimate of the GLA's total performances during the year 
would provide the number of BMI performances for which it would be billed. 
 
The first problem with this proposal for a per use price is a conceptual 
one. It fails to account for a significant part of the benefit provided by the BMI 
license. The inability of GLAs to identify in advance the compositions which will 
be played means that they need the right to perform all BMI music which the 
musician may ultimately select. Thus, with the full repertory blanket license the 
GLA purchases more than the right to play the BMI compositions which are 
actually performed; he also purchases immediate and unlimited access to BMI's 
entire repertory. As the Supreme Court observed in CBS IV, this makes the 
blanket license akin to a single product. 
  
The major difficulty with this proposed per use licensing feature, 
however, is a practical one, the increased costs associated with the sampling. 
Initially, there would be the expense of educating GLAs with respect to the 
necessity of taking the sample and the proper method of performing that task. 
Following up to secure a suitable sample from these GLAs will also involve 
expense. Finally there would be the expense of determining which compositions 
listed on the logs are in the BMI repertory.  
 
In addition to the disadvantage of increased costs, I am unable to say on 
this record that institution of per use pricing would materially effect the restraints 
which have been identified in the market. Such a system would not provide a 
constraint on BMI's pricing by giving a GLA control over the quantity of BMI 
music used and paid for. GLAs do not know which compositions belong to which 
organization and providing complete lists of BMI's repertory to educate them 
would require the equivalent of a two thousand page phonebook, with frequent 
periodic supplements to keep it current. And, even if the GLA owner were 
motivated enough to purchase and work with such a cumbersome publication, it 
is the musician, and not the GLA owner, who actually decides which 
compositions will be performed. 
 





It is, of course, true that under a per use pricing scheme a GLA could 
reduce its total consumption of music in order to reduce the amount paid during 
the period covered by the license. But so long as the unit price in each new 
license is controlled by the performing rights societies, nothing in this record 
demonstrates that the per use pricing system by itself would serve as a 
constraint on BMI's power over price. 
 
It is only in the area of the potential barrier to entry that I perceive the 
possibility of a beneficial effect from a per use pricing approach. Under such a 
system, if and when a new performing rights society attempts to enter this 
market, presumably by gaining rights to compositions which would otherwise 
belong to existing organizations, its licensing fees would be reflected in 
correspondingly reduced charges by the existing organizations and, as noted 
above, one would expect this fact to lessen GLA resistance to that entry. As 
discussed in more detail in Section VII, however, one cannot tell from this record 
the significance of that barrier or, indeed, whether such an entry would be 
feasible under either pricing scheme. 
 
Given the additional cost of per use licensing and the fact that the only 
potential benefit from its adoption is a highly speculative one, I decline to require 
its adoption by BMI. 
 
In combination with per use pricing, the Triple Nickel asks the Court to 
impose a “proxy price” to be charged for each performance of a BMI 
composition. This request brings us to the heart of this matter. The core problem 
here is, of course, that normal competition does not and cannot operate in this 
market to establish the price which GLAs will pay for the right to perform music. 
The Triple Nickel insists that this means the Court must step in to set an 
appropriate price. I decline to do so for several reasons. 
 
First, the Triple Nickel has not suggested an adequate rationale for 
adopting any of its suggested means of determining that price. … 
  
There are two other possible remedies for the unique problem which the 
Triple Nickel here brings to the Court: concentration of market power on the 
buyer's side of the market of the kind which has occurred in the hotel and motel 
market, or some form of continuing regulation which will fix and modify prices in 
light of the present and future conditions in this market. The first remedy I am 
obviously unable to prescribe. The second is one that this Court is not suited to 
administer. If Congress sees fit to occupy this field, I am confident it can make a 
more rational assignment of the task. As Judge Kaufman recently observed in a 
Section Two context, “(J)udicial oversight of pricing policies would place the 
courts in a role akin to that of a public regulatory commission. We would be wise 





to decline that function unless Congress clearly bestows it upon us.”   Berkey 
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 294 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 
Regardless of whether various aspects of BMI's current pricing system 
constitute restraints of trade objectionable under the antitrust laws, they are also 
subject to scrutiny under the copyright misuse doctrine. I conclude, however, 
that the Triple Nickel's case fares no better under copyright misuse analysis. 
 
The Triple Nickel maintains that BMI's practice of basing its license fee on 
entertainment expense unlawfully extends the scope of its lawful copyright 
monopolies. As already noted, it objects to entertainment expense because it 
contains “add-on” factors; it includes the popularity of the musician and it 
reflects not only the contribution of the music in BMI's pool, but that of all music 
performed. In support of its argument it relies primarily upon Zenith Radio Corp. 
v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969). 
 
In the Zenith case, Zenith asserted a patent misuse defense against an 
infringement claim. The contested licensing agreement allowed Zenith to use all 
of Hazeltine's radio and television patents for a fee based on a percentage of 
Zenith's total sales. The court concluded that such an arrangement might 
constitute patent misuse, distinguishing a similar earlier case, Automatic Radio 
Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, 339 U.S. 827 (1950), in which it had found 
nothing “inherent” in a patent arrangement based on a percentage of total sales 
which illegally extended the monopoly conferred by the patent. On remand, the 
District Court in Zenith was to be guided by the Court's statement that “If 
convenience of the parties rather than patent power dictates the total sales 
royalty provision, there is no misuse of the patents and no forbidden conditions 
attached to the license.”  
 
Under the Zenith approach, the relevant issue here is whether the feature 
of BMI's licensing which bases the fee on a percentage of entertainment expense 
rather than on a per use price times the number of BMI songs played is a 
product of the convenience of the parties or of a BMI effort to extend its 
monopolies beyond their legal boundaries. The evidence on this issue weighs in 
BMI's favor. The record establishes that the percentage of entertainment 
expense approach is a simple and convenient one for both parties because it 
utilizes reliable data collected and maintained for other purposes. It further 
establishes that a pricing system based on a per use price times the number of 
BMI songs played would require the gathering of additional information which 
would be substantially more costly while substantially more susceptible to 
manipulation. Further, we know that in another market in which BMI customers 
have substantial bargaining power, the hotel-motel market, the negotiated 
licenses provide for fees based on entertainment expense. Finally, the record 
fails to persuade me that as a practical matter BMI's current approach enables it 





to abuse its monopoly power more easily than would be the case if it determined 
a per unit price and charged on the basis of BMI plays. Accordingly, I perceive no 
motive for BMI coercing use of the former in lieu of the latter. Under these 
circumstances, it is more likely than not that the percentage of entertainment 
expense approach arose and exists as a matter of the convenience of the 
parties….. 
 
In defending against a copyright infringement action, the Triple Nickel 
has contended that a number of licensing practices of BMI in the GLA market-
primarily its use of a full repertory blanket license in combination with a price 
based on total entertainment expenses-are illegal. It has challenged these 
practices as violations of Sections One and Two of the Sherman Act and as 
copyright misuse. I have concluded that it has failed to prove any of these 
claims. Therefore, judgment will be entered in favor of BMI on its copyright 
infringement claim and against the Triple Nickel on its antitrust counterclaims. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), 
CBS charged BMI and ASCAP claimed that the blanket licenses they used, which 
gave the licensee the right to play anything in the licensor’s library, amounted to 
price-fixing in violation of the Sherman Act. The court of appeals held that the 
blanket license was a per se violation of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that the arrangement should be addressed under the rule of 
reason.  The  Court stated: 
 
…  our inquiry must focus on whether the effect and . . . the purpose of 
the practice are to threaten the proper operation of our predominantly 
free-market economy -- that is, whether the practice facially appears to 
be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition 
and decrease output. 
 
The blanket license, as we see it, is not a “naked restrain[t] of 
trade with no purpose except stifling of competition,” White Motor Co. v. 
United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263, but rather accompanies the integration 
of sales, monitoring, and enforcement against unauthorized copyright 
use. … ASCAP and the blanket license developed together out of the 
practical situation in the marketplace: thousands of users, thousands of 
copyright owners, and millions of compositions. Most users want 
unplanned, rapid, and indemnified access to any and all of the repertory 
of compositions, and the owners want a reliable method of collecting for 
the use of their copyrights. Individual sales transactions in this industry 
are quite expensive, as would be individual monitoring and enforcement, 
especially in light of the resources of single composers. Indeed, as both 





the Court of Appeals and CBS recognize, the costs are prohibitive for 
licenses with individual radio stations, nightclubs, and restaurants, and it 
was in that milieu that the blanket license arose. 
 
A middleman with a blanket license was an obvious 
necessity if the thousands of individual negotiations, a virtual 
impossibility, were to be avoided. Also, individual fees for the use 
of individual compositions would presuppose an intricate schedule 
of fees and uses, as well as a difficult and expensive reporting 
problem for the user and policing task for the copyright owner. 
Historically, the market for public-performance rights organized 
itself largely around the single-fee blanket license, which gave 
unlimited access to the repertory and reliable protection against 
infringement. When ASCAP's major and user-created competitor, 
BMI, came on the scene, it also turned to the blanket license. 
 
The blanket license has certain unique characteristics: It 
allows the licensee immediate use of covered compositions, 
without the delay of prior individual negotiations and great 
flexibility in the choice of musical material. Many consumers 
clearly prefer the characteristics and cost advantages of this 
marketable package, and even small-performing rights societies 
that have occasionally arisen to compete with ASCAP and BMI 
have offered blanket licenses.  
 
Not all arrangements among actual or potential 
competitors that have an impact on price are per se violations of 
the Sherman Act or even unreasonable restraints. Mergers among 
competitors eliminate competition, including price competition, but 
they are not per se illegal, and many of them withstand attack 
under any existing antitrust standard. Joint ventures and other 
cooperative arrangements are also not usually unlawful, at least 
not as price-fixing schemes, where the agreement on price is 
necessary to market the product at all. 
 
Here, the blanket-license fee is not set by competition 
among individual copyright owners, and it is a fee for the use of 
any of the compositions covered by the license. But the blanket 
license cannot be wholly equated with a simple horizontal 
arrangement among competitors. ASCAP does set the price for its 
blanket license, but that license is quite different from anything 
any individual owner could issue. The individual composers and 
authors have neither agreed not to sell individually in any other 
market nor use the blanket license to mask price fixing in such 





other markets. . . . The District Court found that there was no 
legal, practical, or conspiratorial impediment to CBS's obtaining 
individual licenses; CBS, in short, had a real choice. 
 
[T]he blanket license has provided an acceptable 
mechanism for at least a large part of the market for the 
performing rights to copyrighted musical compositions, we cannot 
agree that it should automatically be declared illegal in all of its 
many manifestations. Rather, when attacked, it should be 
subjected to a more discriminating examination under the rule of 
reason. It may not ultimately survive that attack, but that is not 
the issue before us today. 
 
2.  In BMI v. CBS, supra, the Supreme Court also noted that there was no 
“impediment to CBS’s obtaining individual licenses.” 441 U.S. at 24. Indeed, as 
the district court below found, members of ASCAP and BMI are granted “the 
nonexclusive right to license users to perform the compositions owned by them.” 
CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Because the agreements 
granted BMI and ASCAP a nonexclusive right to license, the individual copyright 
owners were free to license their works individually. By the same token, if a bar 
such as the Triple Nickel wanted to license only certain songs it could contact 
each individual owner. 
 
A cartel can keep up its monopoly price only by reducing output.  How 
can it sustain an output reduction if any one of its thousands of members is free 
to make unlimited “side sales.”   Couldn’t the Supreme Court in BMI v. CBS and 
the court in Moor-Law simply have rested on the single observation that 
nonexclusive agreements made anticompetitive outcomes very unlikely? 
 
PRODUCTION JOINT VENTURES AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
POLYGRAM HOLDING, INC. V. FTC 
416 F.3d 29 (D.C.Cir. 2005) 
 
GINSBURG, Chief Judge. 
 
PolyGram Holding, Inc. and several of its affiliates petition for review of 
an order of the Federal Trade Commission holding PolyGram violated § 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45. As detailed below, PolyGram 
entered into an agreement with Warner Communications, Inc. to distribute the 
recording of a concert to be given by “The Three Tenors” in 1998. The two 
companies later entered into a separate agreement to suspend, for ten weeks, 
advertising and discounting of two earlier Three Tenors concert albums, one 





distributed by PolyGram and the other by Warner. The Commission held the 
latter agreement unlawful and prohibited PolyGram from entering into any similar 
agreement in the future. We agree with the Commission that, although not a per 
se violation of antitrust law, the agreement was presumptively unlawful and 
PolyGram failed to rebut that presumption. We therefore deny PolyGram's 
petition for review. 
 
 The Three Tenors—José Carreras, Placido Domingo, and Luciano 
Pavarotti—put on spectacular concerts coinciding with the World Cup soccer 
finals in 1990, 1994, and 1998. PolyGram distributed the recording of the 1990 
concert, which became one of the best-selling classical albums of all time.  
 
 In late 1997 PolyGram and Warner agreed jointly to distribute the 
recording of The Three Tenors' July 1998 concert. Warner, which had the 
worldwide rights, retained the United States rights but licensed to PolyGram the 
exclusive right to distribute the 1998 album outside the United States, and the 
companies agreed to share equally the worldwide profit or loss on the project. 
The agreement also obligated PolyGram and Warner to consult with one another 
on all “marketing and promotional activities” for the 1998 concert album, but 
each company was free ultimately to pursue its own marketing strategy and to 
continue exploiting its earlier Three Tenors concert album without limitation. The 
agreement also provided that PolyGram and Warner would collaborate on the 
distribution of any future Three Tenors album released through August 2002. 
 
  Representatives of PolyGram and Warner first met in January 1998 to 
discuss “marketing and operational issues.” One of PolyGram's representatives 
voiced concern about the effect of marketing the earlier Three Tenors albums 
upon the prospects for the 1998 concert album and suggested the two 
companies impose an “advertising moratorium” surrounding the 1998 release, 
which was scheduled for August 1. According to notes of their next meeting (in 
March) PolyGram and Warner representatives agreed that “a big push” on the 
earlier albums “shouldn't take place before November 15.” After that meeting, 
each company instructed its affiliates to cease all promotion of the 1990 and 
1994 Three Tenors albums for approximately six weeks, beginning in late July or 
early August.  
 
  Apparently Warner's overseas division did not get the message because 
in May it announced an aggressive marketing campaign, scheduled to run 
through December, to discount and to promote the 1994 album throughout 
Europe. When PolyGram learned of this, it threatened to “retaliate” by cutting 
the price of its 1990 album. Accusations then flew between the two companies 
about which had started the imminent price war. Meanwhile, in June the 
promoter of The Three Tenors concert informed PolyGram and Warner that the 
repertoire for the 1998 concert would substantially overlap those of the 1990 and 





1994 concerts, which in the view of both PolyGram and Warner executives 
jeopardized the commercial viability of the forthcoming concert album. 
 
 By the time The Three Tenors performed in Paris on July 10, PolyGram 
and Warner had exchanged letters reaffirming their commitment to suspend 
advertising and discounting the 1990 and 1994 concert albums and agreeing the 
moratorium would run from August 1 through October 15. About a week later, 
however, PolyGram's Senior Marketing Director, who had passed on the details 
of the agreement to PolyGram's General Counsel, sent a memorandum around 
the company stating, “Contrary to any previous suggestion, there has been no 
agreement with [Warner] in relation to the pricing and marketing of the previous 
Three Tenors albums.” Warner followed suit on August 10, sending a letter to 
PolyGram repudiating any pricing or advertising restrictions relative to its 1994 
album. At the same time, however,PolyGram and Warner executives privately 
assured one another their respective companies intended to honor the 
agreement, and in fact the companies did substantially comply with the 
agreement through October 15, 1998. 
 
 In 2001 the Commission issued complaints against PolyGram and Warner 
charging that, by entering into the moratorium agreement, the companies had 
engaged in an unfair method of competition in violation of § 5 of the FTC Act. 
Warner soon consented to an order barring it from making any similar 
agreement in the future. PolyGram contested the charge and, after a trial, an 
Administrative Law Judge ruled that PolyGram had violated § 5 and ordered 
PolyGram, like Warner, to refrain from making any similar agreement in the 
future. 
 
 The Commission affirmed the order of the ALJ. After first observing 
(correctly) that the analysis under § 5 of the FTC Act is the same in this case as 
it would be under § 1 of the Sherman Act, the Commission revived the analytic 
framework it had first announced In re Massachusetts Board of Optometry, 110 
F.T.C. 549 (1988), which begins with the proposition that conduct “inherently 
suspect” as a restraint of competition—that is, conduct that “appears likely, 
absent an efficiency justification, to restrict competition and decrease output”—is 
to be presumed unreasonable. Only if the competitive harm wrought by the 
restraint is not readily apparent from the nature of the restraint itself, or the 
charged party offers a plausible competitive justification for the restraint, must 
the Commission, under this approach, engage in a more searching analysis of 
the market circumstances surrounding the restraint 
 
Here the Commission determined the agreement between PolyGram and 
Warner to prohibit discounts and advertising for a time was indeed “inherently 
suspect” because such restraints by their nature tend to raise prices and to 
reduce output. The Commission then looked to PolyGram to identify some 





competitive justification for the restraint. PolyGram objected that the Commission 
must first offer some evidence the agreement actually harmed competition. In 
any event, PolyGram argued, the agreement was justified because it prevented 
PolyGram and Warner, as distributors of the 1990 and 1994 albums, respectively, 
from free-riding upon—and thereby diminishing—each other's efforts to promote 
the 1998 album; hence the restraints created an incentive for each company 
vigorously to promote the 1998 album and thereby increased output. The 
Commission rejected that purported efficiency justification as legally insufficient. 
In the Commission's view, the moratorium agreement could not have had any 
such procompetitive effect but instead simply shielded the 1998 concert album 
from the competition of the two earlier albums.  
 
Observing that under the analytic framework of Mass. Board it could have 
stopped there, the Commission nonetheless went on to rule that, even if 
PolyGram's efficiency justification were cognizable, the facts simply did not 
support it; indeed, the Commission found the moratorium had no effect upon the 
degree to which the companies promoted the 1998 album and did not make the 
joint venturers any more likely to release a future Three Tenors album. Thus, 
upon closer inspection, the Commission confirmed its initial conclusion that the 
moratorium agreement was an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of § 
1 of the Sherman Act and, hence, an unfair method of competition in violation of 
§ 5 of the FTC Act.  
 
 PolyGram raises four objections to the decision of the Commission: First, 
the Commission should not have rejected the free-rider justification as legally 
insufficient because the moratorium agreement had a legitimate, procompetitive 
purpose reasonably related to the joint venture. Second, the Commission was 
required to show the restraints actually harmed competition before it could 
require PolyGram to proffer a competitive justification. Third, the Commission's 
findings concerning the competitive impact of the restraint were not supported 
by substantial evidence. Finally, there is no danger the same conduct will recur, 
so the Commission's prohibitory remedy is unreasonable. 
 
 The Commission's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by 
substantial evidence. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(c). The legal issues are “for the courts 
to resolve, although even in considering such issues the courts are to give some 
deference to the Commission's informed judgment that a particular commercial 
practice is to be condemned as ‘unfair.’ ” FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 
447, 454, (1987). 
 
The Supreme Court's approach to evaluating a § 1 claim has gone 
through a transition over the last twenty-five years, from a dichotomous 
categorical approach to a more nuanced and case-specific inquiry. In 1978, just 
before the transition began, the Court summarized its doctrine as follows: 






There are ... two complementary categories of antitrust analysis. In the 
first category are agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so 
plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed 
to establish their illegality—they are “illegal per se.” In the second 
category are agreements whose competitive effect can only be evaluated 
by analyzing the facts particular to the business, the history of the 
restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed. 
 
Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. FTC, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). 
 
  Courts and commentators have recognized the trade-offs inherent in each 
category. Per se analysis, which requires courts to generalize about the utility of 
a challenged practice, reduces the cost of decision-making but correspondingly 
raises the total cost of error by making it more likely some practices will be held 
unlawful in circumstances where they are harmless or even procompetitive. See, 
e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) (“For the 
sake of business certainty and litigation efficiency, we have tolerated the 
invalidation of some agreements that a full-blown inquiry might have proved to 
be reasonable”); Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, ¶ 1509c 
(2d ed.2003) (observing that per se analysis “dispenses with costly proof 
requirements, such as proof of market power,” but consequently “produces a 
certain number of false positives”). The converse—increased litigation cost but 
reduced cost of error—obtains under the rule of reason, which requires an 
exhaustive inquiry into all the myriad factors “bearing on whether the conduct is 
on balance anticompetitive or procompetitive.” Donald F. Turner, The Durability, 
Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust Policy, 75 CAL. L. REV. 797, 800 
(1987); see Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L.Rev. 1, 12-
13 (1984) (“When everything is relevant, nothing is dispositive .... Litigation 
costs are the product of vague rules combined with high stakes, and nowhere is 
that combination more deadly than in antitrust litigation under the Rule of 
Reason”). 
 
  Since Professional Engineers the Supreme Court has steadily moved away 
from the dichotomous approach—under which every restraint of trade is either 
unlawful per se, and hence not susceptible to a procompetitive justification, or 
subject to full-blown rule-of-reason analysis—toward one in which the extent of 
the inquiry is tailored to the suspect conduct in each particular case. For 
instance, the Court did not hold unlawful per se an agreement limiting the 
number of football games each participating college could sell to television, 
which agreement was challenged in NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 
(1984) (recognizing but declining to apply doctrine that “[h]orizontal price-fixing 
and output limitation are ordinarily condemned as a matter of law under an 
‘illegal per se ’ approach”); or the refusal of an organization of dentists to provide 





x-rays to dental insurers, which was at issue in IFD, 476 U.S. at 458 (“Although 
this Court has in the past stated that group boycotts are unlawful per se, we 
decline to resolve this case by forcing the Federation's policy into the ‘boycott’ 
pigeonhole and invoking the per se rule”) (citations omitted). Compare, 
e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price-
fixing per se unlawful); and Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 
207 (1959) (group boycott per se unlawful). 
 
  At the same time, however, in NCAA and IFD the Court did not insist 
upon the elaborate market analysis ordinarily required under the rule of reason 
to prove the defendant had market power and the restraint it imposed had an 
anticompetitive effect. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109-10 (rule of reason analysis 
unnecessary in light of district court's finding price and output not responsive to 
demand); IFD, 476 U.S. at 459 (“While this is not price fixing as such, no 
elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive 
character of such an agreement”). The Court instead adopted an intermediate 
inquiry, since dubbed the “quick look,” to evaluate horizontal restraints of 
trade. See, e.g., Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, ¶ 1911a. 
 
  It would be somewhat misleading, however, to say the “quick look” is just 
a new category of analysis intermediate in complexity between “ per se ” 
condemnation and full-blown “rule of reason” treatment, for that would suggest 
the Court has moved from a dichotomy to a trichotomy, when in fact it has 
backed away from any reliance upon fixed categories and toward a continuum. 
The Court said as much in California Dental Association v. FTC: 
 
The truth is that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are 
less fixed than terms like “ per se,” “quick look,” and “rule of reason” 
tend to make them appear. We have recognized, for example, that there 
is often no bright line separating per se from Rule of Reason analysis, 
since considerable inquiry into market conditions may be required before 
the application of any so-called “ per-se ” condemnation is justified. 
 
526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999). 
 
  Rather than focusing upon the category to which a particular restraint 
should be assigned, therefore, the Court emphasized the basic point that under § 
1 the essential inquiry is “whether ... the challenged restraint enhances 
competition.”  In order to make that determination, a court must make “an 
enquiry meet for the case, looking to the circumstances, details, and logic of a 
restraint,” which in some cases may not require a full-blown market analysis. The 
Court continued: 
 





The object is to see whether the experience of the market has been so 
clear, or necessarily will be, that a confident conclusion about the 
principle tendency of a restriction will follow from a quick (or at least 
quicker) look, in place of a more sedulous one. And of course what we 
see may vary over time, if rule-of-reason analyses in case after case 
reach identical conclusions. 
 
Id.; cf. United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 84 (D.C. Cir.2001) (declining to 
condemn per se tying arrangements involving platform software products 
because there was “no close parallel in prior antitrust cases” and “simplistic 
application of per se tying rules carries a serious risk of harm”). 
 
 In this case, as we have said, the Commission analyzed PolyGram's 
conduct under the legal framework it had devised in Mass. Board (1988), which 
it maintains is consistent with the Supreme Court's teaching of more than a 
decade later in California Dental (1999). The Mass. Board analysis proceeds in 
several distinct steps: First, the Commission must determine whether it is 
obvious from the nature of the challenged conduct that it will likely harm 
consumers. If so, then the restraint is deemed “inherently suspect” and, unless 
the defendant comes forward with some plausible (and legally cognizable) 
competitive justification for the restraint, summarily condemned. “Such 
justifications,” the Commission explained, “may consist of plausible reasons why 
practices that are competitively suspect as a general matter may not be expected 
to have adverse consequences in the context of the particular market in 
question, or they may consist of reasons why the practices are likely to have 
beneficial effects for consumers.” 
 
If the defendant does offer such an explanation, then the Commission 
“must address the justification” in one of two ways. First, the Commission may 
explain why it can confidently conclude, without adducing evidence, that the 
restraint very likely harmed consumers. Alternatively, the Commission may 
provide the tribunal with sufficient evidence to show that anticompetitive effects 
are in fact likely. If the Commission succeeds in either way, then the evidentiary 
burden shifts to the defendant to show the restraint in fact does not harm 
consumers or has “procompetitive virtues” that outweigh its burden upon 
consumers. 
 
  PolyGram argues the Commission's framework conflicts with Supreme 
Court precedent by condemning a restraint that is not per seillegal without the 
Commission having to prove the restraint actually harms competition. According 
to PolyGram, “proof of actual anticompetitive effect (or market power as its 
surrogate) is required in any Rule of Reason case.” 
 





For reasons we have already explained, we reject PolyGram's attempt to 
locate the appropriate analysis, and the concomitant burden of proof, by 
reference to the vestigial line separating per se analysis from the rule of 
reason. See Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, ¶ 1511a (“judges and litigants 
too often assume erroneously that the classification, per se or rule of reason, 
necessarily determines what must or may be alleged and proved, made the 
subject of detailed findings, or submitted to the jury”). At bottom, the Sherman 
Act requires the court to ascertain whether the challenged restraint hinders 
competition; the Commission's framework, at least as the Commission applied it 
in this case, does just that. 
 
We therefore accept the Commission's analytical framework. If, based 
upon economic learning and the experience of the market, it is obvious that a 
restraint of trade likely impairs competition, then the restraint is presumed 
unlawful and, in order to avoid liability, the defendant must either identify some 
reason the restraint is unlikely to harm consumers or identify some competitive 
benefit that plausibly offsets the apparent or anticipated harm. That much 
follows from the caselaw; for instance, in NCAA the Court held that a “naked 
restraint on price and output requires some competitive justification even in the 
absence of a detailed market analysis.” 468 U.S. at 110. Similarly, in IFD, the 
Supreme Court ruled a horizontal agreement to withhold services could not be 
sustained because the dentists failed to advance any “credible argument” that 
“some countervailing procompetitive virtue ... [redeemed] an agreement limiting 
consumer choice by impeding the ‘ordinary give and take of the market place.’ 
” 476 U.S. at 459; see also California Dental, 526 U.S. at 771 (remanding for 
closer look at challenged advertising restrictions after concluding they “might 
plausibly be thought to have a net procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at 
all on competition”). 
 
 Although the Commission uses the term “inherently suspect” to describe 
those restraints that judicial experience and economic learning have shown to be 
likely to harm consumers, we note that, under the Commission's own framework, 
the rebuttable presumption of illegality arises not necessarily from anything 
“inherent” in a business practice but from the close family resemblance between 
the suspect practice and another practice that already stands convicted in the 
court of consumer welfare. The Commission appears to acknowledge, as it must, 
that as economic learning and market experience evolve, so too will the class of 
restraints subject to summary adjudication. See California Dental, 526 U.S. at 
781 (the ability of a court to draw “a confident conclusion about the principal 
tendency of a restraint ... may vary over time, if rule-of-reason analyses in case 
after case reach identical conclusions”); see also Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 
U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (“it is only after considerable experience with certain business 
relationships that courts classify them as per se violations”). 
 





That said, we have no difficulty with the Commission's conclusion that 
PolyGram's agreement with Warner in all likelihood had a deleterious effect upon 
consumers—unless, that is, PolyGram comes forward with some plausible 
explanation to the contrary. An agreement between joint venturers to restrain 
price cutting and advertising with respect to products not part of the joint 
venture looks suspiciously like a naked price fixing agreement between 
competitors, which would ordinarily be condemned as per se unlawful. The 
Supreme Court has recognized time and again that agreements restraining 
autonomy in pricing and advertising impede the “ordinary give and take of the 
market place.” IFD, 476 U.S. at 459; see also NCAA, 468 U.S. at 107 
(“[r]estrictions on price and output are the paradigmatic examples of restraints 
of trade that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit”)….  
 
PolyGram's fate in this case therefore rests upon the plausibility of the 
sole competitive justification it proffered for the moratorium agreement, namely, 
that the restrictions on discounting and advertising enhanced the long-term 
profitability of all three concert albums and promoted the “Three Tenors” brand. 
According to PolyGram, each company was concerned the other would “free 
ride” on the promotional activities of the joint venture by promoting its own 
earlier concert album; as a result fewer Three Tenors albums would be sold 
overall and the joint venture would be less likely to create future products, such 
as a “greatest hits” album or a boxed set. Thus, PolyGram likens the moratorium 
agreement here to the restraint at issue in Polk Brothers, Inc. v. Forest City 
Enterprises, 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir.1985), where two potential retail competitors 
collaborated to build a store offering some of each company's products but 
agreed not to sell competing products at the new store. Because the restraint 
arguably promoted productivity and output by controlling each participant's 
ability to free-ride on the other's promotional efforts, the court, rather than 
condemning the restraint summarily, went on to evaluate it under the rule of 
reason. 
 
At first glance PolyGram's contention has some force; the moratorium 
appears likely to have mitigated the “spillover” effects that could be expected to 
follow an aggressive launch of the 1998 album. Absent the moratorium, that is, a 
consumer, after learning of the new album through the joint venture's 
advertising, might decide that he would be just as happy with an older concert 
album, especially if the older album were then available at a discount. The “free-
riding” to be eliminated by the moratorium agreement, however, was nothing 
more than the competition of products that were not part of the joint 
undertaking. Why not an agreement by which PolyGram and Warner would 
eliminate advertising and price competition on all their records for a time while 
they focused exclusively upon promoting the new Three Tenors album? The 
“procompetitive” justification PolyGram offers is “nothing less than a frontal 





assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act.” Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l 
Engineers, 435 U.S. at 695. 
 
To take the Commission's example, if General Motors were vigorously to 
advertise the release of a new model SUV, other SUV manufacturers would no 
doubt reap some of the benefit of GM's efforts. But that would not mean General 
Motors and its competitors could lawfully agree to restrict prices and advertising 
on existing SUV models in return for General Motors giving its rivals a share of its 
profit on the new model. Nor would an agreement to restrain prices and 
advertising on existing SUVs be lawful if General Motors were to release the new 
model SUV as a joint venture with one of its competitors. A restraint cannot be 
justified solely on the ground that it increases the profitability of the enterprise 
that introduces the new product, regardless whether that enterprise is a joint 
venture or a solo undertaking. And it simply does not matter whether the new 
SUV would have been profitable absent the restraint; if the only way a new 
product can profitably be introduced is to restrain the legitimate competition of 
older products, then one must seriously wonder whether consumers are 
genuinely benefitted by the new product. See also Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 
1023 (10th Cir.1998) (“While increasing output, creating operating efficiencies, 
making a new product available, enhancing service or quality, and widening 
consumer choice have been accepted by courts as justifications for otherwise 
anticompetitive agreements, mere profitability or cost savings have not qualified 
as a defense under the antitrust laws”). 
 
In sum, because PolyGram has failed to identify any competitive 
justification for its agreement with Warner to refrain from advertising or 
discounting their competitive Three Tenors products, we hold it violated § 5 of 
the FTC Act. Hence, we need not go on to determine whether the Commission's 
findings of fact concerning actual competitive harm are supported by substantial 
evidence. 
 
  Finally, we hold the remedy ordered by the Commission was reasonable. 
The Commission found there was a significant risk that, if not prohibited from 
doing so, PolyGram would enter into similar arrangements in the future. That 
determination is supported by substantial evidence. The record shows the 
condition that gave rise to the moratorium agreement-namely, the company 
“fear [ed] that a new release by one of [its] recording artists may lose sales to 
the artist's older albums owned by a competitor,” FTC Op. at 59-is a recurrent 
one in the record industry; therefore, PolyGram would have the same incentive 
in the future to enter into other agreements to restrain advertising and price 
discounting. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, PolyGram's petition for review is Denied. 
 





NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  Traditionally the courts have taken a bifurcated approach to the antitrust 
analysis of multifirm conduct – a rule of “per se” illegality for conduct that seems 
inherently competitive and does not involve any integration of research and 
development, production or distribution; and a “rule of reason” for conduct that 
has plausible competitively benign explanations.  In rule of reason cases the 
plaintiff, including the government, must prove that the defendants collectively 
have market power and that the practice has an anticompetitive effect. One 
important issue that often emerges is the so-called problem of characterization – 
or determining whether the per se rule or the rule of reason applies. 
 
 A few decisions, of which Polygram is an example, have sought ought 
middle ground for highly suspicious restraints for which more benign 
explanations are possible, although perhaps not probable.  These require at least 
a “quick look” at any defenses that may be offered.  See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶1508, 1511 (3d ed. 2010). 
 
STANDARD SETTING AND FRAND (RAND) LICENSING 
 
GOLDEN BRIDGE TECHNOLOGY, INC. v. MOTOROLA, INC. 
547 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2007) 
 
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge: 
 
The district court granted summary judgment against GBT’s claim that 
the defendants unlawfully conspired not to deal with GBT in violation of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act. For the following reasons, we affirm. 
 
Golden Bridge Technology (“GBT”) develops wireless communications 
technology for cellular networks. Along with the Appellees, GBT is a member of a 
non-profit standard setting organization called Third Generation Partnership 
Project (“3GPP”). 3GPP institutes uniform technology standards for the 
telecommunications industry to ensure worldwide compatibility of cellular devices 
and systems. More than 260 companies belong to 3GPP, representing all levels 
of the cell phone industry. The 3GPP members are responsible for creating and 
developing the 3GPP standard, which means determining what technologies will 
be included in the standard as either mandatory or optional features. 
 
GBT owns patents to Common Packet Channel technology (“CPCH”), 
which allows the transmittal of electronic information packets between cellular 
phones and base stations. In 1999, 3GPP adopted CPCH as an optional feature. 
Optional status meant that manufacturers did not have to use CPCH, but if they 
chose to they had to follow the 3GPP standard to ensure compatibility with other 





equipment and networks. Since that time, two companies have obtained licenses 
to use CPCH, but neither company has field tested or implemented the 
technology…. 
 
At the 2004 plenary meeting for the Technical Specification Group to 
which GBT and the Appellees belonged, individual members wanted to simplify 
the 3GPP standard by removing old and unused technologies. At a subsequent 
Working Group meeting in Scottsdale, Arizona, two individual members 
presented a proposed feature clean-up list that did not include CPCH. No 
decision was reached…. 
 
The next plenary meeting occurred in Tokyo, Japan. Appellees all 
attended this meeting, but GBT did not. The proposed feature clean-up list was 
presented, still not including CPCH. However, an Ericsson representative spoke 
out in front of the entire group, suggesting adding CPCH to the clean-up list. 
Cingular, a previous friend of CPCH, announced support for removal….  At the 
following plenary meeting in Quebec, the change requests obtained final 
unanimous approval and all of the features on the revised clean-up list were 
removed from the 3GPP standard. GBT also failed to attend this meeting and did 
not appeal CPCH’s removal to the Project Coordination Group. 
 
GBT filed this lawsuit prior to the Quebec meeting, alleging a violation of 
the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. GBT claimed that the defendants 
conspired with each other to remove CPCH from the 3GPP standard, resulting in 
the unlawful exclusion of GBT from the market. The district court granted the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding that GBT had failed to 
present any evidence of a conspiracy. GBT now appeals. 
 
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo…. 
 
The Supreme Court has specified what a plaintiff must show to avoid summary 
judgment on a Sherman Act § 1 claim: 
 
To survive a motion for summary judgment ... a plaintiff seeking 
damages for a violation of § 1 must present evidence “that tends to 
exclude the possibility” that the alleged conspirators acted independently. 
Respondents ... must show that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable 
in light of the competing inferences of independent action or collusive 
action that could not have harmed respondents. 
 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88(1986)…. 
 
Regarding the conspiracy element, the Supreme Court recently observed 
that “the crucial question [in a § 1 claim] is whether the challenged 





anticompetitive conduct stems from independent decision or from an 
agreement.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (internal 
quotations omitted). The plaintiff must present evidence that the defendants 
engaged in concerted action, defined as having “a conscious commitment to a 
common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.” Monsanto Co. v. 
Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984). Concerted action may be shown by 
either direct or circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence explicitly refers to an 
understanding between the alleged conspirators, while circumstantial evidence 
requires additional inferences in order to support a conspiracy claim. See Tunica, 
496 F.3d at 409. Independent parallel conduct, or even conduct among 
competitors that is consciously parallel, does not alone establish the contract, 
combination, or conspiracy required by § 1. 
 
GBT argues that email communications between the Appellees and others 
following the Scottsdale meeting show a conspiracy, in the form of a group 
boycott, to eliminate CPCH from the 3GPP standard. The district court disagreed, 
granting summary judgment because GBT failed to present any evidence 
supporting the inference of a conspiracy. We agree. 
 
As a threshold matter, GBT has presented only circumstantial evidence of 
a conspiracy. None of the emails, or any other evidence GBT presents, show an 
explicit understanding between the Appellees to collude and unlawfully eliminate 
CPCH from the standard. Compare Tunica, 496 F.3d at 410 (finding that email 
communications show conspiracy because they contain direct evidence stating 
that the parties entered into a “gentlemen’s agreement” not to deal with another 
company). Unlike Tunica, here the emails actually reveal disagreement among 
the Appellees. The Appellees disliked CPCH for different reasons and wanted to 
remove it at different times. They disagreed about the very action GBT claims 
constituted the conspiracy-whether to add CPCH to the clean-up list being 
presented at the Tokyo meeting. Viewing the evidence favorably to GBT, the 
emails do reveal a common dislike for CPCH among some of the Appellees and 
other companies. However, common dislike is not the same as an explicit 
understanding to conspire, so we accordingly review GBT’s claim under the 
stricter standard required for circumstantial evidence. 
 
To show conspiracy, circumstantial evidence must tend to exclude the 
possibility that the Appellees acted independently. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 
587-88. However, GBT has presented no evidence refuting the possibility that 
the Appellees found CPCH outdated and independently supported its removal. 
Viewed most favorably to GBT, the evidence indicates that some of the Appellees 
communicated their dislike of CPCH to each other, and that each Appellee hoped 
CPCH would eventually be removed from the standard. However, at least one 
Appellee (Lucent) only expressed a desire to remove CPCH in internal company 
emails, and was not part of the group email discussions. This evidence amounts 





to an exchange of information, followed by parallel conduct when the Appellees 
(and over 100 other companies) unanimously voted to remove CPCH, and it does 
not refute the likelihood of independent action. See Consol. Metal Prods., Inc. v. 
Am. Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284, 294 n. 30 (5th Cir.1988) (noting that the 
mere exchange of information, or even consciously parallel action, is insufficient 
to establish a conspiracy under § 1). Moreover, the action that GBT alleges 
implemented the conspiracy-when the Ericsson representative moved to place 
CPCH on the clean-up list at the Tokyo meeting-occurred independently before 
the entire plenary body, and GBT offers no evidence indicating it resulted from 
any explicit agreement. On the contrary, the evidence indicates that Ericsson’s 
action was in opposition to what some of the other Appellees wanted, due to 
their concerns about Cingular’s allegiance to CPCH. 
 
GBT argues that the Appellees’ had economic motives to remove CPCH, 
demonstrating that they did not act independently. These purported motives 
include avoiding the payment of royalty fees to use CPCH and promoting their 
own competing technology. The first motive finds no support in the evidence, 
because none of the Appellees, and in fact no company at all, had ever paid 
royalties to GBT for CPCH. Further, CPCH was an optional feature in the 3GPP 
standard. There was no rational reason for the Appellees to conspire to 
unlawfully remove CPCH to avoid paying royalties, when they could simply opt 
not to use it. Regarding the alleged competing-technology motive, such evidence 
does not exclude the possibility of independent conduct. Appellees could still 
support CPCH’s removal because they disliked it, even if they owned competing 
technology. In fact, the existence of an independent financial motive to remove 
CPCH might be an independent reason for each Appellee company to support 
CPCH’s removal. It is not sufficient under Matsushita for GBT to simply propose 
conceivable motives for conspiratorial conduct; GBT’s evidence must tend to 
show that the possibility of independent conduct is excluded. See Matsushita, 
475 U.S. at 587-88. GBT’s evidence does not tend to exclude the possibility that 
the Appellees acted independently, motivated by a desire to improve the 3GPP 
standard by removing outdated and underused technologies. 
 
Moreover, the Appellees presented evidence showing that these informal 
communications are an important part of the standard setting process, and that 
the 3GPP standards are beneficial to the market. We have maintained that “it has 
long been recognized that the establishment and monitoring of trade standards 
is a legitimate and beneficial function.” Consol. Metal Prods., 846 F.2d at 293-94 
(finding that though a trade association naturally involves collective action by 
competitors, it is not by its nature a “walking conspiracy”). The standards 3GPP 
sets allow the numerous necessary components of cellular communications to 
operate compatibly. Potential procompetitive benefits of standards promoting 
technological compatibility include facilitating economies of scale in the market 
for complementary goods, reducing consumer search costs, and increasing 





economic efficiency. We have found it “axiomatic” that a standard setting 
organization must exclude some products, and such exclusions are not 
themselves antitrust violations. See Consol. Metal Prods., 846 F.2d at 294. To 
hold otherwise would stifle the beneficial functions of such organizations, as 
“fear of treble damages and judicial second-guessing would discourage the 
establishment of useful industry standards.”  Accordingly, we decline to infer 
conspiratorial action on the basis of limited circumstantial evidence, particularly 
where this evidence is at least as consistent with permissible competition, and 
with independent action, as with unlawful conspiracy. 
 
As GBT has not met the threshold requirement of demonstrating the 
existence of an agreement in restraint of trade, we need not review the district 
court’s findings as to the remaining requirements of a § 1 violation. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  A standard setting group for a profitable and very widely used product such 
as cellular phones cannot possibly incorporate every patented technology that is 
offered to it; it must choose.  So is the issue in Golden Bridge whether the 
members of the SSO “agreed” or “conspired” to exclude someone’s technology 
from their standards, or is the question whether the decision to exclude was 
“reasonable” in the antitrust sense.  Clearly the members of the SSO “agreed” in 
the sense that they voted to remove CPCH from the standard.  Should the court 
be more concerned about the reasonableness of the agreement rather than its 
existence? Considering that CPCH was only an optional standard and was never 
implemented in any product even when it was available probably indicates that 
its exclusion was not anticompetitive. 
 
2.  It is unclear whether any of the other members of the SSO had a technology 
that competed with CPCH, although the plaintiff alleged that some did. Should 
that matter?   For example, if Motorola owned a competing technology, it would 
have an incentive to exclude GBT’s competing technology. The court addressed 
this issue in Moore v. Boating Indus. Ass’n, 819 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1987).  The 
plaintiff  manufactured tail lights designed for trailers, and claimed that the 
defendant boating association engaged in anticompetitive behavior by refusing to 
certify its lights.  The boating association answered that the plaintiff’s tail lights 
had a tendency to short out when the trailer was submerged.   Because none of 
the defendants in the standard setting organization were in competition with the 
plaintiffs the court found it highly unlikely that the defendants had behaved 
anticompetitively.  Trailer makers are customers of tail light manufacturers.  









MICROSOFT CORP. v. MOTOROLA, INC.  
696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012) 
BERZON, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this interlocutory appeal, Motorola appeals from the district court’s preliminary 
injunction to enjoin Motorola temporarily from enforcing a patent injunction that 
it obtained against Microsoft in Germany. We review the district court’s grant of a 




A. Standard-setting organizations and intellectual property law 
 
The underlying case before the district court concerns how to interpret and 
enforce patent-holders’ commitments to industry standard-setting organizations 
(“SSOs”), which establish technical specifications to ensure that products from 
different manufacturers are compatible with each other. See generally Mark A. 
Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard–Setting Organizations, 90 
Calif. L.Rev. 1889 (2002). Specifically, the case involves the H.264 video coding 
standard set by International Telecommunications Union (“ITU”), and the 802.11 
wireless local area network standard set by the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (“IEEE”). This appeal implicates primarily the H.264 
standard. 
  
Standards provide many benefits for technology consumers, including not just 
interoperability but also lower product costs and increased price competition. See 
Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 2011 WL 7324582, at *1 (W.D. Wis. June 
7, 2011). The catch with standards “is that it may be necessary to use patented 
technology in order to practice them.” Id. As a result, standards threaten to 
endow holders of standard-essential patents with disproportionate market power. 
In theory, once a standard has gained such widespread acceptance that 
compliance is effectively required to compete in a particular market, anyone 
holding a standard-essential patent could extract unreasonably high royalties 
from suppliers of standard-compliant products and services. This problem is a 
form of “patent holdup.” See generally Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About 
Patent Holdup of Standards (And One Not To), 48 B.C. L. Rev. 149 (2007). 
  
Many SSOs try to mitigate the threat of patent holdup by requiring members who 
hold IP rights in standard-essential patents to agree to license those patents to 
all comers on terms that are “reasonable and nondiscriminatory,” or “RAND.” See 
Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights, 90 Calif. L.Rev. at 1902, 1906. For example, 





consider the ITU, whose H.264 standard is implicated in this appeal. The ITU’s 
Common Patent Policy (the “ITU Policy”) provides that “a patent embodied fully 
or partly in a [standard] must be accessible to everybody without undue 
constraints.” Anyone who owns a patent declared essential to an ITU standard 
must submit a declaration to the ITU stating whether it is willing to “negotiate 
licenses with other parties on a non-discriminatory basis on reasonable terms 
and conditions.” If a “patent holder is not willing to comply” with the 
requirement to negotiate licenses with all seekers, then the standard “shall not 
include provisions depending on the patent.” 
  
Pursuant to these procedural requirements, Motorola has submitted numerous 
declarations to the ITU stating that it will grant licenses on RAND terms for its 
H.264–essential patents. A typical such declaration provides: 
 
The Patent Holder will grant a license to an unrestricted 
number of applicants on a worldwide, non-discriminatory basis 
and on reasonable terms and conditions to use the patented 
material necessary in order to manufacture, use, and/or sell 
implementations of the above ITU–T Recommendation 
ISOC/IEC International Standard. 
  
The ITU Policy does not specify how to determine RAND terms, or how courts 
should adjudicate disputes between patent-holders and would-be licensors under 
a RAND commitment. To the contrary, the ITU Policy includes the following 
disclaimer: 
[Standards] are drawn up by technical and not patent experts; thus, they may 
not necessarily be very familiar with the complex international legal situation of 
intellectual property rights such as patents, etc.... 
.... 
... The detailed arrangements arising from patents (licensing, royalties, etc.) 
are left to the parties concerned, as these arrangements might differ from case 
to case. 
The ITU Policy also disclaims any role for the organization in negotiating licenses 
or in “settling disputes on Patents,” stating, “this should be left—as in the past—
to the parties concerned.” Finally, the ITU form that patent-holders use to submit 
licensing declarations includes the caveat: “This declaration does not represent 
an actual grant of a license.” 
  
Courts and commentators are divided as to how, if at all, RAND licensing 
disputes should be settled....  Judge Posner, sitting by designation on the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, recently held in a different case 





involving Motorola-owned standard-essential patents for which Motorola had 
made a RAND commitment that the court would not 
be justified in enjoining Apple [the plaintiff in that case] from 
infringing [the patent at issue] unless Apple refuses to pay a 
royalty that meets the FRAND requirement. By committing to 
license its patents on FRAND terms, Motorola committed to 
license the [patent] to anyone willing to pay a FRAND royalty 
and thus implicitly acknowledged that a royalty is adequate 
compensation for a license to use that patent. 
Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F.Supp.2d 901, 913 (N.D.Ill. 2012) (Posner, J.). 
More generally, Justice Kennedy has suggested that injunctions against patent 
infringement “may not serve the public interest” in cases where “the patented 
invention is but a small component of the product the companies seek to 
produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in 
negotiations.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396–97 (2006) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
B. The U.S. contract litigation 
 
In October 2010, Motorola sent Microsoft two letters offering to license certain of 
its standard-essential patents. Of relevance to this appeal is the H.264 letter, 
sent on October 29, 2010. The letter proposed a royalty of “2.25% per unit” for 
each standard-compliant product, “subject to a grant back license” of Microsoft’s 
standard-essential patents, “based on the price of the end product (e.g., each 
Xbox 360 product, each PC/laptop, each smartphone, etc.) and not on 
component software (e.g., Xbox 360 system software, Windows 7 software, 
Windows Phone 7 software, etc.).” It noted in closing: “Motorola will leave this 
offer open for 20 days. Please confirm whether Microsoft accepts the offer.” 
  
Appended to the letter was a “non-exhaustive list” of the U.S. and international 
patents that Motorola declares that it owns and that are essential to the H.264 
standard, and that would be “included in the license” being offered. The list 
comprised not just U.S. patents but also numerous patents granted or filed in 
foreign jurisdictions.... 
  
On November 9, 2010, Microsoft filed a breach-of-contract suit against Motorola 
in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, under 
Washington state contract law. Microsoft’s theory of liability is that Motorola’s 
proposed royalty terms were unreasonable, and that Motorola’s letters therefore 
breached its contractual RAND obligations to the IEEE and the ITU, to which 
Microsoft is a third-party beneficiary. The next day, Motorola filed a patent suit 





against Microsoft in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, 
alleging infringement of U.S. patents ′ 374, ′375, and ′376. 
  
In February 2012, the district court granted partial summary judgment for 
Microsoft on its contract claims, finding that: 
(1) Motorola entered into binding contractual commitments 
with the IEEE and the ITU, committing to license its declared-
essential patents on RAND terms and conditions; and (2) that 
Microsoft is a third-party beneficiary of Motorola’s 
commitments to the IEEE and the ITU.....  
C. The German patent litigation 
 
In July 2011, several months into the above-described domestic litigation, 
Motorola sued Microsoft in Landgericht Mannheim, or Mannheim Regional Court, 
alleging infringement of the German ′667 and ′384 patents. In the German suit, 
Motorola sought, among other relief, an injunction prohibiting Microsoft from 
selling allegedly infringing products in Germany, including the Microsoft Xbox 
gaming system and certain Microsoft Windows software. 
  
On May 2, 2012, the Mannheim Court issued its ruling. First, the court held that 
Microsoft did not have a license to use Motorola’s patents. Second, it rejected the 
argument that Motorola’s RAND commitment to the ITU created a contract 
enforceable by Microsoft.... Finally, the German court held that Microsoft had 
infringed the ′667 and ′384 patents, and enjoined Microsoft from “offering, 
marketing, using or importing or possessing ... in the territory of the Federal 
Republic of Germany decoder apparatus (in particular Xbox 360)”; from “offering 
and/or supplying in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany computer 
software (in particular Windows 7 and/or Internet Explorer 9)”; and “from 
offering and/or supplying in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany 
computer software (in particular Windows Media Player 12).” The German court 
rejected the argument that a RAND commitment operates as a “waiver of claims 
for injunctive relief.”... 
  
On March 28, 2012, Microsoft moved the district court for a temporary 
restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction to enjoin Motorola from 
enforcing any German injunctive relief it might obtain.... 
 
 We clarified our framework for evaluating a foreign anti-suit injunction in 
[E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores S.A., 446 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir.2006) 
and later cases].   Together, these cases establish a three-part inquiry for 
assessing the propriety of such an injunction. First, we determine “whether or 
not the parties and the issues are the same” in both the domestic and foreign 





actions, “and whether or not the first action is dispositive of the action to be 
enjoined.” Gallo, 446 F.3d at 991 (citations omitted). Second, we determine 
whether at least one of the so-called “Unterweser factors”4 applies. Finally, we 
assess whether the injunction’s “impact on comity is tolerable.” ...  
 
 The full list of Unterweser factors is as follows: 
[whether the] foreign litigation ... would (1) frustrate a policy 
of the forum issuing the injunction; (2) be vexatious or 
oppressive; (3) threaten the issuing court’s in rem or quasi in 
rem jurisdiction; or (4) where the proceedings prejudice other 
equitable considerations. 
  
...  In explaining its rationale for the injunction, the district court made findings 
sufficient to establish at least two of the Unterweser factors: that the foreign 
litigation is “‘vexatious or oppressive,’” and that the foreign litigation 
“‘prejudice[s] ... equitable considerations.’” 
  
 Motorola contends that the German litigation cannot be described as 
“vexatious” because the German court ruled in Motorola’s favor. But litigation 
may have some merit and still be “vexatious,” which is defined as “without 
reasonable or probable cause or excuse; harassing; annoying.” Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1701 (9th ed.2009). In the midst of litigation over Motorola’s 
obligations under Washington state contract law with respect to a portfolio of 
patents that includes the two German patents, Motorola initiated separate 
proceedings in Germany to enforce those two patents directly. The district court 
interpreted this step as a procedural maneuver designed to harass Microsoft with 
the threat of an injunction removing its products from a significant European 
market and so to interfere with the court’s ability to decide the contractual 
questions already properly before it. Although the district court’s interpretation of 
Motorola’s litigation decisions may not be the only possible interpretation, it is 
not “illogical, implausible, or without support from inferences that may be drawn 
from facts in the record.” .... 
  
 . . .  Reviewing that determination for an abuse of discretion, we cannot 
say that it rested upon an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous view 
of the facts. “At most, there are competing comity concerns, so it cannot fairly 
be said” that the district court’s preliminary injunction “would have an intolerable 
impact on comity.” 
                                                 
4 [Referring to In re Unterweser Reederei GMBH, 428 F.2d 888, 896 (5th Cir.1970), 
aff'd on reh'g, 446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir.1971) (en banc) (per curiam), rev'd on other 
grounds sub nom. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off–Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) -- ed.]  







Under the unique circumstances of this case, the district court’s narrowly tailored 
preliminary injunction was not an abuse of discretion. We AFFIRM. 
  
APPLE, INC. v. MOTOROLA, INC.  
869 F.Supp.2d 901 (N.D. Ill. 2012) 
 
 [Apple and Motorola sued each other for patent infringement. Motorola sued 
Apple for infringing its ‘898 and ‘559 patents, and Apple sued Motorola for 
infringement of its ′002, ′263, ′647, and ′949 patents. Both Apple and Motorola 
sought damages and injunctive relief. Judge Posner, sitting on the district court 
by designation, granted Apple’s motion for summary judgment as to Motorola’s 
′559 patent. Following a Daubert hearing, Judge Posner first rejected both 
parties’ damages claims and then moved on to their requested injunctive relief—
Ed.] 
POSNER, Circuit Judge. 
... 
  
 There is another decisive objection to Motorola’s damages claim. The 
proper method of computing a FRAND royalty starts with what the cost to the 
licensee would have been of obtaining, just before the patented invention was 
declared essential to compliance with the industry standard, a license for the 
function performed by the patent. That cost would be a measure of the value of 
the patent qua patent. But once a patent becomes essential to a standard, the 
patentee’s bargaining power surges because a prospective licensee has no 
alternative to licensing the patent; he is at the patentee’s mercy. The purpose of 
the FRAND requirements, the validity of which Motorola doesn’t question, is to 
confine the patentee’s royalty demand to the value conferred by the patent itself 
as distinct from the additional value—the hold-up value—conferred by the 
patent’s being designated as standard-essential. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm 
Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 313–14 (3d Cir. 2007); Daniel G. Swanson & William J. 
Baumol, “Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties, Standards 
Selection, and Control of Market Power,” 73 Antitrust L.J. 1, 7–11 (2005). 
Motorola has provided no evidence for calculating a reasonable royalty that 
would be consistent with this point. 
  
 So damages are out for both parties. But a patentee can also seek 
injunctive relief for infringement, and both parties seek such relief, as I have 
already noted with respect to Apple. 
  





 Injunctive Relief. To begin with Motorola’s injunctive claim, I don’t see 
how, given FRAND, I would be justified in enjoining Apple from infringing the 
′898 unless Apple refuses to pay a royalty that meets the FRAND requirement. 
By committing to license its patents on FRAND terms, Motorola committed to 
license the ′898 to anyone willing to pay a FRAND royalty and thus implicitly 
acknowledged that a royalty is adequate compensation for a license to use that 
patent.... 
  
 The Federal Trade Commission recently issued a policy statement which 
implies that injunctive relief is indeed unavailable for infringement of a patent 
governed by FRAND. “Third Party United States Federal Trade Commission’s 
Statement on the Public Interest,” filed on June 6, 2012, in In re Certain Wireless 
Communication Devices, Portable Music & Data Processing Devices, Computers & 
Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337–TA–745, 
www.ftc.gov/os/2012/06/1206ftcwirelesscom.pdf (visited June 22, 2012). This 
was said in the context of an exclusion order by the International Trade 
Commission, but its logic embraces any claim to enjoin the sale of an infringing 
product. For the FTC says it’s “explaining the potential economic and competitive 
impact of injunctive relief on disputes involving SEPs [standard-essential 
patents].” Id. at 2. It goes on to note that 
a royalty negotiation that occurs under threat of an exclusion 
order may be weighted heavily in favor of the patentee in a 
way that is in tension with the RAND commitment. High 
switching costs combined with the threat of an exclusion order 
could allow a patentee to obtain unreasonable licensing terms 
despite its RAND commitment, not because its invention is 
valuable, but because implementers are locked in to practicing 
the standard. The resulting imbalance between the value of 
patented technology and the rewards for innovation may be 
especially acute where the exclusion order is based on a 
patent covering a small component of a complex 
multicomponent product. In these ways, the threat of an 
exclusion order may allow the holder of a RAND-encumbered 
SEP to realize royalty rates that reflect patent hold-up, rather 
than the value of the patent relative to alternatives.... 
  
 Motorola counters that Apple’s refusal to negotiate with it after rejecting 
its initial offer of a 2.25 percent royalty warrants injunctive relief; by opting not 
to take a license ex ante, it argues, Apple should lose the FRAND safe harbor. 
But Apple’s refusal to negotiate for a license (if it did refuse—the parties offer 
competing accounts, unnecessary for me to resolve, of why negotiations broke 
down) was not a defense to a claim by Motorola for a FRAND royalty. If Apple 





said no to 2.25 percent, it ran the risk of being ordered by a court to pay an 
equal or even higher royalty rate, but that is not the same thing as Motorola’s 
being excused from no longer having to comply with its FRAND obligations. 
Motorola agreed to license its standards-essential patents on FRAND terms as a 
quid pro quo for their being declared essential to the standard.  It does not claim 
to have conditioned agreement on prospective licensees’ making counteroffers in 
license negotiations. 
  
 Motorola argues further that deprived of the possibility of injunctive relief, 
it will not be able to extract a reasonable royalty from Apple. Suppose, 
hypothetically, that the maximum reasonable FRAND royalty would be $10 
million. If Motorola therefore demanded such a royalty, Apple, knowing that 
litigation is costly, would refuse, and Motorola would accept a lesser amount. Of 
course litigation would also be costly for Apple, and this might induce it to pay 
the $10 million rather than fight. But the deeper objection to Motorola’s 
argument is that the “American rule,” which with immaterial exceptions makes 
the winning party in a litigation bear his litigation costs rather than being able to 
shift them to the loser, does not deem damages an inadequate remedy just 
because, unless backed by a threat of injunction, it may induce a settlement for 
less than the damages rightly sought by the plaintiff. You can’t obtain an 
injunction for a simple breach of contract on the ground that you need the 
injunction to pressure the defendant to settle your damages claim on terms more 
advantageous to you than if there were no such pressure. 
  
 .... The grant of an injunction is not an automatic or even a presumptive 
consequence of a finding of liability, either generally or in a patent case—in fact 
the Supreme Court has held that the standard for deciding whether to grant such 
relief in patent cases is the normal equity standard. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C., supra, 547 U.S. at 391–92...  And that means, with immaterial exceptions, 
that the alternative of monetary relief must be inadequate. “[T]he inadequacy of 
one’s damages remedy is normally a prerequisite to injunctive relief.” Hoard v. 
Reddy, 175 F.3d 531, 533 (7th Cir. 1999)....  A FRAND royalty would provide all 
the relief to which Motorola would be entitled if it proved infringement of the 
′898 patent, and thus it is not entitled to an injunction. 
  
 In fact neither party is entitled to an injunction. Neither has shown that 
damages would not be an adequate remedy. True, neither has presented 
sufficient evidence of damages to withstand summary judgment—but that is not 
because damages are impossible to calculate with reasonable certainty and are 
therefore an inadequate remedy; it’s because the parties have failed to present 
enough evidence to create a triable issue. They had an adequate legal remedy 
but failed to make a prima facie case of how much money, by way of such 
remedy, they are entitled to. That was a simple failure of proof..... 
  





 There is no question of collectability in this case, a common reason why a 
damages remedy is inadequate. Both parties have deep pockets. And neither has 
acknowledged that damages for the infringement of its patents could not be 
estimated with tolerable certainty. On the contrary, each insists not only that 
damages are calculable but that it has calculated them. The problem is not that 
damages cannot be calculated, but that on the eve of trial, with the record 
closed, it became apparent that the parties had failed to make a responsible 
calculation. 
  
 Apple claims that Motorola profited from infringement by incorporating 
the desirable features of Apple’s patented technology into its own devices 
without either paying a royalty for a license to use the patents or incurring the 
cost of inventing around them. Apple has never contended that these benefits to 
Motorola of infringement cannot be quantified. It merely has failed, despite its 
vast resources and superb legal team, to do so in a minimally acceptable 
manner—failed whether because of mistakes in trial preparation (which even the 
best lawyers can make), or because too many cooks spoil the stew (Apple is 
represented by three law firms in this litigation), or maybe because the 
infringements did not deprive Apple of any profits (I’ll come back to this 
counterintuitive point). 
  
 Apple also contends that it’s losing market share (which could happen 
though its sales were growing—as they have been—because a competitor, 
namely Motorola, was growing faster) to Motorola, and also losing future 
customers to Motorola because of infringement, and requests an injunction to 
limit Motorola’s penetration of the market and preserve Apple’s own customer 
base. But it has not laid a foundation for such relief. 
  
 To begin with, as far as the record shows, an injunction would not avert 
such losses, because of the ease of designing around the patent claims at issue. 
The costs of designing around the ′647 patent (structure detection and linking) . 
. . would just require reprogramming Motorola’s smartphones to avoid at least 
one claim limitation. (A claim is not infringed if at least one “limitation” (element) 
of the claim is not present in the allegedly infringing device. Catalina Marketing 
Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 812 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Lemelson 
v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1985).) Given my claims 
construction of the ′647 patent, Motorola could design around simply by creating 
copies of the code that performs structure detection and linking for each 
particular program rather than by using a common-code module for all 
programs; for without a common code there is no “analyzer server,” as required 
by the patent claim. As far as the ′263 patent (realtime) is concerned, there is no 
evidence of the cost of inventing around the surviving claims in it, and for all the 
records shows the cost may be slight.  
  





 If, then, Apple couldn’t exclude Motorola from the market with an 
injunction because of the ease of inventing around, the only thing Apple lost as a 
result of the alleged infringements was royalties capped at the minimum design-
around cost. Its alleged loss of market share because Motorola’s smartphones do 
the same thing (either via license or design-around) would have occurred with or 
without an injunction, and so doesn’t establish the inadequacy of damages. 
  
 Thus, while difficulty of quantifying loss of goodwill or of market share 
might justify injunctive relief in some cases, in this case an injunction would in all 
likelihood be ineffectual in preventing such loss. (No damages are sought for 
past such loss.) Unsurprisingly, there’s no evidence of loss of market share or 
customer goodwill by Apple, and no basis for expecting such loss in the future. 
The price differences between the iPhone, which is Apple’s smartphone, and 
Motorola smartphones suggest that the markets for the two classes of product 
are not perfectly overlapping, and so a small improvement in a Motorola 
smartphone attributable to infringement may not take significant sales from 
Apple. And while the patents themselves (or some of them at least) may well 
have considerable value, after the claims constructions by Judge Crabb and 
myself and after my grants of partial summary judgment only a handful of the 
original patent claims remain in the case; infringement of that handful may not 
be a source of significant injury past, present, or future. For a variety of reasons 
patents in the field of information technology often have little if any value except 
defensively. See Alan Devlin, “Systemic Bias in Patent Law,” 61 De–Paul L. Rev. 
57, 77–80 (2011), and references cited there.... 
  
 A compulsory license with ongoing royalty is likely to be a superior 
remedy in a case like this because of the frequent disproportion between harm 
to the patentee from infringement and harm to the infringer and to the public 
from an injunction, a factor emphasized in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion 
in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., supra, in which he pointed out that “when 
the patented invention is but a small component of the product the companies 
seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue 
leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for 
the infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest.” He could 
have been describing this case. Three Justices joined his opinion, and no Justice 
expressed disagreement with it....  
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  At this writing Judge Posner’s decision is under appeal to the Federal Circuit.  
However, early in 2013 Google agreed to a consent order permitting those who 
wish to use its FRAND-encumbered patents to enter a request for a royalty 
determination from an independent arbitrator.  Google agreed to refrain from 
making claims for injunctive relief against qualified firms requesting such 





arbitration, provided that they agreed to the arbitrated royalty terms.  If a firm 
refuses to recognize the patents or pay any royalty, Google is free to bring an 
infringement action and seek an injunction under ordinary equity principles. 




2.  In Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 2012 WL 1672493 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 
2012), Samsung sought to dismiss Apple’s claims that Samsung “defraud[ed] the 
standards setting organization that set the UMTS standards, inducing the 
organization to adopt Samsung's Declared–Essential Patents, and later refus[ed] 
to license its Declared–Essential Patents on fair, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory terms. 
 
 For its Sherman Act § 2 claim and its unfair competition claim, Apple was 
required to allege that: “(1) Samsung possessed monopoly power in the relevant 
market, and (2) that Samsung achieved or is maintaining monopoly power 
through anticompetitive conduct.” The district court held that Apple sufficiently 
pled a relevant market because it “pled that [t]he relevant markets in which to 
assess the anticompetitive effects of Samsung’s conduct . . . are the various 
markets for technologies that—before the standard was implemented—were 
competing to perform each of the various functions covered by each of 
Samsung’s purported essential patents.”  The court further held that Apple 
adequately alleged that Samsung’s patents provided it with monopoly power. 
Samsung alleged that Apple “erroneously base[d] its allegation of Samsung’s 
monopoly power on ETSI’s incorporation of Samsung technology into the 
WCDMA standard.”  In rejecting Samsung’s argument, the court agreed with 
other courts which held that there is  
 
a legal distinction between a normal patent—to which antitrust 
market power is generally not conferred on the patent owner, and 
a patent incorporated into a standard—to which antitrust market 
power may be conferred on the patent owner. In so doing, these 
courts have found similar allegations of market power conferred 
as a result of a patent incorporated into a standard to be sufficient 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
 
Id. The court also found that Apple adequately pled that Samsung engaged in 
anticompetitive conduct based on a False FRAND theory. As the district court 
stated, to survive a motion to dismiss under this theory, a party must allege that: 
 
(1) in a consensus-oriented private standard-setting environment, 
(2) a patent holder's intentionally false promise to license 
essential proprietary technology on FRAND terms, (3) coupled 





with [a standard setting organization's] reliance on that promise 
when including the technology in a standard, and (4) the patent 
holder's subsequent breach of that promise, is actionable 
anticompetitive conduct. 
 
Does it make sense to potentially hold the owner of a standards-essential 
patent liable for treble damages for not offering its patent on terms that a 
court would find reasonable and non-discriminatory? Suppose that a 
company has been issued a patent that could potentially be adopted by a 
standards-setting organization as a standards-essential patent. Might the 
threat of treble damages (pursuant to the Sherman Act) down the line 
prevent a firm from submitting its patent to a standards-setting 
organization as a standards-essential patent? Does this harm standard-
setting organizations? Would it be better to allow patentees free rein in 
setting terms it deems “reasonable?” 
 
3.  Interpreting FRAND commitments requires courts to fill in the gaps in 
incomplete contracts.  Assessing the base and royalty rate poses one set 
of problems.  Another set relates to “evasion” devices –namely, transfers 
and injunctions  
 
Should FRAND commitments “run with the land,” in the sense that 
owners of FRAND-encumbered patents should not be able to free them from 
FRAND commitments simply by assigning the patents to someone else?  One 
fundamental principle of property law is that a property owner cannot transfer 
away a larger interest than it owns.  Of course, that may beg the question if the 
issue is what does it own.  More fundamentally, the entire FRAND commitment 
process would be worthless if patentees were able to evade it by the simple 
device of assigning encumbered patents to someone else in order to remove the 
encumbrance.  As a result the proper default rule is that a FRAND commitment 
“runs with the patent” so to speak.  If a firm wants to transfer less, it should be 
required to state its wishes up front when technologies are being selected.  For 
example, if a firm wants to limit its FRAND commitment to, say, two years it 
should be free to do so by declaring as much as part of its original commitment.  
Then the SSO can consider the offer and compare it with alternatives or make a 
counter-proposal.  By contrast, if a patentee stated up front that it intended to 
make its FRAND commitment last only until it chose to sell the patent to 
someone else, whenever that might be, it would be tantamount to no FRAND 
commitment at all.  Some companies, such as Microsoft, have policies to this 
effect,5 but the legal obligation should be clear in any event. 
                                                 
5 See Microsoft’s Support for Industry Standards (Feb. 8, 2012), available at 
http://www.microsoft.com/about/legal/en/us/IntellectualProperty/iplicensing/ip2.aspx 
(visited Sep. 26, 2012) (commitment to continue acknowledging FRAND commitments). 





 The question of injunctive relief is only a little more complex.  A FRAND 
commitment is on its face an offer to license to all who employ that patent in 
their standards-compatible product.  True, the precise royalty terms are typically 
not specified in advance, but that entails that the FRAND royalty will be 
determined by the body, and by reference to common indicia of royalty rates, 
such as rates paid for similar technologies in the same or perhaps another 
situation.  Further, as noted earlier, the FRAND commitment effectively turns the 
royalty issues into a breach of contract claim rather than a litigated royalty claim.  
Permitting the owner of a FRAND-encumbered patent to have an injunction 
against someone willing to pay FRAND royalties is tantamount to making the 
patent holder the dictator of the royalties, which once again is the same thing as 
no FRAND commitment at all.  Permitting an injunction effectively places the 
patent holder and the potential infringer in the same position that they would be 
when an innocent infringer invests in a technology and is later taken by surprise 
by a patent holder, who can then claim royalties whose amount is driven mainly 
by the infringer’s costs of extracting itself from the patented technology. 
 
 The Supreme Court’s eBay decision overruled a line of Federal Circuit 
decisions that had made injunctions almost a matter of right in patent 
infringement cases.6  The fact that the patent in question has already been 
FRAND encumbered establishes that the patentee’s reasonable expection was 
the right to obtain FRAND royalties, not to exclude.  Further, inherent in the 
FRAND requirement is that the royalties be nondiscriminatory – that is, once they 
are determined any participant has the right to the technology upon payment of 
that sum.  Beyond that, the fact that the patent in question is standards-
essential places a heavy thumb on the scales with respect to eBay’s public 
interest requirement.  Here, an injunction can potentially hold up an entire 
network or make it less competitive.  In sum, FRAND-encumbered patents 
should never be enforced by injunction, at least not when the infringement 
defendant has agreed to pay a FRAND royalty.   
 
In January 2013 the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office issued a joint statement indicating 
that obtaining injunctions on FRAND-encumbered patents is generally 
inappropriate.  Further, the statement concluded, "hold-up may be exacerbated 
when patents are sold or otherwise transferred by their owners.  If F/RAND 
licensing obligations do not travel with a transferred patent, the potential for 
hold-up from the network effects of a standard may be substantially increased.  
For this reason, we believe that F/RAND commitments should bind subsequent 
patent transferees."  United States Department of Justice and United 
States Patent & Trademark Office, Policy Statement on Remedies for 
                                                 
6eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 





Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments 




4. Exclusion Orders and the U.S. International Trade Commission.  The ITC is a 
regulatory body with quasi-judicial power to exclude certain classes of unlawful 
imports.  Historically the ITC, created in 1916, was concerned with practices like 
dumping and foreign subsidies deemed to make import of the subsidized goods 
unlawful.  More recently, however, the ITC has had a major role to play in the 
enforcement of United States intellectual property rights abroad by preventing 
the import into the United States of goods that infringe United States patents, 
copyrights, or trademarks.7  The ordinary remedy granted by the ITC is an 
“exclusion order,” which is not a general injunction prohibiting production but 
rather a bar from importing the foreign-produced good into the United States.8  
To the extent that domestic companies outsource production to foreign firms or 
produce in plants located abroad, they may also be subject to exclusion orders.  
If a large American firm outsources the production of its products for shipment 
back into the United States, those goods are within the jurisdiction of the ITC.  
For example, in May, 2012, the ITC issued an exclusion order against Motorola 
Mobility upon Microsoft’s complaint that certain imported Motorola Mobility 
devices infringed Microsoft’s patents.9  In an extreme case where most of a 
firm’s product is made abroad an exclusive order is tantamount to an injunction. 
 
 The difficulty with ITC exclusion orders derives from two things.  First, 
because an exclusion order is not literally an injunction but only a prohibition of 
import, the Federal Circuit has held that it is not covered by the Supreme Court’s 
eBay decision.10  Second, the ITC has no independent authority to award 
damages for patent infringement.  The fact that damages are unavailable would 
ordinarily count in favor of injunctive relief.  Equally significant, however, is the 
                                                 
7See Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public 
Interest, 98 Cornell L.Rev. 1 (2012); Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: 
Congressional Regulation of the ITC, 61 Fla. L. Rev. 529 (2009). 
819 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(f).  A prominent example involving virtually the entire smart phone 
industry is Certain Electronic Devices with Communication Capabilities, Components 
Thereof, and Related Software; Notice of Institution of Investigation; Institution of 
Investigation Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1337, 76 Fed. Reg. 60870-01 (Sept. 30, 2011). 
 
9 See, e.g., In re Certain Mobile Devices, Associated Software, and Components 
Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-744, 2012 WL 3715791 (USITC, May 18, 2012). 
10 See Spansion, Inc. v. ITC, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. 
Ct. 758 (2011).  The FTC has argued the contrary position.  See FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, 
THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 
31‐72 (2011). 





fact that once an infringing good is sold in the United States the seller is guilty of 
infringement and facilitators may be guilty of contributory infringement or 
inducement.  As a result, the reason that the challenger has gone to the ITC 
rather than a district court in the first place may be in order to earn a kind of 
quasi-injunctive relief that it could not obtain from a federal district court.  Given 
that a significant percentage of devices or their components employing standards 
essential patents are produced abroad for United States markets, a ITC exclusion 
order can be an effective end run around a FRAND commitment if the ITC issues 
an exclusion order because of infringement of a FRAND-encumbered patent. 
 
 Once again, the reasonable approach for the ITC in such a case is to 
deny an exclusion order.  Significantly, this does not deny the patent holder a 
remedy.  Rather, it relegates the patentee to a federal district court, which can 
then decide the injunction or damages question in light of the FRAND 
commitment, eBay, and any other relevant factors.   Exclusion orders should be 
limited to situations representing a manifest unwillingness to pay a FRAND 
obligation.  The Federal Trade Commission has taken that position in an ITC 
filing.  As the Commission observed 
 
The possibility of patent hold-up derives from changes in the relative 
costs of once competing technologies as a result of the standard setting 
process.  Prior to adoption of a standard, alternative technologies 
compete to be included in the standard.   SSO members often agree to 
license SEPs on RAND terms as a quid pro quo for the inclusion of their 
patents in a standard.  Once a standard is adopted, implementers begin 
to make investments tied to the implementation of the standard.  
Because it may not be feasible to deviate from the standard unless all or 
most other participants in the industry agree to do so in compatible ways, 
and because all of these participants may face substantial switching costs 
in abandoning initial designs and substituting a different technology, an 
entire industry may become locked in to a standard, giving a SEP owner 
the ability to demand and obtain royalty payments based not on the true 
market value of its patents, but on the costs and delays of switching 
away from the standardized technology.11 
 
Nevertheless, the ITC has indicated that it will not refrain from granting an 
exclusion order simply because the patents upon which the request is based are 
FRAND encumbered.12 
                                                 
11 See in re Certain Gaming and Entertainment Consoles, Related Software, and 
Components Thereof, Third Party United States Federal Trade Commission’s Statement 
on the Public Interest, Inv. No. 337-TA-752 (USITC, June 6, 2012), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/06/1206ftcgamingconsole.pdf. 
12 See In re Certain Gaming and Entertainment Consoles, Related to Software, and 






5. FRAND commitments and non-practicing entities.  A non-practicing entity, or 
NPE, is a firm that does not make patent-protected goods itself but earns its 
revenue by licensing to others or bringing infringement actions.  The classical 
image of the NPE is the firm that developed its own patents internally in its own 
laboratory or other facility, but then licensed them rather than producing goods 
that employ them.  A more recent phenomenon is the firm that acquires patents 
from others, often in large numbers, and then re-licenses them or brings 
infringement actions.  One of the most important consequences of eBay was for 
NPEs.  Because a nonproducing firm can profit from patents only by licensing 
them it is very difficult for the NPE to show that damages are an inadequate 
remedy, as eBay requires.  As a result, since eBay most NPEs have been limited 
to damages. 13 
 
 NPEs have the potential to destabilize the entire standard setting process 
because they have a different set of incentives from participating members.  
Whether they agree to FRAND terms depends on the circumstances.   First, at 
the standards adoption, or “bidding” stage the NPE certainly has an incentive to 
induce the SSO to adopt its own technology as the standard.  Returning to the 
previous example, if the SSO is selecting among patented standards Alpha, Beta, 
and Gamma, it will presumably apply the same criteria even though Alpha might 
not be a producer of any good covered by the standard, but merely a patent 
holder.  In order to attain SEP status, Alpha must make the same FRAND 
commitment as anyone else.  On the other side, however, the NPE does not 
have to worry about infringing the standard once it is adopted, because it does 
not make anything.  As a result it may decide to avoid the standard setting 
process altogether, hoping to be in a position to bring an infringement action 
after the standard is deployed.  Its incentive to do this may be stronger if it 
believes it can conceal its own technology from the SSO – for example, if it has a 
pending but undisclosed patent application covering one or more of the 
standards, or if its patents are so numerous and ambiguous that the SSO might 
overlook one or more of them.  In general, the more relevant patents the NPE 
owns and the more costly it is to interpret them, the greater will be its incentive 
to avoid making any FRAND commitment and stake its royalty claims later. 
 
 The lack of FRAND commitments is only part of the story for the NPE, 
however.  Because the NPE is not a potential infringer itself, it faces an entirely 
different risk profile from producing entities.  When the NPE is enforcing FRAND 
                                                                                                                                     
Components Thereof, Initial Determination, Inv. No. 337-TA-752, 2012 WL 1704137 at 
*163 (USITC, Apr. 23, 2012). 
13See Chien & Lemley, Patent Holdup, supra; CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 79 
(2012). 





encumbered patents there is no less reason for enforcing the FRAND 
commitment than when the enforcer is a practicing entity. 
 
 The bigger problem involving NPEs is those who have never agreed to 
FRAND commitments and who threaten infringement actions or request licensing 
only after the technologies claimed to infringe have been put into place. Even 
though its NPE status is likely to deny it an injunction, it will be in a position to 
obtain larger damages because it has not made the FRAND commitment.  This 
problem is hardly confined to the context of standard setting.  However, it has 
become particularly serious in networked communications technologies because 
of the very large numbers of poorly defined patents. 
 
 Here, defects in the patent system (whether inherent or not) account for 
a great deal of the extra leverage that NPEs enjoy.  Perhaps the most significant 
problem is that patent law provides no protection for the independent developer, 
as copyright law does.  You can infringe a patent even if you have developed the 
relevant technology entirely on your own.  Compound this fact with the 
extraordinarily high cost of interpreting a patent and the large number of patents 
at issue, and one soon suspects that the principal thing that patents are 
contributing to these technologies are transactions costs.  The NPE or patent 
aggregator who owns several thousand patents can go to a producer and claim 
infringement of various unspecified patents in its portfolio and then ask for a 
license fee that is much smaller than the cost of ascertaining whether any of the 
patents cover the producer’s technology, leaving aside questions of patent 
validity.14 
 
This is much less likely to occur when both of the parties in question have 
substantial patent portfolios and each is a producer.  In that case each one of 
them is in a position to make the same offer to the other and we often see a 
phenomenon called “tacit pooling,” in which the equilibrium position is for each 
firm not to bring suit against the other.15  This explains why many producers or 
their representatives have attempted to acquire large portfolios for defensive 
purposes.  This phenomenon differs from traditional tacit collusion in that it 
operates pairwise rather than across the entire industry; that is, each firm will 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, 2011 WL 7324582 (W.D. Wis.  June 7, 
2011) (Motorola could have violated §2 by threatening an infringement action on 
unidentified “essential” patents, which would be identified only after certain standards were 
adopted).  See also Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp., 653 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011), 
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2391 (2012) (finding litigation misconduct in filing of baseless 
patent claims where cost of obtaining legal opinions on patent validity and infringement 
greatly exceeded the demand license fee). 
15 See Erik Hovenkamp, Tacit Pooling (2012) (unpublished manuscript on file with 
author). 





decide whether or not to sue the other depending on the size and scope of the 
other’s portfolio.  In some cases the best strategy will be to file an infringement 
suit, particularly if the patent portfolios are uneven in strength, but in others the 
most profitable strategy will be not to sue.16 
 
Tacit pooling is a socially desirable phenomenon in that it permits the 
firms in question to rely on production of goods rather than litigation for their 
revenue.  Patent aggregators are fashionable today because they are in a 
stronger position to monetize patents than individual owners.  But one must then 
question the source.  Conceivably an aggregation of patents can provide turnkey 
licensing that eliminates double marginalization problems and provides a 
manufacturer with all of its technology needs for a certain product.  Often, 
however, the source of additional revenue is nothing more than the increased 
transaction costs that can be threatened against producers who would rather pay 
the license fee even though they may not actually be using any of the 
technology held by the aggregator’s valid patents. 
 
One approach is to require that a firm that is in a position to earn 
supracompetitive returns from a patent be relegated to a nonexclusive license for 
all patents obtained from outsiders.17  That is to say, the firm engaged in internal 
patenting, a presumptively innovative act, is in a much stronger position than the 
firm that acquires its patents from another.  To be sure, a producing dominant 
firm needs someone else’s patent in order to keep its own technology up to date.  
It has a legitimate interest in acquiring patents to the extent it intends to 
practice them.  But a nonexclusive license will serve that purpose just as well as 
an exclusive license or assignment. 
 
Why does a patent become more valuable in the hands of an acquirer 
from its original owner?  One possibility is that a monopoly producer will earn 
more from it than a competitive producer could, but that rationale applies only to 
the firm that actually practices the patent.  Another possibility is that uniting 
ownership of complementary patents may reduce double marginalization 
problems.  Generally, when two or more firms with market power each licenses 
its own technology separately the sum of their individual prices will be higher 
than if one firm owned everyone’s technology and licensed it together.  This 
union benefits both licensors and licensees and thus might explain some 
instances of aggregation by non-practicing entities, although I am unaware of a 
specific example.18  But even here the aggregator needs only a nonexclusive 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17See 3 ANTITRUST LAW ¶707b-g; and BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT 
RESTRAINT, supra, 293-295. 
 
18 On double marginalization, see ERIK HOVENKAMP & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, Tying 





license plus the right to sublicense.  That is, by uniting two complementary 
patents into a common licensing agency and permitting them to sublicense the 
agent will be able to offer a lower price for the two together than others can 
offer for each patent separately. 
 
In any event, the NPE who knew or reasonably should have known about 
a standard setting procedure and voluntarily declined to participate should be 
held to the same remedy as actual participants – namely, FRAND damages.  The 
Patent Act’s standard for damages in this context is a “reasonable” royalty, and 
here the policy preference should be strong for competitively determined royalty 
rates rather than those based on ex post possibilities for holdup. 
 
5.  In Interdigital Communic., LLC v. ITC, ___ F.3d ___ (Fed. Cir. Jan. 10, 
2013) (en banc), the Federal Circuit held that a patentee could obtain an 
exclusion order from the ITC even though it was not practicing the patent itself 
within the United States.  While the ITC provisions in question required a 
domestic injury, the majority concluded that the business of licensing, rather 
than producing, met the injury requirement.  Judge Newman wrote a lengthy 
dissent. 
 
NOTE:  REFUSAL TO LICENSE AND RELATED PRACTICES INVOLVING 
STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS 
 
 One almost omnipresent component in information technologies is 
standard setting, driven by the need for compatibility across networks that 
contain numerous participants.  Notwithstanding some competitive risks, 
collaborative standard setting is presumptively a good thing, particularly when 
one considers the alternative.  The monolithic controller of a network, such as 
AT&T prior to its 1982 breakup,19 may have little need for standards to the 
extent that it makes every product and controls every transaction that occurs on 
the network.  In more dominated networks, such as Microsoft’s Windows system, 
standards are essential but many may be imposed from the top down, as when 
Microsoft instructs independent software developers in the protocols necessary 
to achieve compatibility.  As networks become more competitive, however, more 
collaborative standard setting is necessary.  Today virtually every interactive 
technology incorporated into a cellular phone, computer, digital camera or similar 
devices is governed by a standard. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Arrangements, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW (2012), currently 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=23858. 
19 United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 136 (D.D.C. 1982), aff ’d mem. sub nom., 
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
 





 Participation in a standard-setting organization (SSO) is usually voluntary, 
but access to existing standards is often essential if a producer wishes to supply 
its product or service “on the network.”  For example, cellular phones must be 
able to connect into the wireless system and in some cases the internet.  
Memory devices for computers or video cameras must be compatible if the 
hardware itself is to be transportable, or if the files or images they read or create 
are to be shared.  In some cases the standard that an SSO adopts is already in 
the public domain, perhaps because the relevant patents have expired, have 
been dedicated to the public by their users, or are part of an open source 
arrangement.  In other cases the SSO may believe that the standard it is 
adopting is in the public domain, but may find out only later that the standard 
actually infringes someone’s patent.  This may happen inadvertently, or it may 
happen if a patentee intentionally withheld information about its technology.20 
 
 Intentional withholding can also take different forms.  First it may occur 
because a patentee takes advantage of the “gap” between patents, which 
become public upon issuance, and patent applications, which have priority over 
later developed technology but are not published for the first eighteen months 
after the filing date.  35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1).  This problem in turn can be 
magnified by the patent "continuation" process, by which patent claims can be 
added or broadened as long as a patent is pending and even after issuance in 
some cases.21  A firm actively participating in an SSO might be surreptitiously 
modifying its patent claims so as to cover a standard that the SSO is in the 
process of developing.  It may then lie in wait until other members have made a 
significant investment in the standardized technology, announcing its patents at 
a time when it can extract the largest possible royalty.  Finally, intentional 
withholding may occur because patents are ambiguous and costly to interpret; 
so a patent owner might simply wait until after the standard has been deployed 
to announce its belief that its patent has been infringed. 
 
 As a result it is critically important from the onset that an SSO insist that 
its members make a commitment about their own patents as a condition of their 
participation.  The standard setting process is typically not run by lawyers but 
rather by engineers, product managers, or other people whose technical training 
is in some area other than law.  As a result, the process has sometimes reflected 
                                                 
20See 3 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶712 (3d ed. 2007); and 
Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1171 (2009). 
 
21 Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. 
Rev. 63, 70 (2004); Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and 
Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 Geo. L.J. 
1947, 1993 (2005). 
 





considerable naiveté about the strategic possibilities that can arise.  This was 
true, for example, in the Rambus case, where JEDEC, the standard setting 
organization, did not do an adequate job of making such precommitments clear. 
 
 At the time such precommitments are called for the participants are 
typically acting under a great deal of uncertainty about the value of their 
respective technologies.22  Alternatively, if they have no technologies to offer 
themselves, they will not be clear about how much they will be expected to pay.  
For example, an SSO may begin considering technologies for a particular feature 
that limits undesirable noise in audio transmissions.  The choices may be 
patented technologies Alpha, Beta, and Gamma, and also technology Delta, 
whose patent has expired.  Delta may not be quite as good as the patented 
alternatives, but it is free.  Until the owners of patented technologies Alpha, Beta 
and Gamma have made commitments they are all likely to have positive but 
uncertain costs.  To the extent that any questions persist about the validity or 
scope of Alpha’s, Beta’s, or Gamma’s patents there may be additional 
uncertainty. 
 
 This is where the FRAND royalty comes in.  FRAND refers to a firm’s 
commitment to make its technology available at a “fair, reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory royalty” if it is adopted as the standard.23  That is, the FRAND 
commitment is a form of bidding.  Typically the FRAND commitment is not a 
promise to charge any particular price, but only a price that meets the FRAND 
expectations.  For example, the Ninth Circuit quoted this typical FRAND 
provision: 
 
The Patent Holder will grant a license to an unrestricted number of 
applicants on a worldwide, non-discriminatory basis and on reasonable 
terms and conditions to use the patented material necessary in order to 
manufacture, use, and/or sell implementations of the above … 
Standard.24 
 
                                                 
22See Doug Lichtman, Understanding the RAND Commitment, 47 Hous. L. Rev. 1023, 
1039–43 (2010); Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patents and Access Lock-In:  
RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 Ind. L. Rev. 351, 358 (2007); Daniel G. 
Swanson & William J. Baumol, Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties, 
Standards Selection, and Control of Market Power, 73 Antitrust L.J. 1, 7–11 (2005); Mark 
A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard–Setting Organizations, 90 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1889 (2002). 
23The United States literature often speaks of “RAND” royalties, thus explicitly 
requiring that the royalty be “reasonable” but not necessarily that it be “fair.”  Today the 
two terms are generally used interchangeably. 
24 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2012). 





This commitment permits the members of the SSO to focus on technical issues 
and worry about the price later.  Of course, if the commitment meant nothing at 
all, then the concept of FRAND would largely lose its value.  Nevertheless, 
computing FRAND royalties in the first instance after the FRAND commitment has 
been made is not easy.  It may become much easier, however, after the FRAND-
encumbered patent has been licensed to others, thus creating a “yardstick” for 
measuring future royalties.  The non-discrimination provision creates at least a 
strong presumption that the terms given to a first licensee will also apply to 
subsequent licensees. 
 
FRAND obligations tend to “level” the value of patents in the sense that 
they apply a uniform royalty measure to patents that are declared essential.  Of 
course, patentees can be expected to claim that their particular patent is 
unusually valuable because of the features that it covers.  Patents have market 
value, however, not intrinsic value.  Their value depends on the cost of the next-
best alternative. A patent may cover sixteen different “essential” things in a 
device, but if one or a set of alternative patents or public domain technologies 
can do these things as well the value of the patent must be measured against 
these alternatives.  For example, clean drinking water is “essential,” but if six 
different technologies are available to filter water effectively, then the value of 
any particular patent is the price it would claim in a market in which the six 
technologies bid against each other. 
 
Of course, once a patent is declared by an SSO to be standards essential 
and incorporated into technology, the bidding is over.  If we ignore the FRAND 
commitment, the patent’s value is largely determined by the costs of extraction 
from that particular technological element, not from anything inherent in the 
patent itself.  As a result, a patent declared to be essential can acquire 
significantly more market power than it had previously.  Further, firms know all 
of this in advance, so if they wish to assert later that a particular patent within 
their standards-adaptable portfolio is unusually valuable, they can always say so 
and leave the SSO to decide whether or not to adopt it.   
 
 “FRAND” typically refers to a rather nonspecific agreement among 
participants to bargain about technology first, while deferring questions about 
specific royalties to later.  The Patent Act itself specifies that a patentee in an 
infringement action is entitled to damages that are not less than a “reasonable" 
royalty,25 but identification of a reasonable royalty in infringement cases has 
become an extremely costly and often indeterminate process.  Further, royalties 
developed as damages in a patent infringement action may differ in important 
respects from royalties negotiated at arms’ length in a market.  To the extent 
                                                 
2535 U.S.C. § 284 (“…damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in 
no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention….”). 





that a FRAND commitment is contractual damages should reflect the arms length 
bargaining setting rather than the litigation setting. 
 
In the FRAND context, the term “nondiscriminatory” means an absence of 
third degree price discrimination, which occurs when a seller charges two or 
more different prices to two or more distinctively identified groups of customers.  
The term certainly does not refer to a promise not to engage in second degree 
price discrimination, which refers to such things as quantity based pricing.  For 
example, a patentee that charges a royalty of five cents per unit discriminates 
between the licensee who sells 100 units and the one who sells 1000, because 
its costs of licensing are the same for both.  But such discrimination is inherent in 
the per unit, per dollar, or other “per click” licensing terms that are common in 
patent licensing, including FRAND licensing. 
 
 The important questions that a FRAND commitment typically leaves open 
is the base upon which the royalty rate must be computed and the royalty rate.   
As to the base, a memory chip in a GPS device may be covered by 10 patents, 
one of which is subject to a FRAND commitment.  Should the royalty percentage 
(whatever it may be) be computed on the chip, the GPS device that contains the 
chip, or the automobile that contains the GPS device?26  In general, the royalty 
must reflect a base that identifies the functionality to which that particular patent 
is tied.27  Second, it must include a realistic apportionment of the overall number 
of patents included in a device.  For example, someone who claims that an 
accused device infringes 10 of its patents and seeks a 3% royalty, but who later 
establishes infringement of only one patent, should not be heard to say that this 
one patent deserves the entire 3% royalty.28  Presumptively, it deserves one 
tenth of that amount. 
 
 The federal courts have increasingly rejected an “entire value” method 
that identifies the “gross” product as the base for measuring royalties.  Instead, 
they are moving toward a “smallest salable patent practicing unit” measure in 
ordinary patent infringement actions where damages are based on per unit 
royalties.  As the Federal Circuit recently observed, 
 
                                                 
26 See Eingestellt von Florian Mueller um, Newly-Discovered Apple Letter to Wireless 
Standards Body Proposed Solution to Rampant FRAND Abuse, FOSS PATENTS (Feb. 8, 
2012, 11:41 AM), http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/02/newly-discovered-apple-letter-
to.html (visited Sep 26, 2012).  See also Ove Granstrand & Marcus Holgersson, The 25% 
Rule Revisited and a New Investment-Based Method for Determining FRAND Licensing 
Royalties, 47 les Nouvelles, No. 3 (2012). 
27 See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011); IP 
Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Tex. 2010). 
28Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 





damages must be awarded “for the use made of the invention by the 
infringer.” [Citing 35 U.S.C. §284]  Where small elements of multi-
component products are accused of infringement, calculating a royalty on 
the entire product carries a considerable risk that the patentee will be 
improperly compensated for non-infringing components of that product. 
Thus, it is generally required that royalties be based not on the entire 
product, but instead on the “smallest salable patent-practicing unit.”29 
 
The court took the same approach in Lucent Technologies, when it 
rejected an expert report concerning a relatively minor patent for entering 
information into fields on a computer with a touchscreen without using the 
physical keyboard, but which based royalties on the value of the entire computer 
in which the accused method was employed.30  The court held that a patentee 
could base damages on the value of the entire product only by showing that “the 
patent-related feature is the ‘basis for customer demand” of the entire good.31  It 
relied on nineteenth century decisions holding that when a patent is on an 
improvement rather than the original machine, damages based on reasonable 
royalties must be confined to the value of the improvement.32 
 
The “basis for customer demand” language is not particularly helpful.  A 
computer may have patents on memory chips, processor chips, storage devices, 
controllers, all of which are essential to the functioning of the computer.  In 
addition, each of these things forms a “basis for consumer demand” to the 
extent that consumers do not want to purchase a computer that lacks any one of 
them.  The value of any “essential” component effectively becomes the value of 
the entire device to the extent that the device is worthless without it.  But ten 
essential components cannot each claim to represent the value of the entire 
device. 
 
 In any event, the size of the base is largely irrelevant if one can freely 
inflate the royalty rate.  The Lucent decision addressed an attempt to do that.  
Forbidden from estimating a reasonable royalty at 1% of the entire computer, 
the expert revised his opinion to base royalties only on Microsoft Outlook, a 
                                                 
29LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 67 (Fed. Cir. 2012), 
quoting Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F.Supp.2d 279, 287-288 (N.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
30 Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed.Cir. 2009).  The 
method consisted in using a keyboard displayed on the screen together with a calculator, 
and touching the screen directly.  The patentee did not claim to invent the touchscreen 
itself. 
31 Id. at 1336. 
32 Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120 (1884); Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 
How.) 480, 491 (1853). 





portion of Microsoft’s Office software thought to be the smallest saleable unit 
upon which royalties could be based, but then he raised the royalty rate to 8%.33 
 
While the use of the smallest saleable unit as a base for estimating 
royalties is not free from problems, it does have the value that it provides a 
more-or-less common and objectively measurable currency for assessing the size 
of the royalty base.   At that point the market itself will hopefully provide 
yardsticks for computing the size of the royalty, using negotiated royalties rather 
than damage awards as the yardstick.  That is, damages measurement in an 
infringement case involving a FRAND-encumbered patent should be different 
from damages in patent cases generally. 
 
Using negotiated royalties rather than damages awards based upon a 
reasonable royalty standard is justified by an important difference in how 
royalties are computed in arms length as opposed to litigation settings.  In the 
standard-setting process, proffered technology is probabilistic in the dual sense 
that (1) the patents being offered have typically not been litigated in order to 
establish validity or scope; and (2) the SSO typically has alternative technologies 
to choose from in selecting a standard.  By contrast, in the litigation context the 
infringement defendant has already “selected” the standard by virtue of its 
infringement, and the patent has already been determined or acknowledged to 
be valid.  When we are dealing with ex ante FRAND commitments rather than ex 
post infringement, it is the ex ante value that should be accorded the weight.34  
For example, in a breach of contract action in which the plaintiff contractor had 
bid on the job in a competitive market, it would not be proper to look at the 
price charged in a monopoly transaction to determine damages. 
 
 In spite of their many ambiguities, open ended FRAND commitments are 
a valuable and competitive tool, given the uncertainty that exists at the time the 
commitments must be made.  Standard setting would be a much more costly 
and indeterminate process without them.  FRAND royalties should generally be 
low and manageable by default, because SSO participants can always “bid” for a 
higher royalty ex ante, and then the SSO can decide which technology to accept 
on the basis of the proffered price. 
 
                                                 
33 Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1301, 1338 (“Being precluded from using the computer as the 
royalty base, he used the price of the software, but inflated the royalty rate 
accordingly.”). 
34 Cf. Judge Posner’s conclusion  the the FRAND royalty analysis should start out 
“with what the cost to the licensee would have been of obtaining, just before the 
patented invention was declared essential to compliance with the industry standard, a 
license for the function performed by the patent.”  Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. 
Supp. 2d 901, at 913-914. 





The non-practicing entity (NPE) that declines to participate in the SSO 
process should generally be held to the same price as the measure of its 
damages.  That is so say, a “reasonable” royalty is the royalty that the NPE 
would have obtained in the competitive market in which it might have 
participated but declined to do so.  The case for measuring NPE damages in this 
way is strongest when the NPE had actual knowledge of the SSO process but 
declined to participate, or when an objectively reasonable NPE would have 
known about the process.  The case is weakest when the SSO’s processes were 
not well communicated to outsiders or the NPE in question was not permitted to 
participate.35 
 
 The FRAND process permits SSOs to select a standard based upon 
performance characteristics on the assumption that all of the standards will be 
reasonably priced, without worrying too much about exactly what that price will 
be.  Once the standard is adopted, however, the patents that write on that 
standard become “essential” to the extent that the standard is a necessary 
component of the network.  The change in the financial positions of those 
offering the alternative technologies can be dramatic.  To return to the previous 
hypothetical, prior to standard adoption patents Alpha, Beta, and Gamma 
competed to be selected as the standard.  If Alpha’s technology is adopted the 
result will be an immediate and very substantial increase in Alpha’s value 
because it is now a “standards essential patent” (SEP).  By contrast, Beta and 
Gamma were not adopted.  In an extreme case those patents might become 
worthless.  This would be true, for example, if the technologies that those 
patents cover has no market other than inclusion as the standard for this 
particular SSO.36  Further, as time goes on the manufacturers participating in this 
standard will invest in production facilities and begin producing under the 
standard, typically making a switch very costly. 
 
 Alpha’s position, of course, is that its patent has become immensely 
valuable, but might be even more valuable if it could be freed from its FRAND 
commitment.  Alpha is a little like the contractor who submits a winning low bid 
but later realizes that the seller might have been willing to pay more.  Alpha can 
thus be expected to do what it lawfully can in order to increase the value of its 
patent which has now become standards essential.  First, it might use the 
negotiation process to try to maximize royalties by getting a high royalty rate or 
a larger base for computing royalties.  Second, it might seek to evade the 
consequences of its FRAND obligation altogether. 
 
                                                 
35 See ¶712. 
36See, e.g. Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(rejecting antitrust boycott claim by plaintiff whose technology was not accepted as a 
standard for wireless communication technologies). 





 Solving problems of patent competition often requires a combination of 
Hovenkamp, Herbertantitrust and nonantitrust solutions.  For example, eBay is 
not an antitrust case at all, but an equity decision concerned with private 
remedies generally.  The Ninth Circuit’s decision denying an injunction on 
FRAND-encumbered patents is similar.37  If the FRAND commitment exists at all, 
it is typically enforced under principles of contract law,38 or in some cases 
equitable estoppel, another equity doctrine that requires firms to make good on 
promises once others have acted in reliance.39  By contrast, anticompetitive 




                                                 
37 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012). 
38 See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 2012 WL 3289835 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 10, 
2012) (patentee’s FRAND commitments were a contract for state law purposes). 
. 
39 E.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007). 
